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Deutschsprachige Zusammenfassung 
Der Technologie- und Wissenstransfer aus Universitäten und nicht-
universitären öffentlichen Forschungseinrichtungen in die Privatwirtschaft hat in den 
letzten Jahren stetig an Bedeutung gewonnen. Im Besonderen wird der 
Grundlagenforschung in Hinblick auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und den 
technischen Fortschritt eine tragende Rolle beigemessen. Wissenschaftliche 
Studien zeigen, dass Grundlagenforschung einen wichtigen Beitrag zum 
wirtschaftlichen Wachstum leistet, Arbeitsplätze schafft und die 
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit von Volkswirtschaften stärkt (Mansfield, 1991; 1995; 1998; 
Tijssen, 2002; Dalton and Guei, 2003; Bilbao-Osorio and Rodriguez-Pose, 2004; 
Toole, 2012). Aus politischer Sicht jedoch werden Forschungsleistungen nicht 
konsequent und schnell genug in die Praxis umgesetzt. Um den Technologie- und 
Wissenstransfer aus öffentlichen Forschungseinrichtungen zu vereinfachen und die 
wirtschaftliche Nutzung von wissenschaftlichen Erfindungen zu fördern, wurde in 
den USA das sogenannte Bayh-Dole Gesetz im Jahre 1980 eingeführt. Seit der 
Einführung dieses Gesetzes werden Forschungseinrichtungen das Eigentum und 
das Recht zur Verwertung öffentlich finanzierter Forschungsarbeiten zugesprochen. 
Somit ist es den Forschungsinstituten vorbehalten, Entdeckungen zu patentieren 
und diese durch Lizenzvergaben zu vermarkten. Zahlreiche europäische Länder wie 
Dänemark und Deutschland folgten dem Beispiel der USA und haben vergleichbare 
Änderungen vorgenommen, um die Vorteile von Grundlagenforschung zu nutzen. 
Die vorliegende Arbeit, die sich aus vier eigenständigen Studien zusammensetzt, 
beschäftigt sich mit der Lizenzierung und Kommerzialisierung von Erfindungen aus 
öffentlichen Forschungseinrichtungen. Für die empirischen Analysen werden 
detaillierte Datensätze der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft sowie ein Laborexperiment 
zurate gezogen. Insbesondere können mithilfe der Daten der Max-Planck-
Gesellschaft neue Einblicke und Erkenntnisse in den bislang noch wenig erforschten 
Bereich der Kommerzialisierung innerhalb Europas gewonnen werden. 
Nach einem ausführlichen Literaturüberblick in Kapitel 1 wird der Einfluss von 
Gruppenzugehörigkeit auf die Entscheidungen von Individuen in Kapitel 2 mithilfe 
eines Laborexperiments untersucht. Diese Studie macht sich die Theorie der 
Gruppenidentität zunutze. Diese ist definiert durch den Grad, mit der sich eine 
Person einer Gruppe zugehörig fühlt. In den letzten Jahren wurde dieses 
psychologische Konzept von der Ökonomik aufgegriffen, um dessen Einfluss auf die 
Diskriminierung und Informationsasymmetrie zu untersuchen (Akerlof and Kranton, 
2000; 2005). Zusätzlich erforscht der Bereich der experimentellen Ökonomik den 
Einfluss von Gruppenidentität auf individuelle ökonomische Entscheidungen von 
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Individuen unter kontrollierten Laborbedingungen (Ahmed, 2007; Heap and Zizzo, 
2009). Der Vorteil von Laborexperimenten ist, dass Gruppenzugehörigkeit unter 
kontrollierten Bedingungen induziert werden kann und Unterschiede gemessen 
werden können. Ziel der vorliegenden Studie in Kapitel 2 ist es herauszufinden, wie 
Forderungen, Angebote und Ansichten in unterschiedlichen Gruppenkonstellationen 
in einem Drei-Personen Verhandlungsspiel beeinflusst werden. Dabei wird 
argumentiert, dass Gruppenidentität in Märkten mit geringer Teilnehmerzahl, in 
denen Beziehungen und gemeinsame Erfahrungen einen besonderen Stellenwert 
einnehmen, eine größere Rolle spielt als in Märkten mit einer Vielzahl von 
Beteiligten (vgl. Li et al., 2011). Dies trifft vor allem auf Lizenzierungsmärkte zu, die 
durch eine begrenzte Anzahl von Marktteilnehmern charakterisiert sind (Jensen and 
Thursby, 2001). Um ein gemeinsames Gruppengefühl zu induzieren, wird im ersten 
Teil des Laborexperiments ein Koordinationsspiel gespielt (vgl. Bauernschuster et 
al., 2009). Im darauffolgenden wird ein Drei-Personen Verhandlungsspiel mit 
unterschiedlichen Gruppenkonstellationen durchgeführt, wobei jeder Spieler 
zweimal als Käufer und einmal als Verkäufer agiert. Die deskriptive und empirische 
Analyse zeigt, dass Käufer, die gemeinsame Erfahrungen mit dem Verkäufer im 
Koordinationsspiel gesammelt haben, signifikant mehr bieten als Käufer in der 
Kontrollgruppe ohne vorherige gemeinsame Erfahrung. Dieses Ergebnis wird 
interpretiert als Eigengruppenbevorzugung. Allerdings wird diese 
Eigengruppenbevorzugung durch den Verkäufer nicht erwidert. Dieses Ergebnis 
lässt die Vermutung zu, dass Eigengruppenbevorzugung von der Marktstärke 
beziehungsweise der Marktposition abhängt. Zusätzlich findet die Studie kein Indiz 
dafür, dass Verkäufer bei unterschiedlichen Gruppenzugehörigkeiten diskriminieren. 
In Kapitel 3 wird der Einfluss der geografischen Distanz zwischen 
Lizenzgeber und Lizenznehmer auf den kommerziellen Erfolg von lizenzierten 
Erfindungen untersucht. Die Kommerzialisierung von lizenzierten Erfindungen aus 
öffentlichen Forschungseinrichtungen ist ein nicht-trivialer Prozess, der mit einer 
Vielzahl von Schwierigkeiten einhergeht. Wissenschaftliche Studien zeigen, dass 
offengelegte Erfindungen sich überwiegend in einer sehr frühen Entwicklungsphase 
befinden und deren kommerzielles Potenzial zu diesem Zeitpunkt nicht absehbar ist 
(Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Thursby and Thursby, 2004). Zusätzlich wird die 
Kommerzialisierung durch die hohe Komplexität der Erfindungen und die dafür 
notwendigen absorptiven Fähigkeiten, um das externe Wissen vollständig zu 
erfassen, erschwert (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 1990). Des Weiteren werden nicht 
alle relevanten Bestandteile des Wissens offengelegt und bleiben damit 
personenbezogen, was die Weiterentwicklung und Kommerzialisierung 
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verkompliziert (Agrawal, 2006). Um Zugang zum taciden Wissen zu erhalten und 
eine erfolgreiche Kommerzialisierung voranzutreiben, ist die Partizipation der 
Erfinder während der Entwicklungsphase von entscheidender Bedeutung (Jensen 
and Thursby, 2001; Agrawal, 2006). Dabei sind Wissenschaftler jedoch nicht gewillt 
große geografische Entfernungen zurückzulegen. Zum einen steigen mit der 
geografischen Distanz die finanziellen Aufwendungen und zum anderen haben 
Wissenschaftler höhere Opportunitätskosten für die Zeit, die sie eher in 
Grundlagenforschung als in angewandte Forschung investieren (von Hippel, 1994; 
Stephan, 1996). Um den Einfluss von geografischer Distanz auf die 
Kommerzialisierung zu untersuchen, werden Daten von der Max-Planck-
Gesellschaft für die empirische Analyse herangezogen. Im Speziellen werden 
detaillierte Informationen von offengelegten und lizenzierten Erfindungen verwendet. 
Für die empirische Untersuchung wird eine Teilmenge von Lizenzverträgen genutzt, 
die Lizenzgebühren als Indikator für den kommerziellen Erfolg enthalten. Somit 
können zwei Maße für den kommerziellen Erfolg generiert werden, die zum einen 
die Wahrscheinlichkeit und zum anderen die Höhe des Erfolgs abbilden. Zudem 
können mithilfe der Standorte von Lizenzgeber und Lizenznehmer präzise 
Entfernungen zwischen beiden berechnet werden. Die Ergebnisse der empirischen 
Analysen zeigen, dass geografische Distanz keinen systematischen Einfluss auf 
den kommerziellen Erfolg hat. Ein negativer Zusammenhang zwischen 
geografischer Distanz und kommerziellen Erfolg ist nur für ausländische Spin-offs 
sowie für ausländische Lizenznehmer von mehrfachlizenzierten Erfindungen 
beobachtbar. Diese Ergebnisse implizieren, dass lokaler Technologietransfer aus 
gesellschaftlicher Sicht kontraproduktiv sein kann (vgl. Belenzon and Schankerman, 
2009).
Ausgangspunkt für die Studie in Kapitel 4 ist die Tatsache, dass die 
Geschwindigkeit, mit der Erfindungen vermarktet werden, seit den 90er Jahren an 
strategischer Bedeutung gewonnen hat (Kessler and Chakrabarti, 1996). Gründe 
hierfür sind das sich schnell ändernde wirtschaftliche Umfeld, der rapide 
technologische Fortschritt sowie der zunehmende Wettbewerbsdruck (Nadler and 
Tushman, 1999; Markman et al., 2005). Empirische Studien zeigen, dass eine 
schnellere Entwicklung und Vermarktung einen positiven Einfluss auf die 
Produktionskosten und den Erfolg von Produkten hat (Carbonell and Rodriguez, 
2006; Langerak et al., 2010). Allerdings fokussiert sich die Mehrzahl der Studien auf 
unternehmensinterne Produktentwicklungen und vernachlässigt den Aspekt des 
Technologietransfers aus öffentlichen Forschungseinrichtungen. Aus diesem Grund 
wird in Kapitel 4 untersucht, inwieweit die Geschwindigkeit, mit der offengelegte 
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Erfindungen lizenziert werden, den Kommerzialisierungserfolg beeinflusst. 
Zusätzlich wird der Einfluss von erfindungsspezifischen Faktoren auf die 
Transfergeschwindigkeit analysiert. Dabei wird für die Geschwindigkeit die Zeit, die 
zwischen der Offenlegung und Lizenzierung vergangen ist, für die empirischen 
Analysen herangezogen. Wie im vorangegangenen Kapitel (Kapitel 3) werden auch 
für diese Studie die Datensätze der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zurate gezogen. Die 
Resultate der empirischen Analyse zeigen, dass Erfindungen aus der 
biomedizinischen Sektion, kooperative Erfindungen zwischen Industrie und 
Wissenschaft sowie die Beteiligung von Direktoren während des 
Erfindungsprozesses einen positiven Einfluss auf die Lizenzierungsgeschwindigkeit 
haben. Weitere Analysen zeigen, dass die benötigte Lizenzierungszeit keinen 
signifikanten Einfluss auf den kommerziellen Erfolg hat. Betrachtet man jedoch den 
Effekt der Lizenzierungszeit für Erfindungen, die nach 1989 offengelegt worden 
sind, zeigt sich ein signifikant negativer Einfluss auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit und die 
Höhe des kommerziellen Erfolgs. Dieses Ergebnis bleibt robust, wenn für 
erfindungsspezifische Unterschiede mithilfe einer Teilstichprobe für mehrfach 
lizenzierte Erfindungen kontrolliert wird. Dieses Ergebnis bestätigt bisherige Studien 
über die Notwendigkeit eines effektiveren Technologietransfers. 
Kapitel 5 dieser Arbeit widmet sich der Fragestellung, ob Aktivitäten von 
Institutsdirektoren sowie der kommerzielle Erfolg das Kommerzialisierungsverhalten 
in öffentlichen Forschungseinrichtungen beeinflusst. Zahlreiche Studien belegen am 
Beispiel von privaten Unternehmen, dass das Verhalten der Führungskräfte von 
Angestellten adaptiert wird und die Unternehmenskultur beeinflusst (Kogut and 
Zander, 1996; Beckman and Burton, 2008; Levy et al. 2011). Während eine Vielzahl 
von Studien private Unternehmen zum Hauptgegenstand von Untersuchungen 
machen, finden öffentliche Forschungseinrichtungen dagegen kaum 
Berücksichtigung. Ziel dieser Studie ist es herauszufinden, inwieweit Determinanten 
wie kommerzieller Erfolg und die Beteiligung von Direktoren in Erfindungsprozessen 
nachfolgende Offenlegungen in öffentlichen Forschungseinrichtungen beeinflussen. 
Für diese Fragestellung werden die Datensätze der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft 
verwendet und so umstrukturiert, dass Informationen über die Offenlegungen, 
Direktorenmitwirkungen sowie die Zahlungseingänge von lizenzierten Erfindungen 
pro Jahr und Institut vorliegen. Die Ergebnisse der empirischen Analyse bestätigen, 
dass Direktorenbeteiligungen und Lizenzeinnahmen die zukünftigen Offenlegungen 
positiv beeinflussen. Jedoch ist dieser Effekt kurzfristig und verschwindet für 
größere Zeitverzögerungen. Damit kann gezeigt werden, dass existierende 
xi
Organisationstheorien für öffentliche Forschungseinrichtungen nur bedingt 
Anwendung finden und damit angepasst werden müssen. 
Im Schlusskapitel werden die einzelnen Studien zusammengefasst und 
zukünftige Forschungsrichtungen aufgezeigt. 
1. Introduction 
1.1 The Importance of Public Research Organizations 
1.1.1 The Patronage System 
It is widely acknowledged that basic research generates fundamental new 
knowledge that is the driving force behind economic development in modern 
economies. The European Commission states that basic research is essential to 
ensure economic standards and wealth and to maintain and enhance the European 
Union’s long-term competitiveness (European Commission, 2004). The “Europe 
2020” initiative that replaced the “Lisbon Strategy” in 2010, aims to enhance 
economic growth and competitiveness through basic research. Basic research not 
only expands the frontier of knowledge and addresses challenges such as health 
and environmental issues, but it also fosters new innovations derived from current 
research efforts. For example, the discoveries of the X-ray and the laser led to 
various new applications in medical diagnosis and therapy (European Commission, 
2004). The time lags between the generation of new knowledge and subsequent 
applications may be long, but direct and indirect economic impacts are undisputed 
(Gibbons and Johnston, 1974; Stephan, 1996). 
An increase in the stock of knowledge through basic research is an 
investment in the future that is rarely funded by private-sector firms. The literature 
discusses the main explanation for the underinvestment of firms in basic research 
and identifies the specific properties of knowledge as an investment barrier. 
Knowledge is often described as a public good characterized by non-rivalry and 
non-exclusion (Arrow, 1962). Several studies question the public good properties 
and claim that knowledge is tacit or latent (Polanyi, 1966; Callon, 1994; Agrawal, 
2006). Thus, other considerations may better explain firm’s underinvestment in basic 
research. Profit-seeking firms characterized by risk aversion and short-term 
orientation cannot guarantee the benefits of basic research due to uncertainty that 
limit their incentives of investment (Nelson, 1959; Pavitt, 1991). Although private-
sector firms do invest in basic research to create new knowledge and to absorb, 
understand, interpret and appraise existing knowledge, the investments are rather 
socially sub-optimal (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Rosenberg, 1990). For instance, 
Jones and Williams (1998, 2000) find that private-sector investments in basic 
research are only a fraction of what would be socially optimal. 
Several institutions seek to resolve the basic research investment incentive 
problem. David (1993) summarizes the three broad forms of institutions: Property 
Rights, Procurement and Patronage. Property Rights include patents, the most 
common form of protection that grants producers of new knowledge the exclusive 
rights to the use and benefits of their creations. Procurement, often employed in the 
defense industry, is a contractual agreement between the producer of knowledge 
and a party (e.g., the government) that secures and finances the development. 
Patronage refers to the system in which the government takes financial 
responsibility for the development of new knowledge by means of public research 
organizations (PROs).1 Figure 1-1 provides an overview of the patronage system, 
represented by a triangle where the government links the demand and supply of 
knowledge. More precisely, the government raises taxes that are partially 
transferred to the academic system. In return, the PROs in the system generate and 
disseminate knowledge. 
Note: Adapted with minor changes from Antonelli (2008). 
Figure 1-1: The Patronage System 
PROs within the patronage system aimed to fulfill an intellectual purpose. 
The primary tasks of medieval universities were education and teaching, which 
inspired a second mission, the advancement of knowledge through basic research. 
The dual system of research and teaching is important to formulate new knowledge 
and techniques and to reduce the risk of conservative and uncritical diffusion of 
obsolete knowledge. The so-called Humboldtian reform in the early 19th century 
emphasized the mission to conduct research that is still embedded in the culture of 
                                                
1 The term public research organizations (PROs) encompass all research facilities that are financed by 






higher education facilities in Europe (Altbach, 1999; Goldstein, 2010). For instance, 
modern universities are responsible for the majority of the overall basic research 
conducted in Europe (OECD, 2003). To ensure a high quality of publicly funded 
knowledge generation and dissemination, the institutional setup has to provide 
sufficient incentives. The so-called priority reward system is expected to provide 
adequate incentives to invent and disclose (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Stephan, 
1996). Within this system, scientists have a high incentive to be the first to publish 
their results in scientific journals that stimulate their reputations and further research 
funds. A scientific referee system serves as a control institution that monitors the 
quality and innovation of the findings. 
Two opposing concepts, namely the statist model and the laissez-faire model 
depicted in Figure 1-2, capture the traditional intellectual purpose of PROs 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000; Etzkowitz, 2003; Etzkowitz, 2008). In the statist 
model, the government (G) is the dominant sphere that controls academia (PROs) 
and industry (I) and coordinates their actions. In the statist configuration, the 
academic system is separate from industry and primarily focuses on teaching and 
training. Specialized basic and applied research is only relevant in certain sectors 
funded and initiated by the government. In the laissez-faire model, all spheres are 
separated by strong boundaries and limited interaction. The main role of academic 
institutes in this model is to provide basic research and teaching. More precisely, 
PROs supply new knowledge, primarily in the form of publications and trained 
persons. However, it is the industry’s task to find and use adequate knowledge 
without extensive support from the PROs. 
Note: Adapted with minor changes from Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000). 





The statist model The laissez-faire model
1.1.2 Empirical Evidence of the Benefits of Publicly Funded Basic 
Research
Publicly funded basic research makes numerous contributions to economic 
and social development. Based on the existing literature, the benefits of scientific 
research can be divided into two broad categories (Salter and Martin, 2001). First, 
various studies investigate the economic benefits of publicly funded research and 
focus on economic growth, the rate of return and innovation. Second, Martin et al. 
(1996) distinguish between various types of contributions, including an increase in 
useful knowledge, trained and skilled graduates and the creation of new 
instrumentation, techniques and new firms. 
The Economic Benefits 
In an early study, Williams (1986) states that publicly funded basic research 
both directly and indirectly benefits technological progress and economic 
performance. Early work has claimed that economic growth should be significantly 
related to technological change rather than changes in capital or labor (e.g., Solow, 
1957). Several studies attempt to measure the impact of scientific research on 
economic growth (e.g., Bergman, 1990; Martin, 1998). Dalton and Guei (2003) 
estimate that the economic benefit associated with publicly funded research is many 
times larger than the annual investments. Bilbao-Osorio and Rodriguez-Pose (2004) 
analyze whether European research and development policies have a positive 
influence on economic growth in peripheral regions of Europe. They conclude that 
R&D investments in general, and higher education R&D investments in particular, 
are positively related to economic growth. Work by Griffith et al. (2004) shows that 
countries with lagging productivity are able to catch up faster if they invest in their 
knowledge base. 
Mansfield conducted a series of studies to investigate the impact of basic 
research on industrial innovations (Mansfield, 1991; 1998). He surveyed R&D 
managers in U.S. firms to estimate what percentage of their new products and 
processes could not have been developed without academic research. In his first 
study, Mansfield (1991) finds that the development of 11 percent of the products and 
9 percent of the processes would have been substantially delayed in the absence of 
academic research. He estimates that the social rate of return from basic research is 
28 percent. In his follow-up study, Mansfield (1998) confirms that academic research 
has become increasingly important for industrial innovations. Beise and Stahl (1999) 
replicated Mansfield’s survey with a larger sample of German firms and conclude 
that approximately 5 percent of new product sales could not have happened without 
academic research. Tijssen (2002) surveyed inventors in the Netherlands to 
investigate the contribution of academic research to innovations. He argues that 20 
percent of the innovations are based to some extent on public research. Recently, 
Toole (2012) noted that public research has a significantly positive influence on 
pharmaceutical industry innovation. Additionally, he finds a positive return to public 
investment in basic biomedical research. 
The Main Types of Contributions 
Gibbons and Johnston (1974) investigate how scientific research fosters 
industrial innovations. They find that scientific research resolves technical problems 
primarily accessed in scientific publications and through direct personal contact in 
the scientific community. Moreover, an increased knowledge stock through basic 
research stimulates and enhances firm’s R&D (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994) and 
expands the range of technological opportunities (Klevorick et al., 1995). Other 
studies identify skilled graduates as the primary benefit of publicly funded research 
(e.g., Martin and Irvine, 1981). Zellner (2003) demonstrates that economic benefits 
from basic research are associated with the migration of scientists into the private 
sector. In particular, he finds that scientists formerly employed by the Max Planck 
Society transfer problem-solving knowledge rather than the latest theoretical 
insights. 
To tackle new research problems, scientists are forced to develop new 
equipment, laboratory techniques and analytical methods. Thus, much of public 
research output lies in instrumentation and techniques (Rosenberg, 1992). Work by 
Arundel et al. (1995) indicates that firms describe research tools and techniques as 
the second most important contribution of public research. Cohen et al.’s (2002) 
utilization of the Carnegie Mellon Survey on industrial R&D concludes that R&D 
projects across a wide range of industries frequently use instruments and 
techniques. Finally, academic research is often seen as a driving force for firm 
creation. Zucker et al. (1998) argue that basic research is crucial for the creation of 
the entire biotechnology market. Malo (2009) likewise discovers that publicly funded 
research led to the formation of many chemical-based firms and provided firms a 
great network of innovators. Similar development patterns emerge in the fields of 
nanoscience and nanotechnology (Darby and Zucker, 2006). 
1.1.3 The New Role of Public Research Organizations 
Recognizing the tremendous impact of publicly funded research results on 
economic growth, industrial innovations and its various types of contributions, a shift 
has taken place in the role and organization of PROs within the economic system. In 
addition to their traditional tasks of teaching and basic research, the so-called “third 
mission” extended the role of the PROs to include serving as an active contributor to 
innovation and economic change. More precisely, academic institutes have become 
increasingly active in areas such as patenting and licensing, collaborations with 
private-sector firms, science parks and university spin-offs (Mowery et al., 2004). 
Several factors influenced the new PRO “third mission”. First, the rise of the 
knowledge-based economy increased the importance of PROs as active 
contributors to innovations and economic development (von Hippel, 1988; OECD, 
1996). For example, the emergence of knowledge-intensive industries such as 
biotechnology and nanotechnology raised the demand for academic science. 
Second, PROs are affected by tighter constraints on public funding leading to a 
more aggressive search for new financial sources and greater entrepreneurial 
activity (Thursby and Thursby, 2002; Mowery and Sampat, 2004). Finally, many 
potential useful discoveries remain in the ivory tower of PROs because researchers 
are less interested in commercialization issues. To initiate commercial activities, 
policy makers intended to foster knowledge transfer from science to industry. For 
instance, several countries established policy measures such as the Patent Act of 
1977 in the UK and the U.S. legislation popularly known as the Bayh-Dole Act of 
1980 to stimulate the technology transfer of publicly funded research results. 
The new role of modern academic institutes is often depicted in the triple-
helix model (Etzkowitz et al., 2000; Brenner and Sandstrom, 2000). Figure 1-3 
illustrates the triple-helix model in which G stands for the government, I for the 
industry and PROs for public research organizations. In this setting, the traditional 
organizational culture is broken down to intertwine boundaries that previously 
separated the distinct spheres. In this model, the PROs take an active role in 
encouraging economic development, the industry moves closer to academic 
institutes, and the government provides a regulatory environment. While the industry 
and the government are traditionally conceptualized as the primary institutional 
spheres, the PROs in the triple-helix setting serve in a key role with strong linkages 
to industry and government (Etzkowitz, 2002).  
Note: Adapted with minor changes from Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000). 
Figure 1-3: The Triple-helix Model 
Various studies provide strong evidence of the increased linkages between 
PROs and industry. Linkages between PROs and industry are highly diversified both 
within and between sectors (Faulkner and Senker, 1994). Narin et al. (1997) 
investigate the citation linkage between U.S. industry patents and scientific 
publications. They conclude that a high proportion of papers cited by U.S. patents 
from nearly all scientific areas are from public science, while only a fraction are 
authored by industrial scientists. McMillan et al. (2000) likewise study the citation 
linkage between U.S. patents and scientific publications for the biotechnology 
industry. They find strong support that public research is closely linked to the 
biotechnology industry. Verbeek et al. (2002) examine the connection between 
science and technology through the use of patent citation data. Their results reveal 
a strong interaction between science and technology for a limited number of certain 
scientific and technological fields. 
Further studies focus on academic-industry collaborations. Meyer-Krahmer 
and Schmoch (1998) study the importance of various types of connections between 
German universities and private industry and find that from the perspective of 
academic researchers collaborations are most valuable. Fritsch and Schwirten 
(1999) analyze the role of German PROs in the regional context. They state that the 
majority of academic respondents are engaged in various forms of collaborations, 
and non-university research institutes have the highest proportion. Calvert and Patel 
(2003) examine collaborations between universities and industry in joint scientific 
publications in the UK. They conclude that there has been a rapid increase of co-
publications between universities and industry since the 1980s. Similarly, Adams et 
G
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al. (2001) analyze research centers in the U.S. and find evidence of the promotion of 
university and industry co-authorship. 
This thesis analyzes the new role of PROs as active contributors to 
economic growth and innovations. More precisely, this thesis focuses on technology 
transfer and commercialization of publicly funded inventions. The next section 
provides a literature overview on technology transfer channels with a focus on 
licensing, technology transfer offices as a mediator between PROs and industry in 
the technology transfer process and the commercialization of publicly funded 
research results. I then outline the different studies and describe how they contribute 
to the literature on technology transfer and commercialization of academic research. 
1.2 From Science to Business 
1.2.1 Technology Transfer from Science to Industry 
Recognition of the impact of academic science on economic growth, 
competitiveness and innovations dramatically increased the relevance of technology 
transfer from science to industry (OECD, 2003). Technology transfer is defined as 
the process by which knowledge and scientific results move from academia to 
industry (Siegel et al., 2004). Several reasons explain why PROs and industry are 
increasingly involved in technology transfer. As previously mentioned, declining 
public funds pressure PROs to find alternative financial sources. Geuna (2001) 
highlights that many European countries, such as France, Germany, the UK and 
Italy, decreased governmental research funding from 1981-1996. Universities and 
other public research facilities control a large amount of accumulated knowledge 
and scientific expertise available for commercial exploitation. Thus, PROs can 
advertise their valuable research through active technology transfer to increase their 
reputation and raise additional financial sources from industry. In addition to 
financial assistance, academia can benefit from technology transfer with industry 
through increased access to industry facilities and identification of industry problems 
that stimulate projects and ideas for future research (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2006). 
From the policy perspective, technology transfer from PROs to industry is 
important to ensure an efficient societal use of public money and to justify the 
expenditures for basic research activities. Different policy measures such as the 
Bayh-Dole Act in the U.S. were established to foster the positive effect of PROs on 
economic growth, employment and productivity. This legislation promotes 
technology transfer by leaving academia the right to retain ownership of publicly 
funded research results, to protect the intellectual property (IP) through patent 
application and to assign IP rights to the industry. Other countries, such as Germany 
and Denmark, introduced similar legislation. In Germany, new legislation subjected 
universities to the German Employee’s Inventors Act in 2002. This change 
guaranteed universities the ownership of publicly funded research results whereas 
university professors previously held exclusive IP rights to their inventions (Kilger 
and Bartenbach, 2002). 
From the perspective of the private sector, the growing interest in technology 
transfer is a key element of a firm’s exploration strategy that emphasizes the search, 
discovery and development of new knowledge (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). 
Technology transfer gives a firm access to complementary knowledge that may lead 
to path-breaking innovations. Moreover, technology transfer supplies new ideas, 
solutions or answers to current technical problems (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2006). 
Cohen et al. (2002) state that publicly funded research primarily addresses the 
particular needs or problems faced by a firm. In addition, a firm’s investment into 
R&D is characterized by a high technological risk. Technology transfer activities 
allow a firm to partially outsource R&D activities and disperse associated risks (Bell, 
1993).
Technology Transfer through Licensing 
Technology transfer from PROs to industry occurs through a variety of 
channels ranging from recruitment of university graduates to personnel exchanges, 
collaborations, contract research, consulting, publications, licensing, spin-off 
companies and informal contacts such as meetings and conferences (Agrawal, 
2001). Technology transfer channels can be divided into formal (e.g., collaborative 
research) and informal (e.g., publications and conferences) (D’Este and Patel, 
2007). While the former technology transfer mode may result in direct legal 
commercial output such as patents or licenses, the latter instrumentalities often do 
not. Formal transfer modes are often focused on the allocation of IP rights and 
obligations; in informal technology transfer channels, property rights only play a 
minor role (Link et al., 2007). 
The relevance of certain transfer channels has attracted considerable 
attention in the academic literature. Cohen et al. (2002) investigate the relative 
importance of various formal and informal transfer channels from a firm’s 
perspective. Their results emphasize that publications, meetings and conferences, 
informal interaction and consulting are more important transfer mechanisms than 
patents in the majority of industries. Agrawal and Henderson (2002) study the 
relevance of transfer channels from a scientist’s perspective through interviews at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). They demonstrate that patents are 
a relatively less important channel for technology transfer. Most faculty members 
specify that patents only account for less than 10 percent of their knowledge 
transfer. The interviews with the MIT staff identify consulting activities, publications, 
the recruitment of graduates and collaborative research as the most important 
sources of technology transfer. More recently, Bekkers and Freitas (2008) examine 
the factors that influence the relative importance of a wide variety of transfer 
channels using responses from two Dutch questionnaires administered to industrial 
and university researchers. They find that the respondents rate patenting and 
licensing as a moderate technology transfer channel. 
These studies suggest that patenting and licensing is just one of a myriad of 
sources of technology transfer. However, the economic contribution of patenting and 
licensing as a source of technology transfer is highly considerable. Agrawal (2001) 
indicates that licensing strongly contributed to the U.S. economy and created a wide 
range of new jobs. Notwithstanding the importance of informal transfer channels, a 
large number of scholarly literature focus on patenting and licensing mainly because 
these formal channels are directly measurable and available (Agrawal and 
Henderson, 2002; Markman et al., 2008). For instance, the topic of patenting and 
licensing before and after the Bayh-Dole Act has attracted much scholarly research. 
In an investigation of the influence of the Bayh-Dole Act on the growth of patenting 
and licensing activities of three leading U.S. universities, Mowery et al. (2001) 
conclude that the rise started before rather than after 1980. Thus, the Bayh-Dole Act 
was merely only one of several factors contributing to the increased patenting and 
licensing activity of PROs. The rise of new areas of university research, such as 
molecular biology, electronics and software, increased the industry demand to 
license publicly funded research results (Colyvas et al., 2002). 
To provide deeper insights into licensing activity, a broad range of studies 
examine various determinants of this formal transfer mode. Based upon patent data 
from the University of California, Stanford University, and Columbia University, 
Mowery and Ziedonis (2001) compare the geographic reach of patent citations and 
licenses. Their results indicate that licensing activities are more geographically 
localized than patent citations. The difference of the geographic localization effect 
between citations and licenses is even stronger for exclusively licensed university 
patents. Sine et al. (2003) explore the effect of institutional prestige on the annual 
rate of technology licensing using a dataset of 102 U.S. universities collected from 
1991 to 1998. They detect that institutional prestige, measured by two different 
graduate school rankings, significantly influences the university’s licensing rate. 
Using a dataset of 1,397 patents issued to MIT from 1980-1996, Shane (2002) 
analyzes which types of inventions are more likely to be licensed. Empirical results 
show that effectively patented inventions are more likely to be licensed, particularly 
to non-inventors. Elfenbein (2007) recently investigated to which degree scientists’ 
publications, disclosures, commercialization experiences and the patent protection 
status influence the licensing event of disclosed inventions. He concludes that 
disclosures, publications and commercialization experiences are positively related to 
the licensing activity but that patent protection provides little support. 
Technology Transfer Offices as Mediators between Academia and Industry 
The technology transfer process of licensing between PROs and industry is 
characterized by several barriers. The cultural backgrounds and expectations of 
PROs and industry differ substantially from each other (see Siegel et al., 2003a; 
2004). Scientists are primarily motivated by recognition from the scientific 
community, including publication in top-rated journals and achievement of scientific 
breakthroughs. Academic institutes typically undertake challenging projects with 
long time horizons and uncertain practical applications. In contrast, firms are mainly 
focused on less risky research with direct commercial applicability (Di Gregorio and 
Shane, 2003). Moreover, PROs are usually interested in a broad and open 
dissemination of scientific research results, while firms prefer exclusive licenses that 
appropriate all technological benefits. These differences between PROs and 
industry clarify the difficulty of providing an effective technology transfer mechanism. 
Thursby and Thursby (2002) explain other reasons that scientists may avoid 
technology transfer activities. First, because individual scientists are mainly 
interested in basic research and have high opportunity costs of time, they are 
unwilling to spend additional effort and time on applied R&D to induce licensing. 
Second, to generate firm interest in licensing, inventions have to be protected by 
patents that often come along with publication delays. This circumstance may 
hamper invention disclosures by the faculty and adjacent technology transfer 
activities. Finally, scientists expect that commercialization of publicly funded 
research results is not in line with their open science mission. 
To encourage formal technology transfer such as licensing, many PROs 
have established technology transfer offices (TTO) that are seen as intermediary 
agents linking academia and industry (O’Gorman et al. 2008). TTOs primarily 
evaluate scientific discoveries, seek patent protection, negotiate with firms and 
execute contracts on behalf of the PROs that own inventions. Furthermore, TTOs 
are expected to assist inventors in case of weak university-industry linkages and 
unsuccessful commercialization efforts (Colyvas et al., 2002; Lowe, 2006). Ambos et 
al. (2008) provide empirical evidence of the importance of these institutions in the 
technology transfer process. They analyze whether TTOs influence the scientific 
outcomes, such as patents, licenses, spin-off companies or a combination thereof, 
using a dataset of 207 Research Council-funded projects. Their results suggest that 
TTOs positively influence scientific output. 
To improve the formal technology transfer process from PROs to industry, 
scholarly studies analyze various organizational challenges faced by TTOs. Siegel 
et al. (2003a) examine TTO organizational barriers in 98 interviews of university 
administrators, scientists and firms, the three main stakeholders involved in the 
technology transfer process. They state that bureaucratic inflexibility, poorly 
designed reward systems and ineffective management are the most important 
factors that prevent effective technology transfer. Debackere and Veugelers (2005) 
analyze the TTO of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium and compare it 
with 11 other European research universities. Consistent with the evidence in the 
U.S., they find that an inefficient management style, inflexible regulations and an 
inappropriate incentive structure are the main barriers that hinder an efficient 
technology transfer. Another challenge facing TTOs is the circumstance that not all 
scientific inventions are disclosed to the employer. Using a survey of TTOs in 62 
U.S. universities, Thursby et al. (2001) detect that only half of the faculty inventions 
with a commercial potential are disclosed to the employer. To encourage scientists 
to disclose their inventions, a certain incentive structure is required. Jensen et al. 
(2003) construct and analyze a game-theoretic model of technology transfer and 
find that invention disclosure is a function of the faculty quality, equilibrium license 
income and inventor’s time preference. 
Further scholarly studies examine determinants that enhance TTO 
productivity. Studies reveal that TTOs that are financially independent of their parent 
institution are more productive than those that depend on funding from their parent 
organization (e.g., Bercovitz et al., 2001; Feldman et al., 2002). Siegel et al. (2003b) 
show that institutional factors such as the reward system of academic scientists and 
staffing practices explain much of the productivity variation of TTOs, namely the 
average number of licenses and licensing revenues. Carlsson and Fridh (2002) find 
that the number of invention disclosures and the expertise of the TTOs positively 
influence patenting and licensing activities using a dataset of 170 U.S. universities 
and research institutes for the period 1991-1996. Chukumba and Jensen (2005) 
examine how various characteristics of academic inventors, TTOs and universities 
affect licensing performance. One notable result is that, contrary to the UK (Chapple 
et al. 2005), the age of the TTO is positively related to licensing activities. 
1.2.2 Commercializing Licensed Inventions from Public Research 
Whether scientific inventions are transformed into marketable products or 
processes leading to a financial success is highly uncertain. Various studies suggest 
that the amount of revenues of patented and licensed inventions is highly skewed 
(OECD, 2003; Sampat, 2006; Thursby and Thursby, 2007). The majority of licensed 
inventions generate only a small amount of money, if any, and just a few are 
responsible for the overall income. Mowery et al. (2001) show that the top 5 
inventions of three leading U.S. universities generated between 66 and 94 percent 
of the overall licensing income in the 1995 fiscal year. This skewed distribution 
suggests that a substantial risk of commercial and financial success is associated 
with the development of new technologies, time to market and consumer response 
to new products. 
The Complexity of Commercialization of Licensed Inventions 
The transfer of inventions from PROs to the industry is the first step toward 
commercialization. Once scientific inventions are transferred through licenses, the 
firm becomes tasked with successful market placement. However, 
commercialization of academic inventions is a non-trivial process determined by the 
early stage character of inventions (Jensen and Thursby, 2001), information 
asymmetries (Shane, 2002), non-codified knowledge (Agrawal, 2006) and 
absorptive capacity of firms (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 1990). 
The early stage of development in which inventions are transferred to the 
industry may hinder commercialization. Based on a survey of TTO licensing 
managers from 62 U.S. universities, Jensen and Thursby (2001) note that a large 
share of licensed inventions are just a proof of concept or a lab scale prototype. In a 
survey of 112 firms regarding their perception of the development stage of licensed 
inventions, Thursby and Thursby (2004) indicate that nearly 40 percent of the 
respondents evaluate inventions at the proof of concept stage, the earliest listed 
stage of development. Both licensing managers and firms specify that only a small 
fraction of licensed inventions are ready for commercial use. The economic potential 
of early stage inventions is hardly predictable, leading to a low practical and 
commercial use. 
The tacit nature of knowledge also hampers the commercialization process 
of licensed inventions. Scientific results codified in publications, patents and 
blueprints only include a fraction of the underlying knowledge (Polanyi, 1966; Arora, 
1995). Necessary knowledge components important for successful 
commercialization often remain with researchers. For example, the generation of 
academic results is a long lasting process characterized by failures and 
disappointments that generally remain unreported. However, this non-codified 
knowledge may contain information useful to understand the whole development 
process of the scientific invention. Lissoni (2001) states that although codified 
knowledge is sufficient for technological breakthroughs, person-embodied 
knowledge is required to transform the codified knowledge into economically 
valuable technologies. 
Firms require a certain stock of knowledge to understand and exploit 
scientific results. The absorptive capacity of firms is the ability to assimilate and use 
external knowledge strongly related to their in-house R&D investments (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989; 1990). Cockburn and Henderson (1998) state that the connection to 
PROs is an important determinant necessary to build up absorptive capacity and to 
utilize external knowledge. Lim (2009) indicates that connectedness is the primary 
ingredient of absorptive capacity. Connections to academic researchers help firms 
to acquire knowledge from those sources and to increase their absorptive capacity. 
For instance, Zucker and Darby (1996) report that close links between academic 
and firm scientists support the accomplishment of scientific breakthroughs. 
Scholarly Literature on the Commercialization of Licensed Inventions
In view of the early stage of inventions, the latent nature of knowledge and 
absorptive capacity, the involvement of the inventor during the development process 
is highly important. Business respondents claim that approximately 40 percent of 
licensed inventions require the participation of the inventor for further developments 
(Thursby and Thursby, 2004). Engagement with the inventor enables firm access to 
a scientist’s non-codified knowledge and expertise and ensures the advancement of 
embryonic technologies (Pavitt, 1998). Agrawal (2006) examines the direct influence 
of inventor engagement on the likelihood and the degree of commercial success 
using a sample of 124 license agreements from MIT. He finds that inventor 
involvement in the development process positively influences the commercialization 
success of licensed inventions. Furthermore, the participation of academic inventors 
is a critical determinant of the speed of commercialization (Markman et al., 2005). 
To get scientists on board for enhancements, a certain incentive mechanism 
is necessary to encourage involvement (e.g., Gallini and Wright, 1990; Jensen and 
Thursby, 2001). Licensing contracts include a fixed fee and an output-based 
payment, the royalty payment. The royalty payment is intended to incentivize 
additional efforts. If a licensed invention is successfully commercialized, the inventor 
gets a percentage of the revenues. Friedman and Silberman (2003) analyze several 
organizational characteristics, including greater rewards for faculty involvement, 
TTO experience, university location and support for technology transfer. They find 
that all four factors greatly impact university licensing income. Based on a dataset of 
102 U.S. universities, Lach and Schankerman (2004) show that a higher inventor 
royalty share is associated with a larger licensing income. Link and Siegel (2005) 
confirm that PROs with attractive incentive structures, such as higher royalty shares 
for faculty members, generate greater licensing income. 
The effect of appropriability on the commercial success of licensed 
inventions is a further research topic. Shane (2002) analyzes the impact of patent 
effectiveness on the hazard that licensed inventions reach their first sales. He 
distinguishes between inventor and non-inventor licensees, and he investigates 
whether patent effectiveness influences the extent of non-inventor’s commercial 
success. The results show that the hazard of first sales from patents licensed to 
non-inventors is higher with greater patent effectiveness. Furthermore, the patent 
effectiveness positively influences the magnitude of commercial success in non-
inventor firms. He concludes that non-inventors more effectively commercialize 
inventions when the inventions are appropriable through patents but inventor-
founded firms best develop inventions that are more difficult to appropriate. 
Dechenaux et al. (2008) explore the role of appropriability in generating incentives 
that influence licensee investment in commercialization. They estimate the hazard 
rate of first sales and find that the effectiveness of learning as a measure of the 
appropriability mechanism taken from the Yale survey on innovation positively 
influences the hazard of technology commercialization. 
Besides the organizational determinants and appropriability mechanisms, 
scholars have also explored the influence of different types of licensees and various 
attributes of technological inventions on commercial success. Thursby et al. (2001) 
show that licensed invention commercial success is positively related to the fraction 
of licenses executed at later stages of development. Using a dataset of 966 licensed 
inventions from MIT, Neklar and Shane (2007) examine the influence of technology 
attributes on the likelihood of commercialization. Their results show that inventions 
with a broader scope of patent protection and a pioneering nature are positively 
related to the likelihood of first sales. Additionally, the age of inventions has an 
inverted U-shaped relationship with commercial success. Analyzing the commercial 
success of licensed inventions, Lowe and Ziedonis (2006) find weak evidence that 
licenses to startup firms generate greater earnings than do invention licensed to 
established firms. Based on a dataset of 2,200 inventions of Max Planck Society 
researchers from 1980 to 2004, Buenstorf and Geissler (2012) analyze the impact of 
inventor, technology and licensee characteristics on the likelihood and magnitude of 
commercial success. They find limited evidence that domestic and incumbent 
licensees outperform foreign and spin-off firms. However, patented inventions are 
less likely to be commercialized and generate lower royalty payments. 
1.3 Scope and Structure of this Thesis 
The previous sections presented a literature overview of the importance and 
benefits of PROs within the economic system, described their shift to more 
entrepreneurial activity (section 1.1) and discussed the transfer and 
commercialization of academic technologies (section 1.2). This thesis contributes to 
the scholarly literature on technology transfer and commercialization of scientific 
inventions. Most of the existing studies are based on U.S. data. The empirical 
evidence for Europe is rare, which is not surprising because academic invention 
legislation in Europe recently changed. Moreover, the lack of detailed data of 
disclosed, licensed and commercialized inventions also explains the proportionally 
low amount of empirical studies (Neklar and Shane, 2007). Thus, the primary 
objective of this thesis is to provide new empirical insights into technology transfer 
and commercialization using data from Germany’s largest non-university public 
research organization, the Max Planck Society. 
In this thesis, four separate studies investigate technology transfer and 
commercialization activity. Thereby, each chapter in this thesis can be read 
independently and covers distinct research questions. Chapter 2 examines one part 
in the licensing process, the bargaining stage, and studies the influence of group 
identity on the determination of prices and beliefs. Chapter 3 considers the influence 
of the geographic distance between the licensor and the licensee on the likelihood 
and magnitude of commercial success of licensed inventions. Chapter 4 focuses on 
the speed by which inventions are transferred to private-sector firms. This study 
explores the impact of time inventions required for licensing on commercial success. 
Chapter 5 analyzes the impact of organizational performance measures such as 
royalty payments and director involvement on commercialization behavior in the 
public research sector. 
Each chapter also utilizes different methodologies. While chapter 2 employs 
a laboratory experiment based on a psychological concept, chapters 3-5 are 
empirical studies. Chapter 2 employs a laboratory experiment due to a lack of 
available data necessary to adequately address the research question. Laboratory 
experiments are particularly suited to study individual economic behavior under 
conditions where differences can be controlled and measured. Chapters 3 and 4 
utilize a dataset on disclosed and licensed Max Planck inventions. Chapter 5 utilizes 
the same dataset as in chapters 3 and 4 but at the institute level. 
Although the four chapters consider diverse research questions and employ 
different methodologies, all studies cover the overarching topic of technology 
transfer and commercialization of publicly funded results. Each chapter aims to add 
new insights to the respective subfield. The following sections provide an overview 
of the four chapters of this thesis. 
1.3.1 Group Identity and Discrimination in Small Markets: 
Asymmetry of In-group Favors2
Due to the early stage character of scientific results and various other 
difficulties inherent in the technology transfer process, only a few firms, if any, are 
interested in licensing academic inventions (Jensen and Thursby, 2001). In such 
small markets, common experiences and joint visions between firms and academia 
are important to foster trust and to create long term relationships (Bercovitz and 
Feldman, 2006). A firm’s former positive licensing experience is expected to 
increase the likelihood of subsequent licensing agreements that may lead to a 
discriminative behavior of licensors against other interested parties. Thus, the level 
of social ties and relationships among actors may influence the licensing bargaining 
process. 
To understand the psychological basis for intergroup relations and 
discrimination, Tajfel and Turner (1979) developed the theory of group identity that 
is defined as the degree to which individuals see themselves as members of a 
group. Economists recently adopted the group identity concept to analyze gender 
discrimination, economics of poverty and social exclusion, household division of 
labor, and principal-agent problems (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; 2005). A growing 
number of studies utilize laboratory experiments to investigate the effect of group 
identity on individual economic decision-making (e.g., Ahmed, 2007; Heap and 
Zizzo, 2009). An emerging stream of experimental research focuses on the 
influence of group identity in small market settings (e.g., Ball et al., 2001). For 
instance, Li et al. (2011) study the impact of group identity on partner selection and 
price offers in oligopolistic markets. Utilization of a bargaining game with multiple 
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proposers and responders demonstrates that in-group sellers are more likely to 
make offers to in-group buyers than to out-group buyers. 
Chapter 2 aims to contribute to this field through application of the group 
identity aspect to a market setting in which subjects interact. More precisely, this 
chapter studies the influence of group identity on the determination of prices and 
beliefs in a small market game. Thereby, the group identity is induced through a 
focal point coordination game that offers a greater control and flexibility over the 
group formation process. After the group formation process, subjects play a three-
person bargaining game in which one seller can sell an indivisible good to one of 
two competing buyers under four different treatments while varying the buyer-seller 
constellation. The results of the experiment provide robust evidence of in-group 
favoritism on the buyer’s side. More precisely, buyers who share a common 
experience with the seller and compete with an out-group buyer offer a significantly 
higher price compared to the case in which all subjects belong to the out-group. 
Moreover, sellers expect in-group favoritism from in-group buyers, but they do not 
reciprocate the favoritism with lower ask prices. 
1.3.2 We Need to Talk – or do we? Geographic Distance and the 
Commercialization of Technologies from Public Research3
Commercialization of PRO licensed inventions is a non-trivial process that is 
characterized by several difficulties. Highly complex academic inventions are often 
at an early stage of development and may involve cross-disciplinary knowledge, 
thus hampering the development process of a marketable technology. Relevant 
knowledge known to scientists is often not written or codified, making that progress 
even more difficult. Inventor participation and close face-to-face contact during the 
development process is required to overcome these problems (Jensen and Thursby, 
2001; Agrawal, 2006). Nonetheless, the involvement of the inventor becomes 
increasingly expensive with geographic distance (von Hippel, 1994). Furthermore, it 
is questionable whether scientists facing high opportunity costs of time are willing to 
cover a large distance to spend additional time and efforts on applied tasks rather 
than focus on their own research (Stephan, 1996). 
Several studies provide evidence that proximity to public research yields 
substantial benefits to firm innovativeness (e.g., Jaffe, 1989; Acs et al., 1992). For 
example, Fritsch and Slavtchev (2007) detect that the quality and intensity of 
research of German universities significantly influence the regional innovative 
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output. Adams (2002) finds that geographic proximity plays a greater role in 
university-firm interactions than in firm-firm interactions. Other studies find a lesser 
role for geographic proximity (e.g., Audretsch and Stephan, 1996; Beise and Stahl, 
1999). Despite the numerous studies of the effect of public research on regional 
growth and innovative performance, only a few studies investigate the influence of 
geographic distance in the context of licensing and commercializing academic 
inventions. The work by Santoro and Gopalakrishnan (2001) suggests that 
geographic proximity positively influences technology transfer activities between 
universities and firms. Agrawal (2006) does not find that firm location affects 
commercialization outcomes. 
This chapter attempts to fill a gap in the literature by analyzing the impact of 
geographic distance between the licensor and the licensee on the commercial 
success of licensed inventions from the Max Planck Society. The geographic 
distances between both of the Max Planck Institutes and the corresponding private-
sector licensees are calculated. Royalty payments that serve as a proxy for 
commercial success enable us to construct two different measures. First, a binary 
indicator is constructed, indicating positive royalty payments. Second, the extent of 
commercial success is captured from the accumulated royalty payments. The 
analysis includes additional information about licensees as well as inventions and 
their inventors. The empirical analysis suggests that geographic distance is not 
associated with lower commercialization outcomes. A negative influence of distance 
on commercial success is identified only for spin-off licensees located outside 
Germany and for foreign licensees in the subset of inventions licensed multiple 
times.
1.3.3 Commercializing Inventions from Public Research: Does 
Speed Matter? 
Researchers argue that quick invention placement into the market is 
essential due to the rapidly changing business environment and technological 
obsolescence (Nadler and Tushman, 1999). Moreover, Kessler and Chakrabarti 
(1996) state that since the 1990s, speed has become one of the most important 
strategic determinants to create and sustain competitive advantages. A multitude of 
studies analyze the determinants of speed by which discoveries are put on the 
market (e.g., Kessler and Chakrabarti, 1999; Tessarolo, 2007). A further string of 
research examines the impact of speed on economic outcomes such as 
development costs (e.g., Langerak et al., 2010), product quality (e.g., Kessler and 
Bierly, 2002) and product performance (e.g., Carbonell and Rodriguez, 2006).
However, most of the studies focus on in-house developments and neglect external 
sources such as patenting and licensing from PROs. 
This chapter examines how speed influences the commercial success of 
licensed inventions. Thereby, the time elapsed between invention disclosure and the 
signed licensing contract (time-to-licensing) is used as a proxy for speed. 
Furthermore, the influence of different invention-specific determinants on time-to-
licensing is investigated. The empirical evidence in this field is still scarce. Llor 
(2007) investigates the influence of the delay between patent filings and the 
corresponding transfer agreements on license revenues and finds no correlation. 
Markman et al. (2005) analyze organizational determinants of time-to-licensing and 
its influence on commercial success of patent-protected technologies. They find that 
TTO resources, competency in identifying licensees and participation of faculty-
inventors positively influence the speed of technology transfer. Furthermore, their 
results suggest that a faster technology transfer is associated with a greater 
commercial success. 
To analyze invention-specific determinants on time-to-licensing and its 
influence on commercial success, Max Planck data on disclosed and licensed 
inventions is employed. Regression results suggest that inventions from the 
biomedical section, collaborative inventions with private-sector firms and inventions 
co-invented with senior scientists require less time to get licensed. Using the subset 
of license agreements providing for royalty payments, the empirical analysis 
suggests that time-to-licensing does not influence the commercial success of 
inventions disclosed between 1980 and 2004. However, a separation of the effect of 
time-to-licensing for inventions disclosed after 1989 shows a robust negative 
influence on the likelihood and extent of commercial success. 
1.3.4 The Influence of Leadership on Academic Scientists’ 
Propensity to Commercialize Research Findings4
The last chapter focuses on the impact of leadership behavior and 
organization performance on individual behavior in public research. Although the 
influence of leadership behavior primarily utilizes firms as the unit of analysis, 
surprisingly few studies consider academic organizations. Azoulay et al. (2007) find 
that scientists are more likely to engage in patenting when their coauthors have 
patenting experience. Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) find that the decision of 
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individual faculty members to participate in technology transfer is influenced by 
seemingly unsustainable leadership effects. 
This paper aims to shed more light on academic institutions through an 
examination of the extent to which commercialization performance and leadership 
effects are related to invention disclosure. This study specifically investigates the 
influence of director participation in the invention development process and 
commercial success on subsequent disclosures at the institute level. The dataset of 
invention disclosures and licensing agreements of the Max Planck Society is 
utilized. The data are structured such that information on invention disclosures, 
director involvement, royalty and fixed fee payments is given per year and institute. 
A panel for 1980-2004 is constructed to allow the use of lagged variables. 
Regression results suggest that director engagement in disclosure activity 
and the amount of royalties received positively influence the number of subsequent 
disclosures. However, these effects disappear when modeling longer time lags. 
Thus, academic scientists mimic successful behavior, while leadership behavior 
does not have long-lasting effects on commercialization behavior within the institute. 
2. Group Identity and Discrimination in Small 
Markets: Asymmetry of In-group Favors 
2.1 Introduction 
Trade between members of groups with different non-economic social 
characteristics is almost ubiquitous in every society. Social characteristics should 
not be a factor for trade in a market setting where subjects attempt to maximize their 
gains from trade. However, discrimination between groups is frequently observed in 
market settings such as housing markets (Yinger, 1995), car markets (Goldberg, 
1996), consumer markets (Yinger, 1998), and labor markets (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2004). This phenomenon has been explained either with statistical 
discrimination (Phelps, 1972) or taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1957), where 
negative stereotypes or negative tastes toward another group result in unequal 
treatment. We are interested in how group identity influences the determination of 
prices and expectations on the demand and supply side in a simple market setting 
abstracting from statistical discrimination.  
Early work in social psychology by Tajfel and Turner (1979) developed a 
theory of group identity to understand the psychological basis for intergroup 
relations and discrimination. People define themselves as members of particular 
groups in a society that may have behavioral consequences when two members of 
different groups interact with each other. As noted by Akerlof and Kranton (2000), 
the group identity plays an important role in economic decision-making, such as 
hiring decisions and bargaining. They propose a utility function that included the 
identity associated with different social norms and categories and apply this model 
to analyze phenomena such as gender discrimination, economics of poverty and 
social exclusion. 
Following Akerlof and Kranton (2000), we focus on a minimal group design to 
isolate the effect of statistical discrimination that cannot be excluded from natural 
groups. We induce group identity by employing a simple coordination game. In our 
experiment, one seller is trying to sell an indivisible good to one of two buyers. The 
seller states her willingness to accept separately for each buyer, and the buyers 
state their willingness to pay. If the willingness to pay from both buyers is lower than 
the corresponding willingness to accept from the seller, there is no trade. If both 
buyers are over their respective willingness to accept, the seller can choose to 
whom to transfer the good. This trade happens under four different treatment 
conditions: (1) complete strangers - in this case, subjects have not interacted in the 
coordination game. (2) Both buyers and the seller are all in-group members; i.e., 
they have interacted in the coordination game. (3) Only one buyer and the seller are 
in-group (the other buyer is out-group). (4) Both buyers are in-group and the seller is 
out-group. Additionally, we elicit expectations of behavior over buyers and sellers. 
Our contribution to the literature is to directly compare markets where discrimination 
via group membership is possible versus markets where this is not. 
Our results reveal that in-group buyers who compete with an out-group buyer 
offer significantly more compared to a stranger’s framework. We also find that in-
group seller expect in-group favoritism from their partner, i.e. expect a higher offer. 
However, we do not find evidence of discriminatory behavior of the seller, bargaining 
with an in-group and an out-group buyer. In-group favoritism appears to be 
asymmetric and depends on the market power of the actor: the seller, as the more 
powerful market participant, expects favorable treatment from in-group members; 
however, she is not willing to reciprocate by accepting lower offers from in-group 
buyers.
A large body of experiments in social psychology (and increasingly in 
economics) studies the influence of group identity on behavior.5 Thereby, 
experimental research relies on both natural identities (e.g., Goette et al., 2006) and 
artificially induced groups (e.g., Heap and Varoufakis, 2002). Studies dealing with 
natural groups identify significant effects on the behavior of subject in various 
experiments. For instance, Kramer et al. (1995) find that responders involving 
members of two rival business schools are more willing to accept unfair offers by in-
group proposers than the same offer made by someone from the out-group in a 
bargaining game. Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) show that identifying natural 
groups with a distinct ethnic affiliation in the Israeli Jewish society leads to a 
discrimination of outsiders in both the trust game and the ultimatum game but not in 
the dictator game. Falk and Zehnde (2007) identify statistical discrimination and in-
group favoritism in sequential trust games using natural groups divided into 
residential districts in Zürich. They find that the magnitude of investments depend on 
the district in which the responders live; additionally, people trust strangers from 
their own district significantly more than they trust strangers from other districts. 
More recently, Leider et al. (2009) explore group identity and social ties in the 
context of dictator games and find evidence of in-group favoritism; i.e., dictators give 
nearly 52 percent more to friends (in-group) in a real-world social network than to 
random strangers (out-group). 
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In contrast to natural identities, the use of induced identities gives the 
researchers more control and flexibility over the group formation process. In an early 
experiment, Vaughan et al. (1981) divide a group of 7- to 11-year-old children into 
red and blue groups to play a simple division game. They conclude that, irrespective 
of the age, children give more money to members of their own group than to 
members of the other group. Charness et al. (2007) investigate the influence of 
induced group membership and its salience on the individual behavior in the 
prisoner’s dilemma and battle-of-the-sexes games. In the minimal group treatment, 
they do not find differences in the cooperation rate between in-group and out-group 
members. However, after increasing the salience of the groups, the authors find that 
group membership significantly affects the individual behavior. Likewise, the 
introduction of artificially induced groups by color group assignment leads to the 
discrimination of outsiders in a repeated trust game (Heap and Zizzo, 2009). Chen 
and Li (2009) explore the effect of social identity across a variety of games and find 
that subjects are more altruistic towards in-group members. 
While previous experiments have demonstrated the impact of group identity 
in various types of games, only a few papers deal with the influence of group identity 
in market settings. For example, Ball et al. (2001) investigate the impact of social 
status on market prices and earnings. They find that players randomly assigned to a 
high-status group earn significantly more of the surplus regardless of whether they 
are buyers or sellers. Recently, Li et al. (2011) study the impact of group identity on 
partner selection and price offers in oligopolistic markets. They conduct a bargaining 
game with multiple proposers and responders and find that in-group sellers are 
more likely to make offers to in-group buyers. The authors note that group identity 
may not be important in large markets where buyers and sellers act anonymously. 
However, group identity may be more important in markets with a small number of 
sellers and buyers and, as we argue, with infrequent trade.  
There are several studies investigating the interaction between three people: 
Güth and Damme (1998) examine the effect of the presence of an observer in the 
ultimatum game. Holm (2000) conducts a three-person game with natural groups 
and looks at coalition formation and sharing within a coalition. He finds that Swedish 
subjects choosing between a partner with a Swedish or a foreign name would 
choose the person with the Swedish name significantly more often than they would 
choose the person with a foreign name. However, Holm (2000) does not observe a 
difference in the distribution of resources within the coalition. In a recent study, 
Bauernschuster et al. (2009) explore how competition and group identity affect trust 
and trustworthiness. They find that trustees react to competition among in-group and 
out-group investors by lowering return ratios. The work that is closest to our study is 
the work by Tremewan (2010). In that work, a three-person “divide the dollar” game 
is used to investigate the effect of group identity on the formation of coalitions and 
on the resulting distribution of resources. He concludes that players in the out-group 
earn less because they are more often excluded from the coalition. 
Our design is applicable to a variety of small markets, such as licensing 
markets where only one seller (licensor) and a few buyers (licensees) bargain in the 
market. It is applicable because of the following reasons. First, licensing is 
comparable to a matching procedure: among all firms interested in licensing a 
technology, the firm that submits a price that is at least as much as what the licensor 
asks for while being the highest offer becomes the exclusive licensee. Second, the 
number of potential licensees is limited because the inventions are usually at an 
early stage with uncertain market success (Contractor, 1981; Jensen and Thursby, 
2001). Thus, social ties among the actors may play an important role in these 
markets. For instance, some common experiences may already exist between 
certain participants at the time of negotiation due to prior collaboration. On the other 
hand, other participants may not have any common experience or relation to the in-
group; hence, they belong to the out-group. 
Several caveats should be mentioned here. Dealing with within-group 
manipulations might steer the behavior of the subjects into a direction the 
experiment is designed to test for and invoke an experimenter demand effect (EDE, 
Zizzo, 2010). To circumvent this problem, we formulate our instructions as neutral 
as possible. Moreover, we do not announce our objectives during the experiment; 
i.e., the key goals and claims that the experimenters are actually trying to achieve 
are not revealed. Additionally, we use the focal point game to avoid an obvious 
group formation process (Mehta et al., 1994). Furthermore, using a lump-sum 
payment is not a compatible incentive for belief elicitation. Nonetheless, a lump-sum 
payment can be justified because several studies report that incentivization does not 
significantly improve stated beliefs (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Sonnemans 
and Offerman, 2001; Guarino and Huck, 2006). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2.2, we 
describe our experimental design; in sections 2.3, we outline our hypotheses and 
behavioral prediction. Then, we present the results in section 2.4. In section 2.5, we 
conclude and discuss the implications of our findings. 
2.2 Experimental Design 
To identify the influence of group identity on the determination of the offers of 
the buyers and the claims of the sellers in a market setting, we implement four 
distinct experimental treatments. Each treatment consists of three parts and a 
concluding questionnaire that are computerized using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). In 
the first part of the experiment (identical for all four treatments), we introduce group 
identity using a three-person coordination game. This coordination ensures a 
common and positive experience among the upcoming in-group members. In the 
second part of the experiment, subjects are rearranged into groups of three 
according to the four different treatments with different group compositions. To 
strengthen group feelings, we introduce wording and color assignments to identify 
in-group and out-group members in the subsequent treatments. Subjects who are 
matched with at least one subject, with whom they play the first part together, are 
referred to as in-group members. Subjects who are matched with subjects with 
whom they do not play the first part together are referred to as out-group members. 
Additionally, in-group and out-group members vary according their color 
assignments. 
In the second part, the bargaining game, one seller and two buyers have to 
bargain for an indivisible good. Stage 1 of the three-person bargaining game 
corresponds to a one-shot game because the subjects know that the second part of 
the experiment consists of 3 stages with the exact information regarding the content 
of stage 2 and stage 3 being disclosed at the end of the first bargaining game. This 
arrangement means that, after completing the first bargaining game, subjects are 
informed that the three-person bargaining game will be repeated in stages 2 and 3 
while keeping the group membership and group identity constant. However, new 
roles will be assigned to the subjects. Every subject in each treatment plays once as 
a seller and twice as a buyer. Figure 2-1 gives a graphical overview of the 
treatments. Thereby, S stands for the seller and B stands for the buyer. In treatment 
All-out, all subjects are out-group members represented by white circles. In 
treatment All-in, all subjects belong to the in-group and are represented with gray 
circles. In treatment One-buyer-out, one buyer and seller belong to the in-group 
while the other buyer belongs to the out-group; this is represented with two gray and 
one white circles. In treatment Seller-out, both buyers belong to the in-group and the 
seller belongs to the out-group; this is represented with two gray and one white 
circles. All four treatments are conducted in each session. The third part concludes 
the experiment with a lottery choice game and a final questionnaire. 
Note: S=Seller, B=Buyer. The unequal arrows indicate how subjects changed roles over the stages 
Figure 2-1: Treatment Overview 
2.2.1 First Part: The Coordination Game and Group Formation 
In the first part of the experiment, groups of three subjects are formed 
randomly. All subjects participate in a three-person coordination game played within 
each group to establish common experiences among the randomly formed group. 
Subjects of a group, referred to as partners, have to choose a meeting point in Paris 
(France), either the Eiffel Tower or the Centre Georges Pompidou (see 
Bauernschuster et al., 2009). Coordination is successful if all three players of a 
group pick the same meeting point. In the case of a successful coordination, the 
group receives an amount of 1.50€ that is split equally among the subjects of the 
group. If the players disagree, the group receives 0€. After the coordination game, 
the subjects are informed of their own choice and the choices of their group mates, 
the outcome of the coordination and the profit of the group. 
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After completing the coordination game in the first part, the groups are 
rearranged according to the four treatments; additionally, the subjects receive 
information on the group composition. To strengthen the in-group membership, we 
use wording and color assignment. We assign a color (blue) to all members of the 
in-group and inform the participants of this color assignment. Subjects that are 
supposed to interact as out-group members are matched with two new subjects with 
whom they do not interact in the first part. We inform subjects belonging to the out-
group that they are assigned to subjects that belong to the blue group (referred to as 
partners), who have already collected experience in the first part together. To 
strengthen the out-group feeling, we assign the color red to out-group members (see 
Heap and Varoufakis, 2002). Group membership, i.e., the colors and the 
corresponding information with whom they interacted in the first part, is public 
knowledge to all of the matching-group members. We use this minimal group design 
to avoid confounding the existence of groups with strong reciprocity motives. 
2.2.2 Second Part: The Bargaining Game 
In the second part of the experiment, the matching-group members 
participate in a three-person bargaining game for three rounds where two buyers 
and one seller negotiate for an indivisible good. The bargaining process proceeds as 
follows: all subjects of a matching-group make their individual offers simultaneously 
and in private. The seller has to announce a payment request to each of the two 
buyers , simultaneously, announcing the minimum level of acceptance in 
exchange for the good. On the screen of the seller, the two boxes for the payment 
request for each buyer are arranged vertically. The buyers are randomly assigned to 
the upper and lower boxes. At the same time, each buyer states her offer, indicating 
the willingness to pay for the indivisible good . Proposals and payment 
requests can range between an integer value of 0 and 113 Experimental Currency 
Units (ECUs). After all subjects confirm their proposal(s), the entry is obligatory and 
cannot be renegotiated. Once all subjects make their decisions, the offer of each 
buyer is compared to its corresponding threshold to decide if the good is sold and to 
determine which buyer successfully purchased the good. In case that none of the 
offers meet the corresponding threshold of the seller, the good is not sold. If both 
offers are at least equal to the threshold of the seller , she has 
to decide to whom the good has to be sold.6 A single buyer acquires the good if her 
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The payments of the subjects depend on successful contracting. If there is 
no agreement on the price, the buyers’ endowment of 113 ECUs is lost and all 
participants receive no profit. If the seller concludes a contract with one of the two 
buyers, the seller receives the winning offer of the buyer. The successful buyer 
receives the difference between 113 ECUs and the price offered to the seller. The 
other buyer leaves the bargaining stage empty-handed. In total, the subjects play 
three bargaining rounds while keeping the group membership and group identity 
constant; however, new roles are assigned to the subjects. Thus, every subject 
plays once as a seller and twice as a buyer. The first stage of the bargaining game 
corresponds to a one-shot game. Subjects in the experiment are unaware of the fact 
that the game is repeated two more times. In all three bargaining stages, the 
subjects do not receive feedback about the prior bids or the outcome. 
After each bargaining stage, we elicit beliefs from each subject depending on 
its role in the bargaining game. More precisely, we elicit the beliefs of the seller 
regarding the potential offer from each of the two buyers and the beliefs of the 
buyers regarding the potential payment request of the seller for herself and for the 
other buyer. For the elicitation, we use two different methods: first, we ask each 
subject for a point estimate; i.e., the subjects have to declare an integer between 0 
and 113 ECUs. In the second step, we confront the subjects with twelve intervals of 
equal size apart from the first and the last one.7 The subjects have to state a value 
between 0 and 100 for each interval to specify how likely the expected value is 
located in the corresponding interval. In the end, all stated values have to sum up to 
100, which correspond to 100 percent.8 Thus, each subject has to answer four 
bonus questions after each bargaining game independent from the role. In total, the 
subjects receive a lump-sum payment of 1.20€ for answering all bonus questions. 
At the end of the second part, one stage is randomly chosen for payment. In 
case a clear result is achieved (i.e., either no agreement is reached or an agreement 
where one buyer meets the corresponding threshold of the seller and the other does 
                                                                                                                                        
threshold. However, we are aware that such a design could lead to payment requests of the seller 
close to zero. 
7 The first interval [0, 10] includes 11 values, whereas the last interval [111, 113] includes only 3 
values. All other intermediate intervals include 10 values. 
8 Both methods ask the same question but in a different way. Whereas the first question just asks for 
an integer value, the second question asks for a probability distribution. The aim of the second method 
is to specify the beliefs of the subjects and to control for inequalities and inconsistencies. According to 
Delavande et al. (2008), eliciting probability distributions is more preferable than eliciting point 
expectations. Therefore, we only use probability distributions for the upcoming analysis. Furthermore, 
we do not incentivize belief elicitation to avoid risk hedging problems that may be prevalent, especially 
in market settings (see Blanco et al., 2010). 
not), all subjects receive feedback immediately. In case both buyers meet the 
corresponding threshold of the seller, the buyers receive a message that the seller 
has to choose from one of the two buyers. The choice screen of the seller includes 
two adjacent (colored) boxes for each buyer that include the payment request of the 
seller and the corresponding offer. The buyers are randomly assigned to the box on 
the left or on the right. After the seller makes a choice, all subjects of the group 
receive feedback. 
2.2.3 Third Part: Risk Aversion Elicitation and Questionnaire 
To control for the role of risk aversion, we apply a simplified procedure of 
Holt and Laury (2002).9 Subjects are presented with five different lottery choices. In 
each case, the subjects have a choice between a safe lottery S that guarantees a 
payment of 0.50€, and a risky lottery R that pays from 0.90€ to 1.50€ with a 
probability of 50 percent. In general, more risk-averse people should switch from 
lottery S to lottery R at a higher stage. At the end, one pair of lotteries is selected 
randomly and the decision is paid out. 
2.3 Hypotheses 
First, we are interested in whether differences among buyers with respect to 
group identity have an effect on the stated offers. We expect that a direct 
comparison of buyers in mixed groups lead to a stronger competition between the 
buyers, resulting in higher offers from both buyers compared to situations where the 
buyers are indistinguishable. One explanation for this conjecture might be that the 
sellers are not able to directly discriminate between two identical buyers, which 
might reduce the investment pressure of both buyers compared to situations where 
buyers have different group identities.  
Alternatively, in-group buyers may follow an in-group favoritism pattern. For 
example, Robert and Carnevale (1997) analyze the impact of groups on the 
formulation of ultimatum offers and find that the proposers more often offer a fair 
share to a member of their own group than to a member from a different group. 
Likewise, Wilson (2007) conducts a dictator game with three different ethnic groups 
and finds strong in-group favoritism. The subjects send significantly higher economic 
awards to recipients from their own ethnic groups than to recipients belonging to 
another group. Furthermore, we predict that the out-group buyer in treatment One-
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buyer-out will offer more compared to the All-out case because of anticipated in-
group favoritism from the seller for the in-group buyer. Following these arguments, 
we predict: 
Conjecture 1a: In treatment One-buyer-out, in-group buyers offer more compared to 
buyers in the All-Out treatment. 
Conjecture 1b: In treatment One-buyer-out, out-group buyers offer more compared 
to buyers in the All-Out treatment. 
Second, we are interested in the payment requests of the sellers and 
whether these requests differ between different group identities. We suppose that in-
group sellers may demand either a lower or a higher price from in-group buyers 
compared to out-group buyers. On the one hand, in-group sellers may demand 
lower prices from in-group buyers because of in-group favoritism. On the other 
hand, opportunistic in-group sellers may take advantage of the in-group favoritism of 
the buyers and charge in-group buyers a higher price. Recently, Li et al. (2011) have 
observed that in-group sellers charge in-group buyers a higher price compared to 
out-group buyers. Therefore, we formulate following hypothesis for the case in which 
the sellers can directly distinguish between both buyers: 
Conjecture 2: In treatment One-buyer-out, the payment requests of the in-group 
sellers are higher for in-group buyers than for out-group buyers. 
Furthermore, we are interested in the beliefs regarding the behavior of each 
role of the other players with respect to different group identities. Several studies 
elicit beliefs regarding the actions of the other players, such as the contributions in 
public good games (e.g., Offerman et al., 1996) and the investments in trust games 
(e.g., Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000). In our experiment, the sellers might hold 
heterogeneous beliefs regarding the expected offers of the buyers considering 
differences in group memberships. In-group sellers might expect that their partners 
from the first part of the experiment make them a higher offer compared to the out-
group buyer. This would be in line with the impact of in-group favoritism (Tajfel, 
1982) and common identity, which are the major determinants for transactions in 
markets (Ben-Porath, 1980). The following relationship is expected: 
Conjecture 3: In treatment One-buyer-out, in-group sellers expect a higher offer from 
in-group buyers than from out-group buyers. 
The same argument (in-group favoritism) also holds for beliefs of buyers 
regarding the potential payment requests of the seller. If the buyers have different 
group identities, they may expect different payment requests for themselves and for 
their counterpart. According to in-group favoritism, in-group buyers may expect a 
lower price for themselves than for the out-group counterpart; whereas out-group 
buyers may expect a higher price for themselves than for the in-group counterpart. 
Therefore, we predict the following: 
Conjecture 4: In treatment One-buyer-out, in-group buyers expect a lower threshold 
whereas out-group buyers expect a higher threshold for themselves. 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Implementation 
We conducted the experiment in June 2010 at the laboratory of the Friedrich 
Schiller University Jena. All participants were undergraduate students from a broad 
variety of disciplines, excluding students from economics and psychology, recruited 
via ORSEE (see Greiner, 2004). In total, we conducted 10 sessions with 168 
subjects; there were 18 subjects per session.10 Before the experiment, the subjects 
received the same basic instructions in print (see appendix A). At the end of each 
session, the results of the first part and the results of one randomly picked stage 
from the second part were paid according to the decisions of the subjects. 
Furthermore, the subjects received a lump-sum payment of 1.20€ for all bonus 
questions and, on average, an additional 0.56€ from the lottery game. Each subject 
received a show-up fee of 2.50€. On average, the subjects earned a total of 7.28€, 
with a minimum payment of 4.20€ and a maximum payment of 14.50€. All rewards 
within the experiment were handled in ECUs, where 1 ECU corresponds to 0.08€. 
2.4.2 Group Induction 
                                                
10 We had to restrict the number of subjects to 12 in two sessions due to no-shows. In these cases, the 
first three treatments were conducted. In general, treatments All-out and All-in were run with 1 group 
per session, and treatments One-buyer-out and Seller-out were run with 2 groups per session. 
However, the treatment Seller-out was run for 1 session with 4 groups to balance the number of 
executed treatments. 
In the first part (the coordination game) 99.4 percent of all subjects chose the 
Eiffel Tower as the meeting point in Paris. This leads to a successful coordination in 
98.2 percent of all groups. Only one group out of 56 groups did not coordinate on 
the same focal point. Thus, the coordination success is even larger compared to the 
results shown in the study of Bauernschuster et al. (2009). 
2.4.3 Bargaining Game: First Stage 
In this section, we use the results from the first stage of the bargaining game. 
First, we look at the differences of the stated offers depending on group identity and 
treatments. To test Conjectures 1a and 1b, the offers of in-group and out-group 
buyers in treatment One-buyer-out are compared with the pooled offers from buyers 
in treatment All-out, All-in, and Seller-out.11 Figure 2-2 presents six bar plots where 
the upper three compare the offers of the in-group buyers with pooled offers in 
treatments All-out, All-in, and Seller-out; in the lower three plots, the offers of the 
out-group buyers are compared to the pooled offers in treatments All-out, All-in, and 
Seller-out.
The in-group buyers in treatment One-buyer-out offer 90.83 ECUs on 
average, whereas the pooled buyers in treatment All-out offer 79.15 ECUs on 
average, a difference of nearly 15 percent. The Mann-Whitney two-sample statistic 
shows that the difference is statistically significant (p-value = 0.048).12 It implies that 
in-group buyers who compete with out-group buyers offer significantly more 
compared to the framework of the stranger. Additionally, we test the mean offers of 
the in-group buyers in treatment One-buyer-out with the pooled mean offers in 
treatment Seller-out (80.6 ECUs) and find that in-group buyers in treatment One-
buyer-out offer significantly more than the pooled buyers in treatment Seller out (p = 
0.069).
In the next step, we compare the mean offers of out-group buyers in 
treatment One-buyer-out with the pooled mean offers of treatments All-out, All-in
and Seller-out. All three comparisons, i.e., the difference between treatments All-out
and One-buyer-out (p = 0.988), All-in and One-buyer-out (p = 0.453), and One-
buyer-out and Seller-out (p = 0.985) do not show any significant differences 
between the stated offers.  
                                                
11 The reason why we can pool the offers of the buyers in these treatments is because the buyers are 
indistinguishable. In both cases, the buyers have either no social identity or are both in-group 
members. Therefore, we pool the offers to get more observations for the comparison between 
treatments.
12 We report test statistics from the Mann-Whitney test throughout the rest of the paper unless 
indicated otherwise. 
Overall, the results suggest that in-group buyers tend to offer significantly 
more in treatment One-buyer-out compared to treatments All-out and Seller-out. For 
out-group buyers, no significant difference is observed. Our results confirm 
Conjecture 1a; i.e., in-group buyers in treatment One-buyer-out offer significantly 
more compared to the offers from the buyers in treatment All-out. However, we do 
not find support for Conjecture 1b that out-group buyers in treatment One-buyer-out
offer a significantly larger amount to the in-group seller compared to the mean offers 
in treatment All-out.
Note: The upper three graphs compare the average offers from the in-group buyers in treatment 'One-
buyer-out' with the pooled average offers in treatment 'All-out', 'All-in' and 'Seller-out'. The lower three 
graphs compare the average offers from the out-group buyers in treatment 'One-buyer-out' with pooled 
average offers in treatment 'All-out', 'All-in' and 'Seller-out'. 
Figure 2-2: First Period Treatment Comparisons of Average Offers 
To test Conjecture 2, we analyze the payment requests of in-group sellers in 
treatment One-buyer-out. Therefore, we look at the mean payment requests for both 
the in-group and the out-group buyers. The in-group sellers demanded on average 
78.16 out of 113 ECUs from the in-group buyers compared to 76.61 out of 113 
ECUs from the out-group buyers. The Wilcoxon signed rank test suggests no 
significant difference (p = 0.547) between both requests. Thus, we do not find 
evidence that the in-group sellers treat buyers that belong to either the same or to 





































Additionally, in Figure 2-3 we depict the offers from the out-group and the in-
group buyers for treatment One-buyer-out in cases where both offers meet the 
corresponding threshold of the seller. In total, the in-group seller had to choose nine 
times in the first stage of treatment One-buyer-out. We see that the highest offer 
was chosen most of the time (except two instances). These offers were mainly 
made by in-group buyers. In case of ties, the seller chose the in-group agent, 
indicating in-group favoritism. Surprisingly, the in-group seller chose the partner in 
one case although the in-group buyer offered less than the out-group buyer did. 
However, the difference is not significant. 
Figure 2-3: Choice of Sellers 
Expectations of Sellers 
In this section, we consider the expectations of the sellers regarding the 
potential offers of the buyers in the first stage among the 4 treatments. For this, we 
use the elicited probability distributions over the offers (Table 2-1). We are 
especially interested in the beliefs of the seller in treatment One-buyer-out to test 
Conjecture 3, where the two buyers have different group affiliations. Additionally, we 
investigate the differences in beliefs between treatments. 
In treatment One-buyer-out, the in-group sellers expect a mean offer of 76.4 
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from the out-group buyers. The Wilcoxon signed rank test confirms that the 
expectations of the in-group sellers differ significantly from each other (p = 0.064). 
This result is in line with Conjecture 3 and suggests that in-group sellers expect (on 
average) a favorable offer from the in-group buyers. 
We then compare the expectations of the sellers regarding the potential 
offers of the in-group buyers in treatment One-buyer-out with pooled beliefs of 
treatments All-out (p = 0.090), All-in (p = 0.188), and Seller-out (p = 0.163). The 
results suggest a significant difference between treatments All-out and One-buyer-
out. The sellers in treatment All-out expect a mean offer of 62.69 ECUs from the 
pooled buyers, whereas the in-group sellers in treatment One-buyer-out expect a 
mean offer of 76.43 ECUs from the in-group buyers. This difference might be driven 
by in-group favoritism; i.e., the in-group sellers expect (on average) a higher offer 
from their partner. Another explanation may be that the in-group sellers expect a 
stronger competition among buyers with different group identities in the One-buyer-
out treatment compared to the All-out treatment, where no direct difference can be 
observed.
With regard to the expectations of the sellers on the offers of the out-group 
buyers, we do not find any significant differences between the One-buyer-out
treatment and the pooled beliefs in the All-out (p = 0.335), All-in (p = 0.599) and 
Seller-out (p = 0.910) treatments. 
Table 2-1: Expectations of Sellers 


















































Note: This table presents the mean expectations of the seller differentiated with respect to both buyers; 
the standard errors are in italics and the number of observations is in parentheses. The 1st buyer 
corresponds to the buyer on the left, whereas the 2nd buyer corresponds to the buyer on the right in 
Figure 2-1.  
Expectations of Buyers 
We now analyze the expectations of the buyers regarding the potential 
payment requests of the sellers for themselves and for their counterpart. Table 2-2 
summarizes the mean expectations of the buyers for the 4 treatments. First, we do 
not find a significant difference among the expectations of the in-group and out-
group buyers in treatment One-buyer-out regarding the potential payment requests 
of the sellers for themselves (p = 0.506). The same is true for the expectations of 
the in-group and out-group buyers about the potential payment request for the 
counterpart of the seller (p = 0.506). Hence, we do not find any significant 
differences in the payment request for oneself and for the counterpart among in-
group and out-group buyers under the One-buyer-out treatment; this result 
contradicts Conjecture 4. 
Table 2-2: Expectations of Buyers 
Expectations (Exp.) of the buyers 
 Identity 1st buyer Identity 2nd buyer Total 
Treatment Exp. oneself Exp. other 
Exp. 
oneself Exp. other 
Exp. 
oneself Exp. other 













































































Note: The 1st buyer corresponds to the buyer on the left, whereas the 2nd buyer corresponds to the 
buyer on the right in Figure 2-1. The mean values correspond to the expectations of the buyers with 
respect to the payment request of the sellers for oneself (exp. oneself) and for the counterpart (exp. 
other). The standard errors are written in italics, and the number of observations is written in 
parentheses. 
Furthermore, we investigate whether beliefs, i.e., the expected payment 
requests for oneself and for the counterpart differ in the One-buyer-out treatment for 
each buyer. We are interested if both buyers with different group identities expect on 
average a difference between payment requests for oneself and for their 
counterpart. We do not observe a significant difference in beliefs (when we analyzed 
the expectations using the Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0.225) for in-group buyers 
regarding the payment requests for oneself and for their counterpart. For the 
expectations of the out-group buyers (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0.627), we 
receive a similar result. This implies that buyers do not expect to receive significantly 
different payment requests from the seller. 
To obtain a more precise picture, differences in the expectations across 
treatments are analyzed. In this regard, the expectations of the buyers in the One-
buyer-out treatment are compared with the pooled expectations in treatments All-
out, All-in, and Seller-out. The Mann-Whitney test suggests that the expectations for 
in-group buyers for themselves (80.9 ECUs) in the One-buyer-out treatment differ 
significantly from the pooled expectations (68.8 ECUs) in the All-in treatment (p = 
0.037). All other differences among treatments are insignificant. This implies that in-
group buyers expect a significantly larger payment request for themselves and, 
therefore, fierce competition in the One-buyer-out treatment compared to the All-in
treatment, where both buyers belong to the in-group. 
Moreover, we compare the expectation of the in-group buyer’s counterpart 
with the pooled expectations in the All-out, All-in and Seller-out treatments. The 
expected payment requests for the counterpart (82.2 ECUs) in the One-buyer-out
treatment do not differ significantly from the pooled expectations for the counterpart 
(74.4 ECUs) in the All-out treatment (p = 0.169). However, the Mann-Whitney test 
confirms a significant difference between the expectations of the in-group buyers in 
treatment One-buyer-out (82.2 ECUs) with the pooled expectations in the All-in
treatment (72.1 ECUs) and the Seller-out treatment (72.3 ECUs) (p = 0.075 and p = 
0.040, respectively). These results suggest that in-group buyers expect for their 
counterpart (with a different group affiliation) a higher payment request compared to 
treatments where differences among buyers cannot be directly observed. With 
regard to the expectations of the out-group buyers, i.e., the expected payment 
requests for oneself and for their counterparts, we do not find significant differences 
between treatments. 
2.4.4 Panel Regressions 
To determine whether the above findings regarding the offers of the buyer 
are consistent, we analyze all three stages of the bargaining game including various 
covariates. We focus on the behavior of the buyer according to the structure of the 
data; for each subject, we have two observations as a buyer and one observation as 
a seller. Table 2-3 presents the GLS regressions with individual random effects and 
robust standard errors.13 The regressors are the offers of the buyers to acquire the 
indivisible good. We include indicator variables that state whether or not the group 
members (i.e., the seller and both buyers) belong to the in-group. In our analysis, we 
try to identify how the offer of the buyer is influenced by its own group affiliation and 
that of its teammates when compared to the offer of the buyers in the All-out
treatment, which form the omitted reference group. 
In all regression models (Models 1-3), the group constellation interacts with 
the stage variable to control for the learning effects caused by role reversals. 
Furthermore, we include the variables to control for session effects, gender effects, 
risk aversion and experience. More precisely, the variables are defined in the 
following manner: Session is a categorical variable transformed into a factor 
variable; Female is a binary variable and is equal to one for female; Risk is a ordinal 
variable and ranges from 1 to 6, where 1 corresponds to risk averse and 6 to risk 
loving; Experience is a binary variable that measures whether or not subjects 
already participated in an experiment. 
Table 2-3: GLS Regression Results on the Offers of the Buyers 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(Group constellation) 

























Expectation self (EV)  0.449*** 
(0.070) 








Stage Yes Yes Yes
Session Yes Yes







Difference in coefs between In-group and out-group 
buyer in treatment One-buyer-out 
-11.38** -14.07*** -12.64*** 
Observations 336 296 296 
Number of subjects 168 148 148 
Note: The robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the .10, .05, and 
.01 percent levels, respectively. The coefficient of the group constellation term shows the difference of 
behavior of a buyer of a particular type (in- or out-group) in the respective buyer-seller constellation 
compared to the baseline treatment All-out. A zero indicates that the respective person belongs to the 
out-group, while a 1 indicates in-group. In models 2 and 3, we had to exclude twenty observations due 
to ambiguous choices in the 3rd part of the experiment. The variable experience indicates whether the 
person has participated in previous economic experiments (but not in this one).  
                                                
13 We estimated all models with GLS random effects and Tobit random effects. Because the estimated 
results are very similar, we report only GLS random effects. Further results are available upon request. 
The first model in Table 2-3 investigates the influence of the group members’ 
identity on the offer of the buyers while controlling for stage effects. The results 
suggest a weak significant positive effect for the in-group buyers who bargain with 
in-group sellers and compete with out-group buyers. In-group buyers in the One-
buyer-out treatment offer significantly more compared to buyers who belong to the 
out-group and interact with out-group sellers and out-group buyers. Among the 
buyers in the One-buyer-out treatment, the coefficients of those belonging to the in-
group differ significantly from those belonging to the out-group (p < 0.011). In Model 
2, we control the session effects, gender, risk aversion, and experience. The results 
in Model 2 confirm that in-group buyers who bargain with in-group sellers and 
compete with out-group buyers offer significantly more compared to offers of the 
reference group. The coefficients of both buyers belonging to the One-buyer-out
treatment differ significantly from each other (p < 0.002). Finally, in Model 3, we 
include the expectation of the buyers as an additional explanatory variable. The 
results are qualitatively similar to those obtained in Models 1 and 2. Surprisingly, we 
find that in-group buyers who interact with in-group sellers and compete with 
another in-group buyer (in the All-in treatment) offer significantly more compared to 
the control group in the All-out treatment after controlling for expectations. 
Overall, the results of the regression Models 1-3 suggest that in-group 
buyers who bargain with an in-group seller and compete with an out-group buyer 
offer significantly more compared to the case where buyers bargain with an out-
group seller and compete with an out-group buyer. These results confirm Conjecture 
1a and suggest that the behavior of a buyer does not depend only on the buyer’s 
own group identity but also on the group identity of the other members and, 
therefore, the entire group constellation. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Investigating bargaining behavior among involved parties using field data, 
especially among participants with different group identities, can be difficult. We 
conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate the influence of group identities on 
the behavior of subjects in a market setting where two buyers and one seller bargain 
for an indivisible good. We find that in-group buyers offer significantly more in 
situations where direct discrimination is possible and out-group buyers do not; this 
behavior might be expected due to in-group favoritism. 
The most interesting finding is that sellers expect in-group favoritism from in-
group buyers, but do not reciprocate the favoritism by offering lower ask prices. This 
could be because in-group favoritism is asymmetric and depends on the market 
power of the actor. A more powerful market participant – the seller – expects a 
favorable treatment, but she is not willing to accept lower offers from in-group 
members. This opens a path of further research whether market power (or other 
powers) could lead to asymmetric in-group favoritism that is in favor of the more 
powerful participant. 
Future research may also focus on how different levels of experience (cf. Li 
et al., 2011) influence the behavior of the subject. Furthermore, repeated 
interactions among subjects with prior experience or particular group identities might 
lose its weight through ongoing interactions. To investigate a negotiation that is 
more related to a licensing process, the sellers and both buyers have to be unaware 
of the potential benefit of the indivisible good. 
3. We Need to Talk – or do we? Geographic Distance 
and the Commercialization of Technologies from 
Public Research 
3.1 Introduction 
Creation of new knowledge through research and development (R&D) is the 
main engine of technological change, and technological change is the main engine 
of growth and employment in modern economies. Universities and non-university 
public research organizations (PROs for short) are important generators of new and 
possibly useful knowledge (Salter and Martin, 2001). It is therefore not surprising 
that policy makers around the globe have undertaken considerable efforts to 
strengthen the linkages between public research and the private sector. Driven by 
the motivation to improve the utilization of new knowledge in the economy, the 
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 in the U.S. and similar legislative changes elsewhere 
advanced technology transfer as one of the main objectives – a “third mission” – of 
public research. Even though multiple channels of knowledge transfer including 
publications, conferences, consulting, and scientist migration to the private sector 
are relevant for industrial partners (Cohen et al., 2002; Agrawal and Henderson, 
2002), recent legislative activities have often focused on university patenting and 
licensing as instruments to commercialize scientific results (Bozeman, 2000; 
Mowery et al., 2001; Shane, 2002; Sampat, 2006; Kenney and Patton, 2009; von 
Proff et al., 2012). 
Similar to other “markets for technology” (Arora et al., 2001) the market for 
academic inventions is characterized by substantial information asymmetry between 
the inventor and the potential licensee (Shane, 2002; Siegel et al., 2003a; Lowe, 
2006). More specifically, commercialization of licensed academic inventions is a 
difficult task for private-sector firms because these inventions are usually far from 
being readily marketable (Jensen and Thursby, 2001) and the underlying knowledge 
possessed by the original academic inventors – which is often critical for success – 
is not fully codified (Agrawal, 2006). This raises relevant issues of how licensees 
can best enlist the support of academic inventors in their commercialization efforts. 
Several empirical studies have studied the commercialization of licensed 
university technology at the level of individual inventions. This research is limited by 
the lack of universities and PROs with sufficient numbers of successfully 
commercialized inventions, in particular outside the U.S. Existing empirical findings 
are therefore restricted to a few leading U.S. universities. Licensed inventions by 
MIT scientists are explored by Shane (2002), while Lowe and Ziedonis (2006) study 
the University of California system. Both studies compare startup licensees with 
established firms, but do not find evidence suggesting that the former are 
disadvantaged. Also using data on licensed MIT inventions, Dechenaux et al. (2008) 
analyze how appropriability conditions affect termination likelihood and the 
commercialization success of licensees. They find that patent strength and secrecy 
reduce the risk of license termination. Elfenbein (2004, 2007) explores the 
significance of contractual provisions and inventor seniority for commercialization 
outcomes in the empirical context of Harvard University. He concludes that 
inventors’ prior scientific output is positively correlated with future licenses but is 
uncorrelated with the payment structure or the returns of the technology. 
Given the traditionally different ownership model for academic inventions in 
Europe (Lissoni et al., 2008) and the ensuing lack of licensing data, very little prior 
evidence exists for Europe. However, studying commercialization outcomes outside 
the U.S. seems important because it raises issues such licensing to foreign 
licensees that are less relevant and therefore underexplored in the U.S. context 
(Arundel and Geuna, 2004). Within Europe, Germany’s large non-university PROs 
probably provide the best opportunities for empirical research. In this context, 
Buenstorf and Geissler (2012) study inventions from the Max Planck Society. They 
compare the commercialization outcomes for university spin-offs to those of external 
licensees and fail to find systematic differences. 
The contribution of public research to the regional innovation and growth 
performance has been explored in a long line of prior research. Results have been 
mixed. Some authors (e.g., Jaffe, 1989; Acs et al., 1992; Jaffe et al., 1993; Anselin 
et al., 1997; Fritsch and Slavtchev, 2007) suggest that proximity to public research 
yields substantial benefits to firms’ innovativeness. Mansfield and Lee (1996) 
likewise find that firms prefer to work with university researchers who are less than 
100 miles away from the firm’s R&D laboratories. Based on a survey of R&D 
laboratories in the U.S., Adams (2002) concludes that geographic proximity plays a 
bigger role in university-firm interactions than in firm-firm interactions. Belenzon and 
Schankerman (2012) find that citation rates of both publications and university 
patents decline sharply with distance.  
Other work tends to see a lesser role for geographic proximity. Audretsch 
and Stephan (1996) show that the majority of links between university scientists and 
U.S. biotechnology firms are non-local. Even among spin-off founders, more than 
40% of the researchers in their sample established firms outside the region of their 
university. Similar results have been found for Germany (e.g., Grotz and Braun, 
1997). In a survey of 2,300 German companies, Beise and Stahl (1999) do not 
detect a higher likelihood to innovate for firms that are located close to universities 
or polytechnics. They conclude that proximity to public research institutes does not 
influence the probability of public research-based innovations. However, as pointed 
out by Salter and Martin (2001), this result might be influenced by the geographic 
differences between Germany and the U.S. 
Very little prior work has studied the role of geography in the context of 
commercializing licensed university inventions. Mowery and Ziedonis (2001) 
compare the geographic reach of two important knowledge flows, namely patent 
citations and licenses. They conclude that licenses are more geographically 
localized than patent citations. Survey-based work by Santoro and Gopalakrishnan 
(2001) suggests that geographic proximity favorably affects technology transfer 
activities between universities and firms. In contrast, controlling for inventor 
involvement in licensees’ commercialization efforts, Agrawal (2006) finds no effects 
of location on commercialization outcomes. 
In the present paper we contribute to this latter line of research, using and 
extending a dataset with detailed information about licensing activities of the Max 
Planck Society, Germany’s largest non-university public research organization 
(Buenstorf and Geissler, 2012). In contrast to the faculty of German universities, 
Max Planck researchers have never enjoyed the professors’ privilege but have 
consistently been subject to a Bayh-Dole-like IPR regime since the 1970s. This 
circumstance provides us with a rich dataset encompassing more than 2,300 
inventions and about 770 license agreements for the time period 1980-2004. Our 
data also include detailed information about payments to the Max Planck Society 
indicating whether or not an invention has been commercialized successfully as well 
as the magnitude of the returns. Finally, since we know the locations of both the 
originating Max Planck Institute and the private-sector licensee, we can calculate the 
geographic distance between them. 
We use this information to analyze whether and how probability and 
magnitude of commercial success are affected by geographic distance between 
inventors and licensees. We do not find evidence suggesting that geographic 
distance is generally a relevant obstacle to successful commercialization of 
academic inventions. Significantly negative associations between distance and 
commercialization success are identified only in two specific instances: first, for spin-
off licensees located outside Germany, and second, for foreign licensees within the 
subsample of inventions with multiple licensees. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section 
presents theoretical considerations about the potential importance of geographic 
proximity for commercialization success. Section 3.3 provides information about the 
technology transfer process of the Max Planck Society. Section 3.4 describes our 
data and the research design for the empirical analysis, whereas results are 
discussed in section 3.5. We conclude and discuss implications and limitations of 
our analysis in section 3.6. 
3.2 Does Geographic Proximity Matter for Successful 
Commercialization of University Inventions? 
3.2.1 Distance and Commercialization Outcomes 
In a world of heterogeneous firms, allocating licenses to suitable licensees 
constitutes a non-trivial problem. Ideally, search processes and negotiations 
between inventors (or technology licensing offices as their agents) on the one hand 
and potential private-sector licensees on the other should result in perfect matching: 
the most suitable licensee (in terms of capabilities and complementary assets) will 
submit the highest offer for a license and thus become the actual licensee. Similar 
considerations apply if technologies are licensed non-exclusively. Among all firms 
interested in licensing a technology, those willing to pay at least as much as the 
licensor asks for become licensees. Under ideal conditions, this will again allocate 
licenses to those firms that can expect to gain most from the license because they 
command superior capabilities and/or better suited complementary assets than 
other potential licensees. 
To structure our further considerations, let us consider the following simple 
model of the behavior of potential licensees. We assume that firm i is willing to 
license academic invention j iff its expected profit contribution from commercializing 
the invention is non-negative, . The expected profit contribution depends 
both on the level of profits that the successful firm can realize from the invention, 
, and on the probability that commercialization efforts are successful, . We 
initially assume that only  but not  depends on the distance s between inventor 
and licensee (we will relax this assumption later on) such that 
, (3-1)
where  and  denote, respectively, revenue and costs of producing and 
selling products based on the academic invention.  depends on inherent (i.e., not 
distance-related) characteristics of the licensee, and also on characteristics of the 
licensed invention. Expected profits are then given by (because  is zero if 
commercialization fails): 
(3-2)
The main reason to expect that costs of commercialization are higher when 
licensees are located farther away from the inventors of the technology is that 
distance plausibly increases the cost of inventor involvement. It is well established 
that at the time of licensing, academic inventions have often not been developed 
beyond the proof of concept stage or a lab scale prototype. Based on a survey of 
technology transfer managers of U.S. universities, Jensen and Thursby (2001) find 
that more than 75 percent of all licensed inventions were at an early stage of 
development. Under these conditions licensees need to make substantial R&D 
efforts of their own to obtain a marketable product from the licensed invention.  
Several studies have moreover found that the success of these additional 
efforts is highly dependent on the continued involvement of the academic inventor(s) 
(Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Thursby and Thursby, 2004; Agrawal, 2006). One 
explanation for this finding is that not all elements of knowledge underlying 
academic inventions are accessible to licensees. Licensees’ absorptive capacities 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) may be insufficient to fully appreciate all information 
related to academic inventions. Since these inventions tend to be highly complex 
and involve knowledge from overlapping disciplines, they are often far from the 
knowledge base of the licensee (Agrawal, 2006). In addition, relevant knowledge 
may be partially tacit (Polanyi, 1966; Arora, 1995), i.e. it cannot adequately be 
codified using patents, publications or blueprints. 
According to Agrawal (2006), much of the non-codified knowledge in public 
research could in principle be codified; he refers to this type of knowledge as “latent” 
knowledge. For example, academic inventions are often based on long series of 
experiments. These are characterized by failures and disappointments that are 
usually unreported, i.e. remain non-codified in the process of academic research. 
However, information about what was tried out and did not work would often be 
valuable for licensees trying to further develop an academic invention. 
Direct personal interaction is generally required for the transfer of non-
codified knowledge. Even video-conferencing or e-mails as novel ways of sharing 
knowledge all over the world cannot fully substitute face-to-face communication and 
collaboration (McDonough and Kahn, 1996). Technology transfer has therefore 
been described as a “contact sport” in which the transfer of knowledge necessitates 
the participation of the inventor and requires face-to-face communication (Mowery 
and Ziedonis, 2001). Geographic proximity reduces the cost of face-to-face 
interaction due to reduced travel costs and time losses (Beise and Stahl, 1999; 
Santoro and Gopalakrishnan, 2001). This should be most important for high-level 
scientists with high opportunity costs of time used for interaction with licensees 
rather than for doing research (Stephan, 1996). 
The main objective of our empirical analysis is to find out whether the 
dependence of expected profits on distance implied by (3-2) can be found in 
empirical data. To do so, we have to be more specific as to how we expect potential 
licensees to react to distance, and how this reaction would affect the observable 
outcomes of commercialization activities: the likelihood of successful 
commercialization and the profits realized through commercialization. A variety of 
outcomes (or scenarios) can be considered plausible in this context. 
We take as our benchmark scenario (Scenario 1 in Table 3-1) the possibility 
that, in contrast to the above considerations, distance does not substantially 
influence commercial success from a license. In this case, we would expect that 
neither the likelihood to successfully commercialize licensed technologies nor the 
level of profits realized through commercialization vary with the distance between 
inventors and licensees. 
Alternatively, assume that distance does affect the expected profit 
contribution from the commercialized technologies in non-negligible ways. In 
equation (3-2) we assumed that distance increases the cost of commercialization. 
Depending on what assumptions we make about firm heterogeneity and the 
effectiveness of competition for the license, this may still lead to different outcomes. 
One possibility is that firms are highly heterogeneous. This does not seem an 
unreasonable assumption as markets for technologies from public research are 
usually thin: the number of firms interested in, and capable of, further developing 
and marketing academic inventions is in most cases small (Contractor, 1981; 
Jensen and Thursby, 2001). Accordingly, it may well be that the most suitable 
licensee for a specific technology happens to be located far from the academic 
inventors, and that its expected profits from licensing exceed those of more closely 
located potential licensees even after accounting for the costs of distance. (In the 
extreme case, it may be the only potential licensee expecting to generate positive 
profits from licensing the technology.) Aware of the fact that interaction with the 
inventors will be costly, the maximum price that this potential licensee is willing to 
pay for the license will be adjusted downward. Yet since there are no better offers 
from other potential licensees, the licensor may agree to the firm’s terms and the 
licensing agreement will be concluded. As a consequence, we expect that a distant 
licensee’s profits from successful commercialization are smaller than if the same 
technology had been licensed to a (hypothetical) identical licensee located more 
closely to the inventors. In the aggregate, longer distances between licensees and 
inventors should then be associated with lower profits (Scenario 2 in Table 3-1). 
Now assume a slightly different situation where two potential licensees 
compete for a license on the same academic invention. One of them is more distant; 
i.e. it has to bear higher costs of commercialization according to (3-2). To obtain a 
license, the more distant licensee needs to offer at least the same price as the more 
closely located competitor. This is only consistent with the non-negativity constraint 
for expected profits if the more distant competitor has a higher inherent probability of 
successful commercialization compensating for its disadvantage in costs. 
Otherwise, it will not be able to license the invention. Put differently, the observable 
set of licensing agreements is truncated with more distant licensees having a higher 
minimum probability of success. In this situation, we would therefore expect to find 
that inventions licensed to more distant licensees yield lower profits, but have a 
higher chance of being commercialized. This outcome is expressed as Scenario 3 in 
Table 3-1. 
There are yet further possible patterns of outcomes. Equation (3-2) assumed 
that distance reduces profit  by increasing the cost  of commercializing 
academic inventions, but does not reduce the probability  of successful 
commercialization. This is obviously a restrictive assumption. We now explore the 
symmetric possibility that distance only affects  but not . For example, imagine 
that licensees have a fixed budget for inventor interaction (or inventors have a fixed 
amount of time allocated for firm contacts). Increasing distance between licensee 
and inventor would then reduce the intensity of interaction, which would lower the 
chances that a successful outcome is realized. We can express this situation in a 
variant of equation (3-2) where  is a function of distance (with )
while  no longer depends on distance: 
. (3-2')
If (3-2') is a valid model of expected profits, there are again two alternative 
scenarios analogous to Scenarios 2 and 3, respectively. If a distant firm is 
sufficiently superior to all other potential licensees to not face effective competition 
for the license, it will be able to negotiate a license agreement at a discounted price, 
thus satisfying its non-negativity constraint. In the aggregate this should lead to a 
negative association between commercialization likelihood and distance, 
constituting our Scenario 4. In contrast, if firms do face effective competition from 
other potential licensees and therefore a lower bound of licensing fees, profits of 
more distant licensees have to be higher to satisfy the non-negativity condition in 
spite of their lower commercialization likelihood. Otherwise, distant firms will refrain 
from licensing. Accordingly, in this situation (Scenario 5 in Table 3-1), higher profits 
in case of successful commercialization have to compensate distant licensees for 
lower chances of success. For the (truncated) sample of observable licensing 
agreements we therefore expect that distance is negatively associated with 
commercialization likelihood and positively associated with profits. 
A look at Table 3-1 shows that it is difficult to come up with unequivocal 
predictions regarding the effect of distance on commercialization outcomes. In 
Scenarios 2-5, disadvantages of more distant licensees may lead to lower or higher 
commercialization likelihoods or profits. In essence, this is due to the fact that only 
mutually beneficial licensing agreements are entered into. The agreements we 
observe in reality are a selected subsample of all potential licensing agreements, 
where potential licensees self-select into profitable agreements. However, the higher 
commercialization likelihoods (profits) of more distant licensees expected in 
Scenarios 3 and 5 compensate for lower profits (commercialization likelihoods). 
Thus, if distance is a relevant impediment to successful commercialization we may 
observe a positive association of distance with one, but not both indicators of 
commercialization outcomes. (In contrast, Scenarios 2 and 4 could be combined to 
yield a negative association with both indicators: if distance affected both costs and 
probabilities of commercialization, this could result in lower commercialization 
likelihoods and lower profits if terms of licensing agreements adjust.)  
There is a plausible scenario in which we would expect more distant 
licensees to have higher commercialization likelihoods and higher profits from 
commercialization (Scenario 6 in Table 3-1). In this scenario, we need to assume 
that local firms may obtain licenses for academic inventions even though they are 
inherently inferior to more distant firms. This could have different reasons. One 
simple possibility is that distant firms lack information about profitable licensing 
agreements. Alternatively, it could be that licensors of academic inventions are 
discriminating against more distant potential licensees. This latter assumption is 
plausible in the context of academic inventions since some universities and other 
PROs pursue regional development objectives as part of their general missions and 
more specifically in their technology transfer activities (Belenzon and Schankerman, 
2009). If these objectives induce technology licensing offices to license inventions to 
local firms even though they are inferior to more distant competitors, local licensees 
may show a weaker commercialization performance, in terms of both 
commercialization likelihoods and profits, than their more distant counterparts. 
Table 3-1: Predicted Effects of Distance on Outcomes 
Scenario Characterization 
Effect of distance on 
probability of 
commercialization 
Effect of distance on 
licensee profits 
1 Costs of distance negligible o o
2 Distance increases cost; no effective competition for license o – 
3 Distance increases cost; effective competition for license + – 
4
Distance reduces 
commercialization likelihood; no 





effective competition for license 
– + 
6 Discrimination against more distant licensees + + 
3.2.2 Licensee-specific Effects of Distance 
The above considerations about the costs of distance suggest that all other 
things being equal, it may be attractive for licensees to be in the proximity of 
academic inventors, even in a world where technology has dramatically improved 
the possibilities and reduced the costs of codifying and transmitting knowledge 
across the world by electronic communication superhighways. In addition, we 
assumed that all licensees are not equal. 
Some forms of heterogeneity seem especially relevant. In particular, being 
less well equipped with capabilities and complementary assets (Teece, 1986; Teece 
et al., 1997; Shane, 2002) academic spin-offs may be more reliant on inventor 
cooperation. By definition, spin-offs are organized by academic inventors. Note, 
however, that often not all inventors of a technology join the spin-off. Moreover, 
even if all inventors are part of the spin-off team, proximity to the institute where an 
invention was made may still yield benefits to the firm because knowledge held by 
prior co-workers in the institute is relevant for its further development efforts.
Differences between spin-off and external licensees may be further pronounced 
because successful commercialization of a specific invention will often be more 
relevant for the survival of a recently established spin-off licensee than for an 
external incumbent licensee (Lowe and Ziedonis, 2006). Furthermore, spin-off 
licensees can be expected to be more flexible in their location decisions than 
external licensees, which in our empirical context are almost exclusively established 
incumbents tied to their pre-existing locations. Given these potential differences, we 
will allow the effects of distance on commercialization outcomes to differ across 
licensee types in our empirical analysis.14
Problems of knowledge transfer and efficient collaboration caused by 
geographic distance may be further increased for foreign licensees because 
international travel tends to be more costly and time consuming than domestic 
travel. Cultural and linguistic differences also play an important role, particularly if 
frequent face-to-face contact is required to access tacit knowledge (Maskell and 
Malmberg, 1999; Leamer and Storper, 2001). This is particularly important in a more 
open European Union, where licensees in border regions can be geographically 
close to a public research institution but separated by different languages and 
cultures (Arundel and Geuna, 2004). To allow for the possibility that cultural and 
linguistic differences rather than geographic distance drive differences in 
commercialization outcomes, we will distinguish between domestic and foreign 
licensees in the empirical analysis. 
3.3 Empirical Context: The Max Planck Society 
We analyze the geographic dimension of licensing in the context of the 
German Max Planck Society. Public research in Germany is characterized by a 
distinctive division of labor. Non-university public research organizations play an 
important role in this system, with the Max Planck Society being the largest 
organization focusing on basic research. Its primary task is to complement university 
research by engaging in large-scale, interdisciplinary, or particularly innovative 
activities in science, (parts of) engineering and the humanities. The Max Planck 
Society receives almost 80 per cent of its budget from public, institutional funding 
and employs close to 5,000 researchers (Max Planck Society, 2008). These work in 
80 disciplinary or topical institutes. Geographically, Max Planck Institutes are 
dispersed throughout the country; in most cases they are located close to a public 
university. The geographic dispersion reflects the federalist character of the German 
political system, as federal and regional governments (Bund and Länder) share the 
costs of supporting the Max Planck Society. The roots of the Max Planck Society 
                                                
14 In unreported OLS regressions with distance as the dependent variable, we found that, controlling for 
other characteristics of inventions and licensees, spin-offs are significantly more closely located to 
inventors than external licensees. 
date back to the early 20th century when its predecessor was established. While the 
number of institutes has increased substantially over time, most institutes have been 
located in the same city for decades, while their research agenda has shifted 
substantially over time. New institutes are generally located in the vicinity of 
universities. Given the Max Planck Society’s mission, proximity to relevant industrial 
partners is not a major consideration in location choices. 
Already before the professors’ privilege was abolished in Germany in 2002, 
Max Planck researchers, just like employees of private-sector firms, were (and still 
are) subject to the law on employee inventions. This law mandates that employees 
have to disclose their inventions to their employer, which is the legal owner of the 
intellectual property. To manage its patent applications and technology licensing, the 
Max Planck Society in 1970 established a legally independent technology transfer 
subsidiary, which is presently named Max Planck Innovation GmbH. Staff members 
of Max Planck Innovation, which is co-located with the Society’s central 
administration in Munich, regularly visit the individual institutes to solicit the 
disclosure of new inventions. Patent applications are handled in cooperation with 
external patent attorneys. Technologies are marketed to domestic and foreign firms, 
including spin-offs. The latter have been actively supported since the early 1990s.  
Max Planck Innovation has concluded more than 1,500 license agreements 
since 1979 (Max Planck Innovation, 2007). Accumulated returns from technology 
transfer activities exceed € 200 million, with most income resulting from a handful of 
“blockbuster” inventions. In the case of successful licensing, academic inventors 
receive 30 per cent of all revenues, and the Max Planck Institute employing the 
researcher gets an additional third of all income. The Max Planck Society uses the 
residual income to finance the operations of Max Planck Innovation. 
3.4 Data and Methods 
3.4.1 Data 
The present study is based on information provided by Max Planck 
Innovation GmbH that has been analyzed in earlier work by Buenstorf and Geissler 
(2012). The dataset covers all inventions disclosed by Max Planck researchers from 
the mid-1960s to the beginning of 2005. In total 3,012 inventions have been 
disclosed to the Max Planck Society, of which 1,885 resulted in a patent application. 
Information is available about the date of disclosure and patent application, the 
institute that the respective invention comes from, invention-specific characteristics 
such as the involvement of senior scientists, as well as whether an invention has 
been licensed or not. 
Our empirical analysis focuses on the subset of all 864 inventions that have 
been licensed to private-sector firms. Since a number of inventions are licensed 
non-exclusively to multiple licensees, there are in total 1,172 license agreements. 
Furthermore, a substantial number of license agreements cover multiple inventions 
licensed to a single licensee in a bundle. Lacking more detailed information on the 
value of the individual inventions combined in such bundles, we treat them as 
separate observations in the empirical analysis, dividing observed royalty payments 
(if any) equally among the bundled inventions and including an indicator variable 
denoting bundled licenses in the model specifications. For each license agreement, 
information is available about the name, type and the location of the licensee, the 
dates of conclusion and (possibly) termination, as well as all amounts and dates of 
payments based on the license agreement.  
To minimize right censoring problems, we restrict the sample to inventions 
disclosed 2004 or earlier while using information about licenses and payments up to 
2007. The empirical analysis is further restricted to inventions disclosed in 1980 or 
later for two reasons: First, before 1980 Max Planck Innovation (then named 
Garching Innovation GmbH) pursued a different overall strategy. For example, it not 
only managed inventions disclosed by Max Planck researchers, but also offered its 
services to external customers, mostly other public research organizations. Second, 
information available for the pre-1980 inventions is inferior to that related to the later 
inventions. These restrictions leave us with a total of 2,376 disclosed inventions. Of 
these, 773 have been licensed; they are subject to a total of 1,047 license 
agreements.
Sample size is further reduced by restricting the analysis to license 
agreements providing for sales-dependent royalty payments in the case of 
successful commercialization by the licensee. This restriction is necessary because 
the commercial success of a licensed technology is not directly observable but has 
to be inferred from the incidence and level of positive royalty payments. Our data 
include yearly royalty payments for all individual contracts from conclusion to 2007 
or prior termination.15 In total, 731 contracts provide for royalty payments (with or 
without additional fixed fees), of which 365 (50 percent) have been successfully 
commercialized (Table 3-2). 
                                                
15 Payments are discounted to the base year 2000 and are adjusted to Deutsche Mark.





















For a small number of contracts key information about the invention or the licensee 
could not be retrieved, yielding a final sample size of 715 for the subsequent 
empirical analysis. 
3.4.2 Variables 
In line with the considerations in section 3-2, the subsequent empirical 
analysis employs two different indicators of successful commercialization. First, we 
constructed a binary variable indicating all license agreements leading to positive 
royalty payments for the Max Planck Society. Second, to also account for 
differences in the returns from license agreements, we employ the sum of 
discounted royalty payments from the licensee to the Max Planck Society as an 
alternative indicator of commercial success. As payments for the individual license 
agreements are highly skewed we employ the natural logarithm of accumulated 
royalties (Figure 3-1). Royalty payments are mostly proportional to the licensee’s 
total revenues from the commercialized academic invention. They constitute the 
best proxy we could obtain for the profit contribution made by the respective 
invention (cf. also Lowe and Ziedonis, 2006). 
Note: The graph pictures a histogram of the natural logarithm of accumulated royalty payments from 
1980 through 2007 for licensed inventions where licensing agreements provided for royalty payments. 
Additionally, a kernel density function is plotted. 
Figure 3-1: Cumulated Royalties 
The principal explanatory variable in the empirical analysis is the geographic 
distance between a licensee and the institute where the licensed invention was 
developed. Our measure of geographic distance was constructed as follows. We 
used postal addresses to derive latitude and longitude measures of the locations of 
licensors and licensees. Employing the method suggested by Sorenson (2004), 
these were then transformed into radian values to calculate geographic distances.16
In total, 720 distances were calculated for the restricted sample between all 
licensing Max Planck Institutes and their corresponding licensees. Since the Max 
Planck Society licenses its inventions on a global scale, geographic distance ranges 
from 0 to more than 16,000 kilometers.  
As the distribution of distances is highly skewed we employ the natural 
logarithm of this variable (Figure 3-2). Alternatively, distance is measured by a set of 
indicator variables for different ranges. To pick up interactions within the same urban 
                                                
16 Even though Germany is a relatively small country, accounting for the earth’s curvature is relevant in 
our context because of the presence of international, particularly intercontinental license agreements. 
Travel times are inferior to geographic distance in our context because they vary over time and are 
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area, our smallest category includes all distances shorter than 50 kilometers.17 The 
other distance ranges are 50-100 kilometers, 100-500 kilometers (corresponding to 
the maximum distance that can normally be covered in a daytrip), as well as all 
distances larger than 500 kilometers. To study international licensing, licensees are 
further classified in domestic and foreign according to their postal address. Because 
our theoretical considerations focus on physical distance between the parties to a 
license agreement, foreign subsidies located in Germany are counted as German 
licensees. Of the 731 licenses for inventions disclosed between 1980 and 2004, 227 
are classified as foreign and 502 as domestic. Based on this distinction we classify 
our distance measure into domestic or foreign distance. Figure 3-3 depicts log 
distance for both domestic and foreign licensees. 
Note: The graph pictures a histogram of the natural logarithm of distances with a kernel density 
function of licensed inventions disclosed from 1980 through 2004 where licensing agreements provided 
for royalties. 
Figure 3-2: Geographic Distance 
                                                
17 Belenzon and Schankerman (2012) similarly use a 25-mile distance as their smallest category in 
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Note: The graph pictures two histograms of the natural logarithm of domestic and foreign distances of 
licensed inventions disclosed from 1980 through 2004 where licensing agreements provided for 
royalties. Additionally, a kernel density function is plotted. 
Figure 3-3: Geographic Distance Separated by Domestic and Foreign Licensees 
The analysis includes further information about licensees as well as 
inventions and their inventors. Licensees are classified into spin-offs (i.e., firms 
started by Max Planck researchers) and external licensees on the basis of the Max 
Planck Innovation’s spin-off database. In total 228 license agreements with spin-offs 
and 470 with external licensees have been identified.18 We also employ an indicator 
variable denoting repeat licensees for which earlier license agreements with the Max 
Planck Society can be found. (This includes a number of spin-offs). This variable is 
motivated by the conjecture that if later license agreements are related to earlier 
ones, their odds of commercialization may be larger due to pre-established contacts 
and accumulated knowledge. 
Inventions are classified according to the section of the Max Planck Society 
from which they originate (biomedical section versus chemistry/physics/technology 
section)19 and whether or not they were invented at one of the leading five institutes 
in terms of disclosed inventions (which jointly account for 42% of all inventions). To 
identify inventions by senior researchers, an indicator variable denotes inventions 
                                                
18 Small numbers of licensees could not be classified reliably; they are omitted in the empirical 
analysis. 
19 The Max Planck Society also has a third, social science, section. No invention in our dataset 
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having a Max Planck director among their inventors. Directors are the top-level 
researchers employed at the Max Planck Society. Depending on its size, each 
institute has between two and about twelve directors, many of whom can be 
considered star scientists. The dataset includes 282 cases of director involvement in 
the licensed invention. Time effects (older inventions are exposed longer to the 
hazards of licensing and commercialization than are younger ones) are recorded by 
an integer variable denoting the year of disclosure starting with a zero in 1980. 
We also employ information about patent applications related to licensed 
inventions. Patent applications indicate that intellectual property on the underlying 
technology can in principle be obtained. This could facilitate commercialization 
because it is less risky for the licensee to spend money on the further development 
of the technology. On the other hand, with patented inventions, strategic use of the 
intellectual property and “shelving” become options for the licensee, which may be 
reflected in reduced commercialization rates (cf. Buenstorf and Geissler, 2012). 
Finally, to control for differences across technology fields, licensees are classified 
into three broad sectors using standard industrial classification (SIC) codes. More 
precisely, we first divided firms into manufacturing, services, and others. 
Manufacturing firms were then further divided into chemical products, instruments 
and related products, as well as other manufacturing products and equipments. This 
makes for a total of five different fields of licensees. The descriptive statistics and 
correlations between the independent variables are provided in Tables 3-3 through 
3-5.
Table 3-3: Descriptive Statistics, 1980-2004 
All inventions Licensed inventions with provisions for royalties 
Variables Obs. Mean Min Max Obs. Mean Min Max 
Commercial success     715 0.499 0 1 
Ln royalties     715 4.774 0 19.109 
Ln distance     715 5.395 0 9.692 
Disclosure year 2,223 14.526 0 24 715 13.348 0 24 
Biomed 2,223 0.615 0 1 715 0.775 0 1
Director involvement 2,223 0.143 0 1 715 0.393 0 1 
Patent 2,223 0.633 0 1 715 0.706 0 1
Spin-off  715 0.327 0 1
Foreign  715 0.315 0 1
Bundle  715 0.299 0 1











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.4.3 Empirical Approach 
To assess the influence of geographic distance on commercialization 
outcomes, we estimate a set of models where we regress our measures of 
commercial success on a variety of licensee and technology characteristics, 
controlling for time effects. This leads to the general model: 
(3-3)
where y measures commercial success of invention j licensed to firm i.
Specifications of model (3-3) vary according to dependent variables. To analyze the 
likelihood of successful commercialization, a series of probit models is estimated in 
which the dependent variable takes the value of one if positive royalty payments 
have been realized and zero otherwise. Tobit models are employed to estimate 
models in which accumulated license payments are the dependent variable. 
Payments are left-censored at zero which is taken into account in the tobit models. 
Given that accumulated payments are highly skewed, we employ the natural log. 
Throughout the analysis, standard errors clustered by inventions are estimated to 
control for the occurrence of multiple licensing of the same technology. 
Our empirical analysis is subject to several econometric concerns. One of 
these is selection bias, which may be caused by two different processes. First, 
commercialization outcomes are only observable for the subset of licensed
inventions, which are a non-random sample of all inventions. To control for the bias 
that could result from non-random selection into licensing, we applied the two-stage 
estimation procedure proposed by Heckman (1979). As we show in more detail in 
the appendix, inventor characteristics are well-suited to explain selection into 
licensing. The empirical results of the Heckman models (reported in the appendix B) 
indicate that non-random selection into licensing is not of major concern for our 
sample, as we cannot reject the null hypothesis that commercialization outcomes 
are independent of selection into licensing. 
The second potential selection problem concerns licensee characteristics. 
Specifically, licensing decisions of spin-offs may differ substantially from those of 
external licensees. This is consistent with the empirical results obtained by 
Buenstorf and Geissler (2012) in the empirical context of the present study. To allow 
for differences in the factors shaping commercialization outcomes of both licensee 
types, including our distance measures, we estimate our principal models jointly for 
spin-offs and external licensees, and also separately for the two types of licensees.  
The sample split into spin-offs and external licensees also helps to limit the 
problem that distances between inventors and licensees may not always be 
exogenously given. Endogenous location choices driven by the objective to be close 
to the origins of the licensed technology are a particularly relevant concern in the 
case of (first-time) spin-off licensees. In contrast, most external licensees in our 
sample are large, pre-existing firms, and there are no indications they set up new 
facilities to commercialize in-licensed Max Planck technologies. We address the 
endogeneity issue by re-estimating (3-3) using instruments for the inventor-licensee 
distance. 
Finally, while we analyze a homogeneous institutional context and control for 
a range of licensee and technology characteristics, unobserved heterogeneity 
across inventions may still affect observed commercialization outcomes. For the 
majority of inventions (those licensed to a single firm), we cannot avoid this problem. 
However, for the smaller subset of inventions that were licensed non-exclusively to 
different firms, we also report results from model specifications controlling for 
invention-specific effects. 
3.5 Results 
We begin by estimating how the distance between inventors and licensees is 
related to the likelihood that a licensed invention is successfully commercialized 
(indicated by positive royalty payments). Model 1a (Table 3-6) is estimated for the 
full population of licensed inventions. It finds no evidence that commercialization 
outcomes vary with the distance between inventors and licensees. Significant 
marginal effects are obtained for several other variables included in the model. First, 
more recent inventions are less likely to be commercialized than older ones. This 
finding (which is also reproduced in the subsequent models) may in part reflect the 
right-censored nature of our data. However, we suspect that it also indicates a 
reduced average quality of inventions, which may result from new entry of inventors 
into the market for technology.20 Second, we find that patented inventions are less 
often commercialized than those for which no patent application is documented. 
This result is robust throughout our further analysis. It suggests that both spin-offs 
and external licensees obtain a substantial share of licenses for strategic reasons. In 
addition, spin-offs appear to be less likely to commercialize (the marginal effect of 
the spin-off variable is significant at the 10% level). Model 1b and 1c, respectively, 
re-estimate the same model separately for spin-offs and external licensees. The 
                                                
20 Similar temporal patterns have been found for patents of U.S. universities (c.f. Henderson et al., 
1998). 
main result of Model 1a is reproduced: geographic distance is not systematically 
associated with differences in commercialization likelihoods. As regards the other 
explanatory variables, differences between the types of licensees are modest. 
Tobit estimations of specifications analogous to Models 1a-c but using 
logged accumulated royalty payments to the Max Planck Society resulting from a 
license (our proxy of profits) as dependent variable are reported as Models 4a-c in 
Table 3-7. Similar to the results for commercialization likelihood, no systematic 
effects of geographic distance are suggested by these models.21
We further probe these findings in Models 2a-c (Table 3-6) and Models 5a-c 
(Table 3-7), where the continuous (log) distance variable is replaced by indicator 
variables denoting ranges of distances from 50-100, 100-500 and 500+ kilometers. 
(Inventions licensed within a 50-kilometer range from the inventors form the omitted 
reference group.) This leads to very similar results for the full sample (Models 2a 
and 5a) and for the external licensees (Models 2c and 5c). In both cases, neither the 
likelihood nor the extent of commercial success varies across the distance ranges. 
In contrast, for the spin-off sample Models 2b and 5b suggest superior outcomes for 
licensees located in the 100-500 kilometer range from the inventors. However, 
similar to Models 1a-c and 4a-c, there is no evidence suggesting that even more 
distant licensees are disadvantaged vis-à-vis firms located in close proximity to the 
inventing Max Planck Institute. In addition, none of the positive coefficients obtained 
in the models is counterbalanced by a negative coefficient for the alternative 
indicator of successful commercialization. This is not suggestive of distant firms 
compensating lower commercialization likelihoods with higher profits or vice versa 
(as was suggested above in Scenarios 3 and 5).22
                                                
21 As a robustness check we alternatively estimated OLS regressions. This did not lead to qualitative 
differences in results. 
22 We also experimented with (unreported) models using linear and quadratic measures of the 
continuous distance measure employed in models 1a-c. Both terms are insignificant in all 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Models 3a-c (Table 3-6) and 6a-c (Table 3-7), the continuous distance 
measure from Models 1a-c and 4a-c is split up into separate measures for domestic 
and foreign licensees. Results from these models lend little support to the conjecture 
that distances across national borders have more adverse effects than domestic 
distances. For the full dataset analyzed in Model 3a, a significantly positive marginal 
effect of domestic distance is estimated. The marginal effect for the distance to 
foreign licensees is significantly smaller (p < 0.04) and not significantly different from 
zero. In the corresponding Model 6a we likewise find a (marginally) significant 
positive association of domestic distance, but not of foreign distance, to the level of 
royalty payments. Both marginal effects do not differ significantly from each other (p 
< 0.21). Looking at the individual types of licensees, the most pronounced patterns 
are obtained for the spin-off licensees studied in Models 3b and 6b. In both models, 
increasing domestic distance is associated with more favorable outcomes, while 
increasing distance to foreign licensees is related to inferior commercialization 
results. In contrast, for the external licensees both measures are insignificant and do 
not differ from each other (Models 3c and 6c). 
As noted above, the distance between inventors and licensees may plausibly 
be endogenous in the case of newly established spin-offs, which might strategically 
select their location to benefit from the proximity to the origins of licensed 
inventions.23 To address the endogeneity concern, we estimated models of 
commercializing outcomes using an instrumental variable (IV) for the distance 
between inventors and spin-off licensees. Specifically, we identified the founders of 
all spin-off licensees and retrieved their place of birth, primarily using biographic 
information from Ph.D. dissertations and from a published directory (Max Planck 
Society, 2006). We then calculated the (log) distances between founder birthplaces 
and the locations of the respective licensing institutes (Ln origin), and used these to 
instrument the distance between spin-off location and licensing institute.24 These 
distances qualify as an instrument because they are exogenous, correlated with the 
potentially endogenous distance variable, and do not predict commercialization 
                                                
23 To some extent, this concern is mitigated by the fact that only about 50% of the inventions licensed 
to spin-offs were licensed in the spin-off’s first two years. For the subsequent licenses obtained by 
spin-offs, endogeneity of location choices seems much less of a problem.  
24 In some cases, information about birth places could not be obtained. Where possible, we used the 
location of the respective individual’s Ph.D. as a substitute. Three observations had to be eliminated 
from the sample because neither birth places nor Ph.D. locations could be identified. In the case of 
founder teams, distances were calculated for the first founder listed. We alternatively experimented 
with selecting the most senior (in terms of academic standing) founder in the team to estimate the 
distance used as an instrument. While IV regressions using that alternative instrument led to 
qualitatively identical results to the ones reported below, they are less trustworthy because the 
instrument is considerably weaker.  
outcomes.25 Choosing them as an instrument is based on the empirical observation 
that entrepreneurial location choices are often biased toward the entrepreneur’s 
home region (cf., e.g., Dahl and Sorenson, 2011). Even though most scientists 
move repeatedly during their career, we still expect this bias to show in spin-off 
location patterns.26
Results of the IV regressions are reported as Models 7 and 8 in Table 3-8. 
Model 7 is an instrumental variable probit regression analogous to the above Model 
1b (the coefficient estimates obtained for that model are also reported in Table 3-8 
to allow for comparisons). The IV probit finds a positive association between 
distance and commercialization likelihood, which however is insignificant and 
considerably smaller than in the simple probit model. Coefficients for the other 
variables are nearly similar to Model 1b. Model 8 uses an IV tobit model analogous 
to Model 4b. It finds a negative association between distance and levels of royalties, 
which again is far from attaining statistical significance. We thus conclude that 
accounting for potential endogeneity of spin-off locations, we still do not find 
evidence suggesting systematic effects of distance on commercialization outcomes. 
                                                
25 The instrument’s correlation with the distance between spin-off location and licensing institute is 
0.32. In a model analogous to Model 1, we obtained a coefficient estimate of -0.002 and a z-value of -
0.03 (p > 0.979) for the instrument. Its first-stage F-statistic in a 2SLS IV regression of royalties 
analogous to Model 4b is 12.048. 
26 Recent work in entrepreneurship (e.g., Dahl and Sorenson, 2011) finds a positive association 
between startup success and regional founder backgrounds, which might compromise the validity of 
our instrument. However, in addition to not finding a systematic relationship with commercialization 
outcomes (cf. the previous footnote), this concern seems less relevant in our context because (i) we 
use information about birthplaces, which are often not close to where founders lived prior to 
establishing their spin-off, and (ii) we study scientists, who given their career specialization are less 
likely than other entrepreneurs to possess resources that have been suggested to underlie the success 
of regional founders (such as in-depth knowledge about local sources of capital). 























































































Sectoral controls Included 
Instrumented Ln distance Ln distance 
Instrument Ln origin Ln origin 










P>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Robust standard errors (clustered by invention) in parentheses; *; **; and *** denote significance at the 
0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Finally, to assess the role of unobserved heterogeneity across inventions, we 
estimate model variants including indicator variables for each licensed invention to 
control for invention-specific effects. This approach is obviously limited to the subset 
of inventions that were licensed more than once (120 inventions yielding a total of 
272 observations). Results from these models are of limited generality. Since 
exclusive access to a technology enhances the chances that a licensee can recoup 
its R&D expenditures, we would expect those inventions that require most further 
development effort by the licensee to be most likely to be licensed exclusively. They 
would therefore not be included in the subset of inventions with multiple licensees. 
We are moreover limited to the level of royalties as a dependent variable, because 
in many cases there is no variation in the binary outcome variable across the 
licensees of a single invention. 
Three models controlling for invention-specific effects are estimated. Model 9 
(Table 3-9) replicates Model 4a using the log distance measure. This model does 
suggest that if the same invention is licensed to licensees at different distances, 
royalty payments decrease with the distance between inventors and licensees, 
which would be consistent with higher costs of commercialization for more distant 
licensees. Model 10, however, indicates that this conclusion may be problematic. In 
this model, which employs the set of indicator variables for the alternative distance 
ranges, licensees located in the 100-500 kilometer range generate significantly 
higher royalties than those located less than 50 kilometers away from the inventors. 
Licensees located more than 500 kilometers away from the inventors generate lower 
royalties than those located less than 50 kilometers away from the inventors. These 
nonlinear relationships are hard to reconcile with the argument that increasing 
distance impedes successful commercialization of academic inventions. Finally, 
Model 11 distinguishes domestic from foreign licensees. Similar to the pattern we 
had found above for spin-offs (Model 6b), royalties are positively associated with 
domestic distances, and negatively with foreign distances.27
Table 3-9: Multiple Licenses with Invention-specific Controls (Tobit) 
Ln royalty payments 
Model 9  
(All) 
Model 10  
(All) 
Model 11  
(All) 
Ln distance -0.277*** 
(0.004) 
50-100 km -6.880*** 
(0.085) 
100-500 km 0.712*** 
(0.065) 
> 500 km -0.939*** 
(0.044) 
Ln domestic distance 0.074*** 
(0.012) 
Ln foreign distance -0.173*** 
(0.004) 
























Sectoral controls Included 
Invention-specific effects Included 






P>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.266 0.271 0.266 
Robust standard errors (clustered by invention) in parentheses; *; **; and *** denote significance at the 
0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
3.6 Conclusions: A Regional Mission for Technology 
Licensing from Public Research? 
In this paper we studied potential effects of geographic distance on the 
commercialization of inventions made in public research and licensed to private-
sector firms. Our findings provide little support to the conjecture that the 
                                                
27 One further set of models was estimated in which we explored the association of distance and 
commercialization outcomes changed over time, possibly because of improved communication 
technology becoming available in the 1990s. The (unreported) results do not suggest systematic 
differences between the subsamples of pre-1995 and later inventions. 
commercialization of academic inventions is harmed by geographic distance 
between inventors and licensees. Results suggestive of adverse effects of distance 
were only obtained for foreign spin-off licensees, and for foreign firms among 
multiple licensees of inventions. The above theoretical considerations moreover 
indicated that a positive association between geographic distance and 
commercialization outcomes could be consistent with adverse effects of distance, 
provided that distant licensees self-select into profitable licensing agreements. As 
we argued above, this should result in higher commercialization likelihoods 
compensating for lower profits or vice versa (Scenarios 3 and 5 in Table 3-1). While 
we cannot directly observe licensee profits, based on our proxy variable – 
accumulated royalty payments to the Max Planck Society - we find no evidence that 
this kind of compensation can explain the positive coefficients obtained for some 
distance measures in some models. We thus conclude that geographic distance is 
generally not an important determinant of commercialization outcomes.  
Earlier results obtained by Agrawal (2006) indicate that inventor involvement 
plays a crucial role for commercialization academic inventions. In light of his 
evidence, our results suggest that inventor involvement is not seriously impaired by 
geographic distance, not even for senior and “star” scientists. This interpretation 
resonates with the earlier findings by Audretsch and Stephan (1996) that the 
majority of firm-scientist links in U.S. biotechnology were non-local. At the same 
time, while they only observed that interaction patterns were dispersed 
geographically, our results provide evidence that this dispersion seems to be 
functional. 
Some universities and public research organizations emphasize their mission 
to support regional private-sector R&D activities. Preferential licensing to regional 
firms might be considered as one type of policy to attain this objective. Our results 
do not suggest this would be an efficient strategy from a societal perspective. This 
conclusion is in line with the finding of Belenzon and Schankerman (2009) that U.S. 
universities that pursued strong local development objectives generated about a 
third less income per license than those that did not. It runs counter, however, to the 
importance that policy makers and university administrations often attribute to the 
role of interactions with regional firms. 
The above analysis is not without limitations. While focusing on a single 
organization helps limit the impact of organizational policies on observed outcomes, 
the Max Planck Society’s dedication to basic research may limit the extent to which 
our findings generalize to other organizational contexts. In addition, we already 
discussed potential issues of selection, endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity. 
Our estimates addressing these concerns indicate that the main results are not 
driven by endogeneity or unobserved heterogeneity, but we cannot conclusively rule 
out this possibility.
In the broader context of regional impacts of public research, the present 
study indicates that distance may be much less important for knowledge transfer via 
contractual licensing relationships between public research and private sector firms 
than for other transfer channels such as disclosure via publications and patents or 
labor mobility. Apparently, some of the “real effects of academic research” (Jaffe, 
1989) are more localized than others, and the multidimensional nature of knowledge 
transfer is still not sufficiently well understood. 
4. Commercializing Inventions from Public Research: 
Does Speed Matter? 
4.1 Introduction 
Research and development (R&D) and the resultant product and process 
innovations are an important determinant for a firm’s success and competitiveness, 
thereby enhancing the economic growth and employment in modern economies 
(Zahra and Nielsen, 2002; OECD, 2003). Due to the rapid changes in economic 
competitiveness, technologies and consumer preferences, the product life cycles 
have dramatically shortened and have increased the importance of the rapid 
development of new products and processes and their implementation into the 
market (Rosenau, 1988; Kessler and Chakrabarti, 1996). 
Aside from a firms’ in-house R&D, universities and public research 
organizations also adopt a particular role as a source of new technologies. 
According to Smith (1995), along with education, public research institutes promote 
scientific research and generate new knowledge, which fosters technological 
progress and new industrial developments. For example, surveyed pharmaceutical 
industry managers reported that a substantial fraction of the new drugs would not 
have been developed or would have been delayed without academic research 
(Mansfield, 1991). Further surveys of industrial R&D executives confirmed the 
importance of university research for innovation (e.g., Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et 
al., 2002). Policy makers undertake considerable efforts to increase the linkages 
between public research institutes and industry. For instance, the Bayh-Dole Act in 
the U.S. and other similar legislative changes advanced technology transfer as one 
of the main objectives of public research institutes. Aside from transfer channels 
such as publications, conferences, consulting, and scientists’ migration (Cohen et 
al., 2002; Agrawal and Henderson, 2002), patenting and licensing has become one 
of the most common instruments for commercializing scientific inventions 
(Bozeman, 2000; Shane, 2002). 
Licensing inventions from public research institutes enables firms to gain 
access to new technologies at the point of their discovery, which can result in 
product or process innovations (George et al., 2002). Not surprisingly, a stream of 
research investigates the determinants and the effectiveness of university-to-
industry technology transfer (e.g., Lee, 1996; Sine et al., 2003; Phan and Siegel, 
2006). A further stream examines the nature of technologies (e.g., Jensen and 
Thursby, 2001; Lowe, 2002; Agrawal, 2006), their commercialization process (e.g., 
Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2003; Debackere and Veugelers, 2005; Audretsch and 
Lehmann, 2005) and the role of technology transfer offices within the transfer 
process (e.g., Bercovitz et al., 2001; Jensen et al., 2003; Wright et al., 2008; 
Swamidass and Vulasa, 2009).28
Moreover, licensing inventions from public research allows firms to skip the 
process of discovery, which reduces the technological risk and can increase the 
speed of innovation (Gold, 1987; Markman et al., 2005). The concept of innovation 
speed is not new and has been applied in a long line of prior studies that are related 
to product development, market launches, and firm performance (e.g., Kessler and 
Bierly, 2002; Carbonell and Rodriguez, 2006; Carbonell et al., 2009). However, the 
relationship between innovation speed and the commercial success of a licensed 
invention is rather unexplored. Furthermore, evidence for the influence of various 
determinants on the speed of technology transfer is still scarce. Consistent with the 
study of Markman et al. (2005), I use time-to-licensing as a proxy for innovation 
speed, which is defined as the elapsed time between the disclosure of an invention 
and the signed licensing contract, to investigate these questions.29 Analyzing these 
questions is important because they contribute to theory on innovation speed, clarify 
the relevance of pace on technology commercialization, and thus can contribute to a 
more effective university-to-industry technology transfer. 
More precisely, this paper aims to analyze how the pace of technology 
transfer is affected by the differences across technology characteristics, which can 
be explained by the problems of knowledge transfer for particular inventions (cf. 
Buenstorf and Geissler, 2012). In addition, the influence of time-to-licensing on both 
the likelihood and the extent of commercial success is studied. To the best of my 
knowledge, only the study of Markman et al. (2005) analyzes the determinants of 
time-to-licensing and its influence on commercial success. Their study is devoted to 
the institutional determinants of time-to-licensing, while I focus on the invention-
specific characteristics. Specifically, inventions are distinguished with regard to the 
type of technology, i.e., whether an invention belongs to the biomedical section or to 
the chemistry, physics and technology section. Furthermore, the role of patent 
protection, collaboration, and inventor seniority is studied. While much is known 
about the institutional determinants of technology transfer (e.g., Siegel et al., 2004), 
thus far, the empirical studies have neglected to study the effects of the attributes of 
technological inventions on the pace of technology transfer. 
                                                
28 A detailed literature review on technology transfer and the entrepreneurial role of public research 
organizations can be found in Rothaermel et al. (2007). 
29 While Markman et al. (2005) call this ‘commercialization time,’ the expression ‘time-to-licensing’ 
appears to be more intuitive and feasible. Nonetheless, the meaning and the definition of both 
expressions are the same. 
To pursue these issues empirically, a dataset is used with detailed 
information on the licensing activities of the Max Planck Society, Germany’s largest 
non-university public research organization. Whereas the intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) and the IPR-based commercialization of German universities have both 
changed with the introduction of the so-called “Arbeitnehmererfindergesetz” (ArbEG) 
in 2002, the Max Planck Society has been subject to a Bayh-Dole-like legislation 
since the 1970s. This circumstance provides a rich set of inventions and licensing 
activities with more than 2,300 inventions and approximately 770 license 
agreements for the 1980-2004 time period. To identify the time-to-licensing, the 
dataset includes information on the dates of disclosure and of the license execution. 
In addition, the dataset contains information on the royalty payments, i.e., whether 
the invention has been successfully commercialized, as well as on the magnitude of 
the returns. 
The regression results reveal that time-to-licensing does not influence the 
commercial success of the inventions disclosed between 1980 and 2004. However, 
after separating the effect of time-to-licensing for the inventions disclosed after 
1989, the regression results provide a robust negative influence on the likelihood 
and the extent of commercial success. Furthermore, the inventions from the 
biomedical section, the collaborative inventions with private-sector firms, and the 
participation of senior scientists in the invention development process all require 
less time to become licensed. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section 
presents the related literature on innovation speed. In section 4.3, the hypotheses 
are derived regarding the influence of licensee and technology characteristics on the 
time-to-licensing and its impact on commercial success. Section 4.4 provides 
information about the Max Planck Society, which represents the organizational 
context of the empirical analysis. Section 4.5 describes the data and the research 
design for the empirical analysis, and the results are discussed in section 4.6. I 
conclude the analysis and discuss its implications in section 4.7. 
4.2 Literature Review on Innovation Speed 
In firms, there is scarce time for making strategic decisions, especially in 
frequently changing environments. Rapid decision making and organizational 
processes have become a crucial resource to gain and sustain competitive 
advantages (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jones, 1993). Several studies identify a positive 
relationship between the pace of strategic decision making and firm performance 
(e.g., Judge and Miller, 1991; Baum and Wally, 2003). Next to quick decision 
making, speeding up product development and innovation has become increasingly 
important and has become the focus of scholarly analysis. In this regard, innovation 
speed has been identified as one of the primary factors for strategic success, 
especially for firms that face highly competitive environments, rapid technological 
change and changing market demands (Nadler and Tushman, 1999).
Research on innovation speed has either addressed the determinants and/or 
the influence of speed on performance outcomes. The first string of research, which 
can be separated into the organizational, project and individual levels, examines the 
different determinants of innovation speed. More precisely, this research includes 
studies that address the various procedures within organizations that can accelerate 
innovation speed (e.g., Mansfield, 1988; Cordero, 1991; Ali et al., 1995; Tessarolo, 
2007). For instance, Karagozoglu and Brown (1993) identify the different methods 
and procedures that firms can implement to accelerate their innovation speed using 
data from 35 high-technology firms. Specifically, the customers’ involvement in the 
testing phase and the use of computer-aided tools in the planning phase have been 
identified as boosters for innovation speed. 
Studies at the individual level discuss the person-specific preferences and 
perceptions that influence innovation speed (e.g., Rosenau, 1988). For example, the 
study of Gupta et al. (1992) investigates how R&D, marketing, and manufacturing 
managers in Germany evaluate three critical variables in the product development 
process, namely the development schedule, development costs, and product 
performance. The authors compare the results from Germany and the U.S. and 
assert that all types of German managers placed the greatest emphasis on the 
product development schedule, whereas the U.S. managers did not emphasize the 
product development speed to the same extent. 
Project-based studies investigate the determinants of innovation speed 
associated with various aspects of the product development process (e.g., Millson et 
al., 1992; McDonough, 1993; Bstieler, 2005). For instance, Cooper and Kleinschmidt 
(1994) study the determinants of fast-paced product development using 103 new 
product projects in the chemical industry. They find that cross-functional, dedicated 
and accountable teams with a strong leadership and top management support 
positively influence the pace of product development. Likewise, Kessler and 
Chakrabarti (1999) test the effects of strategic orientation and organizational 
capability on the speed of 75 new product development projects. They conclude that 
clear time goals, longer tenure for the team members, and parallel developments 
increase the speed, whereas product testing decreases the speed. 
The second string of research – the benefits of innovation speed – analyzes 
the impact of innovation speed on outcomes such as development costs, quality or 
performance. The research results suggest that innovation speed has a substantial 
positive impact on new product performance (e.g., Lynn et al., 2000; Chen et al., 
2005). For example, Carbonell and Rodriguez (2006) study the influence of 
innovation speed on product performance based on a survey of 178 manufacturing 
firms. They conclude that innovation speed positively influences new product 
performance in terms of sales, market share and profitability. Further studies 
investigate the influence of innovation speed on product quality (e.g., Harter et al., 
2000; Lukas and Menon, 2004) and development costs (e.g., Graves, 1989; 
Murmann, 1994; Langerak et al., 2008). For instance, Kessler and Bierly (2002) find 
evidence that the innovation speed is positively related to product quality using a 
sample of 75 new product development projects from 10 U.S. firms. Langerak et al. 
(2010) analyze the relationship between innovation speed and development costs 
using survey data from 115 completed product development projects from 
manufacturing firms. They find a U-shaped relationship between innovation speed 
and development costs. Although many studies advertise the benefits of innovation 
speed on outcome measures (e.g., Rosenthal, 1992; Meyer, 1993) other studies 
report opposite effects (e.g., Crawford, 1992; Carmel, 1995). 
Because most studies of innovation speed are focused on in-house 
technological developments and routines, the use of external sources, such as 
licensing, is somewhat unexplored. In an early study, Gold (1987) discusses the 
advantages, limitations and risks of using different external sources to accelerate 
product and process development. Furthermore, Kessler and Chakrabarti (1996) 
suggest that exploiting external sources can increase the speed of innovation 
processes. Thus far, very little prior work has studied the relevance of speeding up 
the technology transfer of inventions from public research organizations. For 
instance, Dechenaux et al. (2003) study the relationship between patent age, which 
is defined as the elapsed time from patent issuance to license, and the commercial 
success or termination of 805 patented technologies from MIT. They observe an 
inverted and a direct U-shaped relationship for the corresponding hazard rates on 
the patent age. Llor (2007) investigates the influence of the delay between patent 
filings and the corresponding transfer agreements on the license revenues of a 
major public research organization in France and finds no correlation between them. 
Markman et al. (2005) analyze the determinants of commercialization time, defined 
as the elapsed time between invention disclosure and the signed licensing contract, 
and its influence on the commercial success of patent-protected technologies from 
public research institutes. More precisely, they investigate the commercialization 
time for 91 U.S. University Technology Transfer Offices (UTTOs) and find that the 
faster UTTOs generate greater returns and have a higher startup formation rate. 
Moreover, several key determinants of speed, such as UTTO resources, their 
competency in identifying licensees, and the participation of faculty-inventors in the 
licensing process, were identified. 
The pace by which inventions are transferred to private-sector firms could be 
important for exploiting the benefits of these novelties to their full extent. Due to 
rapid technological development and change, it appears reasonable that as the shelf 
time of the invention increases, its value decreases and therefore its commercial 
potential (McGrath, 1999; Markman et al., 2005). Moreover, in the meantime, other 
innovative firms can invent similar technologies that substitute for the existing 
inventions (Agarwal and Gort, 2001). These substitutes can reduce the value and 
the returns of the initial disclosed invention. Thus far, insufficient evidence exists as 
to whether and how the speed of technology transfer influences commercial 
success. This study contributes to this gap by analyzing the determinants of time-to-
licensing and whether time-to-licensing influences the commercial success of 
licensed inventions with data from the Max Planck Society. In the following, I derive 
hypotheses regarding the effect of invention-specific determinants on time-to-
licensing, as well as the influence of time-to-licensing on commercial success. 
4.3 Hypotheses Development 
Inventions from public research organizations are one of the major sources 
of commercially viable innovations. Since the introduction of the Bayh-Dole Act in 
1980, which has also been replicated outside of the U.S., public research 
organizations retain the ownership of publicly funded research results (Lissoni et al., 
2008). To organize the protection of the scientists’ IPRs and to actively market their 
inventions, most universities and public research institutes have established 
technology transfer offices (TTOs). Because technology transfer is a complicated 
and time-consuming process, TTOs act as agents and primarily support their 
institutions. This support includes controlling the commercial potential of the 
disclosed inventions, assessing them for patentability, searching for licensees, 
conducting negotiations, and monitoring licensees (Siegel et al., 2003b). 
4.3.1 Invention-specific Determinants 
Following the argument of Buenstorf and Geissler (2012), the difficulties in 
transferring technologies to private-sector firms vary with invention-specific 
determinants. In this regard, technology characteristics can not only influence the 
likelihood of successfully concluding licensing agreements (see Buenstorf and 
Geissler, 2012), but also the pace with which the inventions are transferred to the 
market. Therefore, in an initial step, I investigate how the technology characteristics 
influence the speed with which the disclosed inventions are transferred to the 
market.
Inventions from public research can be differentiated by the technological 
field in which the invention is generated. More specifically, inventions from public 
research can be separated into different fields such as biomedical, technical, 
mechanical, and other sections. It is argued that the technological and commercial 
potential of inventions can vary across the technological fields, which can influence 
the likelihood of licensing (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). In this regard, several 
studies claim that biomedical inventions have a higher potential for being 
commercialized and are thus probably more likely to become licensed because of 
their broad industrial applicability and historical success (Zucker and Darby, 1996; 
Nerkar and Shane, 2007). Thus, the speed of the technology transfer of biomedical 
inventions is expected to be higher compared to the non-biomedical inventions, 
leading to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Inventions from the biomedical section require less time to become 
licensed compared to non-biomedical inventions. 
Furthermore, inventions can be separated by assessing the participation of 
senior scientists in the invention development process. Empirical research reveals a 
positive correlation between inventive output, such as patenting, and the quality of 
research of the individual academic scientists (e.g., Breschi et al., 2008; Azoulay et 
al., 2009). Specifically, senior researchers have a broad knowledge and experience 
in the field of science and close contacts with private-sector firms. Thus, senior 
scientists who participate in an invention process signal its outstanding quality and 
the greater applicability of its technologies, which can influence the likelihood of 
technology transfer to private sector firms. For instance, Buenstorf and Geissler 
(2012) find that seniority positively influences the likelihood of licensing across all 
licensees. Due to the higher reputation of senior scientists, it is expected that their 
inventions are licensed more quickly to private-sector firms compared to the 
inventions generated by more junior researchers. Furthermore, the senior scientist 
can have a stronger influence on the mediator, i.e., the TTO, which can increase its 
efforts toward technology transfer. The following is therefore predicted: 
Hypothesis 2: Inventions co-invented by senior scientists require less time to 
become licensed compared to inventions invented by junior researchers. 
The ability to appropriate economic returns from innovations is important for 
inventors and innovators, as well as for the whole economy (Harabi, 1995). Next to 
secrecy and lead time advantages, patenting is one possible method for protecting 
inventions and exploiting their returns (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2002). 
Therefore, patented inventions from public research send a strong signal that 
indicates a verified novelty with a high potential usefulness and uniqueness. This 
signal is especially important for potential licensees who are interested in inventions 
that prevent competitors from developing rent-destroying imitations or work-around 
solutions (Shapiro, 2001). For instance, Buenstorf and Geissler (2012) find that 
patented inventions are more likely to be licensed than non-patented ones. 
However, because patent applications require expensive preparations and 
additional time, the technology transfer of patented inventions, which are 
complements to lead-time advantages, are expected to take longer compared to 
non-patented inventions. This conjecture leads to the next testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Patented inventions require more time to become licensed compared 
to non-patented inventions. 
Negotiations for inventions from public research often include only a limited 
number of potential licensees and do not necessarily lead to successful agreements 
for several reasons: the early stage character of academic research (Jensen and 
Thursby, 2001), the issue of information asymmetry between the inventor and the 
potential licensee (Shane, 2002), and the problem of complex and non-codified 
knowledge (Agrawal, 2006). To overcome these problems, firms are often already 
involved during the early stage development process of inventions through 
collaborations and other means (Lowe, 2002). Specifically, collaborative research 
between firms and public research institutes can reduce information asymmetries 
and increase communication, which can foster the generation of commercially 
valuable inventions (Siegel et al., 2003a). Moreover, collaborative research has an 
advantage in that the potential licensee has the option to license the invention. 
Thus, the TTO does not need to search for a potential licensee, which increases the 
speed of technology transfer. The following is therefore expected: 
Hypothesis 4: Inventions from collaborative research require less time to become 
licensed to private-sector firms compared to non-collaborative inventions. 
4.3.2 The Implications of Time-to-licensing 
The emphasis on an innovation’s speed is primarily suited to the rapidly 
changing business environment, the shrinking window for technological exploitation 
due to knowledge spillovers, and rapid technological obsolescence (Markman et al., 
2005). Theoretically, R&D investments and inventions are related to real options, 
where the value is inversely related to time, i.e., reducing time-to-licensing increases 
the value of inventions (McGrath, 1999; Markman et al., 2005). Furthermore, the 
longer technologies are shelved, the larger the risk that substitutes will emerge 
(Agarwal and Gort, 2001). In this regard, the commercial potential for these 
technologies will be lower. At the same time, a faster technology transfer enables 
firms to gain a competitive advantage when developing and introducing a successful 
product or process. Thus, with a faster technology transfer, licensees can increase 
the distance from their competitors, extract more profits, and could develop next 
generation products due to first-mover advantages (Porter, 1980; Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000).
Certainly, speed can also have an adverse effect on the likelihood and extent 
of commercial success. One reason for this adverse effect is that a majority of 
disclosed inventions are at an early stage and the commercialization prospects are 
less than obvious (Jensen and Thursby, 2001). To better evaluate perspectives, 
access to information about the inventions and a structured approach with all 
involved parties is required rather than precipitate action. Nonetheless, consistent 
with the results of Markman et al. (2005), I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 5: Time-to-licensing is negatively related to the likelihood and the extent 
of commercial success. 
4.4 Empirical Context: The Max Planck Society 
To analyze the hypotheses developed above, I use detailed data from the 
Max Planck Society (MPS), Germany's most successful public research 
organization. The MPS is a German research association that was initially founded 
in the year 1911 as the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and adopted its current name in 
1948. The MPS currently consists of 80 research institutes and three additional 
research facilities in Germany that perform basic research. The institutes are 
organized into three sections: (i) the biomedical section; (ii) the chemistry, physics 
and technology section; and (iii) the humanities and social sciences section. 
The MPS is assigned to achieve research excellence, with large research 
projects that require special equipment or extraordinary expenses. Its primary task is 
to complement university research by engaging in large-scale, interdisciplinary, or 
particularly innovative activities in science, (parts of) engineering and the 
humanities. Approximately 80 percent of the MPS’s expenditure is met by public 
funding from the Federal Government and the German States. The remaining 
funding stems from donations, member contributions, and a few funded projects. In 
the period from 2006-2011, the budget of the MPS accounted for 1.3 to 1.4 billion 
EUR per annum.
Before 2002, the inventions by Max Planck researchers were treated 
differently from those created by German university researchers. Max Planck 
researchers, similar to the employees of private-sector firms, are subject to the law 
on employee inventions, according to which the employees must disclose their 
inventions to their employer, who is the legal owner of the intellectual property.30 To 
manage the patent applications and the technology licensing, the MPS established 
one legally independent technology transfer office, the Max Planck Innovation 
GmbH (named Garching Innovation GmbH until 1990), which is responsible for the 
inventions of all of the institutes. Established in 1970, the Max Planck Innovation 
GmbH is co-located with the Society’s central administration in Munich. The patent 
applications are handled in cooperation with external patent attorneys.31 The 
technologies are marketed to domestic and foreign firms, including spin-offs, which 
have been actively supported since the early 1990s. Max Planck Innovation GmbH 
has concluded more than 1,500 license agreements since 1979 (Max Planck 
Innovation, 2007). The accumulated returns from technology transfer activities 
exceeded 200 million EUR, with most of the income resulting from a handful of 
“blockbuster” inventions. In the case of a successful licensing, the academic 
inventors receive 30 per cent of all revenues and the Max Planck Institute that 
                                                
30 In contrast, the so-called “professors’ privilege” guaranteed the university researchers the retention 
of their property rights over their research findings. The professors’ privilege was abolished in 2002 
(see von Proff et al., 2012, for more details).
31 Patent applications are applied in case the invention is patentable and even if no licensee has been 
identified. Thus, the Max Planck Innovation’s patenting policy is comparable to that of MIT (cf. Shane, 
2002). 
employs the researcher receives an additional third. The MPS retains the rest of the 
revenues for financial purposes. 
4.5 Data Description and Empirical Methods 
4.5.1 Data 
The present study is based on information provided by Max Planck 
Innovation GmbH that has been used in earlier works by Buenstorf and Schacht 
(2011) and Buenstorf and Geissler (2012). The dataset consists of all of the 
inventions disclosed by Max Planck researchers from the mid-1960s to 2005. 
Overall 3,012 inventions have been disclosed to the MPS, from which 1,885 resulted 
in a patent application. Information is available regarding the date of disclosure and 
the patent application, the institute that the respective invention belongs to, and 
further invention-specific characteristics such as the involvement of a Max Planck 
director, as well as whether an invention has been licensed or not. Overall, 864 
inventions have been licensed to private-sector firms since the mid-1960s. Because 
a number of inventions are licensed non-exclusively to a multitude of licensees, 
there are in total 1,172 license agreements. For each license agreement, the 
dataset provides additional information on the date of the license agreement and 
(possibly) its termination, as well as all of the amounts of the payments received 
based on the license agreement. 
To minimize right-censoring problems, the sample is restricted to inventions 
that were disclosed in 2004 or earlier while using information for payments up to 
2007. The data are further restricted to inventions that were disclosed in 1980 or 
later for two reasons. First, before 1980, Garching Innovation GmbH not only 
managed the inventions disclosed by Max Planck researchers, but also offered its 
services to external customers, mostly other public research organizations. Second, 
the information regarding the pre-1980 inventions is inferior to that for the later 
inventions. These restrictions lead to a total of 2,376 disclosed inventions, with 773 
of them being licensed with 1,047 license agreements.  
To analyze the commercial success, the sample size is further reduced by 
restricting the analysis to the license agreements that provide for royalty 
payments.32 This restriction is necessary because the commercial success of a 
licensed technology is not directly observable but must be deduced from the 
                                                
32 There are several ways in which licensed inventions generate income, including fixed fees and 
royalty payments. Fixed fees are charged to control for the seriousness of the licensee and include the 
reimbursement of patent and administrative costs. However, only royalty payments directly reflect the 
commercial success of the licensed inventions (cf. Agrawal, 2006). 
incidence of royalty payments. The data includes yearly royalty payments for all 
individual contracts from conclusion to 2007 or prior termination. In total, 731 
contracts provide for royalty payments (with or without additional fixed fees), of 
which 365 (50 percent) have been successfully commercialized. Table 4-1 provides 
an overview of the number of disclosed and licensed inventions from 1980 to 2004, 
as well as the number of license agreements that provide for royalty payments. For 
a number of contracts key information, such as the date of disclosure and the 
licensing date could not be retrieved, yielding a smaller sample size for the 
subsequent empirical analysis. 






















Three dependent variables are used in the subsequent empirical models: 
First, a binary variable denotes whether an invention has been licensed. 
Furthermore, two variables specify the commercial success of the licensed 
inventions. Specifically, a binary variable is constructed indicating whether the 
license agreements lead to positive royalty payments. Moreover, because the data 
includes the yearly payments for all of the individual contracts from conclusion to 
2007 or prior termination, the sum of the discounted payments is used as an 
alternative indicator for commercial success.33 Because the accumulated payments 
for individual license agreements are highly skewed, I employ the natural logarithm 
to normalize it. 
The empirical analysis includes additional information about license 
agreements, inventions and their licensees. The main variable of interest is Time-to-
licensing, which measures the elapsed number of days between the disclosure of an 
invention and the signed licensing contract. To abate concerns regarding non-
                                                
33 Royalty payments are discounted to the base year 2000 and are adjusted to the currency Deutsche 
Mark.
normality, I employ the natural logarithm of this variable. Figure 4-1 depicts the 
natural log of Time-to-licensing for inventions disclosed between 1980 and 2004. 
Note: The graph pictures a histogram of the natural logarithm of the elapsed number of days between 
the disclosure of an invention and the signed licensing contract from 1980 through 2004 for licensed 
inventions. Additionally, a kernel density function is plotted. 
Figure 4-1: Time-to-licensing 
A substantial number of license agreements cover multiple inventions that 
are licensed in the form of a bundle. Lacking more detailed information on the 
individual inventions covered in these bundles, I treat them as separate 
observations in the empirical analysis, dividing the royalty payments (if any) equally 
among the number of bundled inventions. The dummy variable Bundle is 
implemented as a control in the model specifications. Furthermore, the inventions 
are classified according to the section of the MPS from which they originate 
(biomedical section versus chemistry/physics/technology section)34 and whether a 
Max Planck director is among the inventors. The binary variable Biomed captures 
the first distinction. For the latter distinction, the indicator variable Director 
involvement is constructed to identify the inventions by senior researchers.35 The 
year of the invention’s disclosure is captured by the integer variable Disclosure year, 
                                                
34 The humanity section is not taken into account because no inventions are disclosed in this field. 
35 Directors are the top-level researchers employed at the MPS. Depending on its size, each institute 
has between two and twelve directors, who can often be considered to be the star scientists (cf. 











0 2 4 6 8 10
Ln Time-to-licensing
which begins with a zero in 1980. Additionally, the indicator variable Top 5 is 
employed for the 5 most active Max Planck Institutes with regard to disclosures. 
I also employ information about patent applications that are related to 
licensed inventions. To control for patent applications, the indicator variable Patent
is employed. For the subset of inventions that are related to patent applications 
(1,504), further information could be derived from the patent statistics. First, the 
collaborative inventions are identified on the basis of the patent assignments. The 
binary variable Collaboration identifies inventions that are not (exclusively) related to 
the Max Planck Society but are (co-) assigned to a private-sector firm.36
Furthermore, the integer variable Patent family size and a dummy that indicates 
triadic patent applications in the U.S., the EU and Japan (Triade) are employed as 
proxies for the patent quality.37
The binary variable Foreign classifies the licensees into domestic or foreign 
according to their postal address. Thereby, the foreign subsidies located in Germany 
are counted as German licensees. Additionally, the indicator variable Spin-off
divides licensees into spin-offs (i.e., firms started by Max Planck researchers) and 
external licensees using the Max Planck Innovation’s spin-off database. 
Furthermore, the indicator variable Repeat licensee denotes those licensees for 
which the earlier license agreements with the MPS are found. This variable is 
motivated by the conjecture that if the later license agreements are related to the 
earlier ones, their odds of commercialization could be larger due to pre-established 
contacts and accumulated knowledge. To control for the fields of activity (Sectoral 
controls), licensees are classified into five broad branches employing the standard 
industrial classification (SIC) numbers. More precisely, I divide the firms into 
manufacturing, services, and others, whereupon the former is split into chemical 
products, instruments and related products, as well as into other manufacturing 
products and equipment. 
The descriptive statistics and correlations are provided in Tables 4-2 through 
4-5. More precisely, Table 4-2 provides the descriptive statistics for all of the 
disclosed inventions and for the subset of disclosed inventions with patent 
applications that are employed in the subsequent empirical analysis. Table 4-3 
reports the descriptive statistics for the number of licensed inventions providing for 
royalty payments used in the upcoming empirical models. Furthermore, Table 4-4 
and 4-5 report, respectively, the correlation matrixes for all of the disclosed 
                                                
36 This definition of collaborative inventions is very restrictive (cf. Fontana and Geuna, 2009). However, 
no better alternative can be provided due to data limitations.  
37 Patent family size is a widely used and accepted measure of patent quality (see Lanjouw et al., 
1998; Harhoff et al., 2003). 
inventions and for the license agreements providing for royalty payments. The 
highest correlations in both correlation tables show up among the variables Top 5
and Biomed. The correlations for the two independent variables are between 0.3 
and 0.5. However, these correlations turn out to be irrelevant in the subsequent 
analysis. The results are robust to different model specifications, i.e., either 
excluding the variables or taking them separately into the regression models. 
Table 4-2: Descriptive Statistics (Disclosed Inventions), 1980-2004 
All inventions Disclosed inventions with patent application 
Obs. Mean Min Max Obs. Mean Min Max 
Biomed 2,197 0.598 0 1 1,350 0.586 0 1
Director involvement 2,197 0.126 0 1 1,350 0.168 0 1 
Patent 2,197 0.633 0 1
Disclosure year 2,197 14.720 0 24 1,350 14.519 0 24 
Top 5 2,197 0.418 0 1 1,350 0.419 0 1 
Patent family size     1,350 5.354 1 120 
Triade  1,350 0.245 0 1
Collaboration     1,350 0.206 0 1 
Table 4-3: Descriptive Statistics (License Agreements Providing for Royalties), 1980-
2004 
License agreements providing for royalties 
Variables Obs. Mean Min Max
Commercial success 681 0.504 0 1
Ln royalties 681 4.824 0 19.109 
Ln Time-to-licensing 681 6.525 1.343 9.484 
Disclosure year 681 13.419 0 24 
Biomed 681 0.775 0 1
Director involvement 681 0.377 0 1
Patent 681 0.706 0 1
Spin-off 681 0.307 0 1
Foreign 681 0.305 0 1
Bundle 681 0.288 0 1
Top 5 681 0.501 0 1
Repeat licensee 681 0.755 0 1
Table 4-4: Correlation Matrix (Disclosed Inventions) 
2197 observations. Disclosure year Biomed Patent 
Director
inv. Top 5 
Disclosure year 1.000  
Biomed 0.072* 1.000    
Patent 0.003 -0.013 1.000   
Director involvement  0.023 0.166* 0.154* 1.000  
Top 5 -0.048 0.340* -0.001 0.148* 1.000 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.5.3 Empirical Methods 
To analyze the incidence of a licensing event, the appropriate empirical 
method is a Cox proportional hazard model. The advantage of this model, compared 
to other models, is that it takes the occurrence of an event, the right censoring, and 
the elapsed time into account. Time is measured in days, begins with the date of 
disclosure and ends with the day of the initial license agreement.38 If a disclosed 
invention is not licensed, it is treated as censored. The following model is specified: 
(4-1)
where , the hazard function, is the probability that invention j becomes 
licensed at time t + , conditional on not having been licensed at time t and  being 
a short interval of time. To account for the influence of covariates, the hazard 
function is redefined as follows: 
) (4-2)
On the left-hand side of equation (4-2),  represents the hazard rate. The 
baseline hazard function is described by , whereas  indicates the invention-
specific covariates. 
To study the potential influence of time-to-licensing on the respective 
outcomes, I subsequently estimate a set of models where the measures of 
commercial success are regressed on a variety of licensee and technology 
characteristics.39 First, a probit model analyzes the likelihood of commercialization 
success in which the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if positive royalty 
payments are realized and zero otherwise. The model is specified as 
                                                
38 For a few number of inventions, the date of disclosure or license execution could not be identified. 
Moreover, in several cases, a licensing agreement is concluded before the disclosure, mainly because 
of an option to license a nascent technology. These cases are excluded in the subsequent empirical 
models.
39 The commercialization of inventions from public research is a two-stage process. In the first step, 
technologies must be licensed. Because not all inventions are licensed, it is likely that the selection of 
technologies into licensing is not a random process. Because commercial success is only observable 
for a subset of licensed inventions, the results might be biased by using such a non-randomly selected 
sample. However, in the study of Buenstorf and Schacht (2011), the results of the two-stage 
methodology developed by Heckman (1979) reveal that non-random selection into licensing is not of 
major concern in the sample analyzing the commercialization of licensed technologies. 
with
(4-3)
where  takes the value of 1 if firm i successfully commercializes invention 
j, and  is an unobserved or a latent variable. LicTimeij represents the elapsed log 
number of days between the disclosure of invention j and the signed licensing 
contract by firm i; L and T are, respectively, the matrices of licensee- and 
technology-specific characteristics; and  is the error term. Alternatively, tobit 
models are employed in which the accumulated royalty payments are used as the 
dependent variable. The respective model has the following form: 
with
(4-4)
where  takes the values of the latent variable for the positive values and 
zero otherwise. As in equation (4-3), the same explanatory variables enter the 
regression equation. Throughout the analysis, the standard errors are clustered by 
inventions to control for the occurrence of multiple licensing of the same technology. 
4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Speed-related Determinants 
First, I analyze the determinants that can influence the pace by which 
inventions are transferred to the market. The results of the Cox proportional hazard 
models are reported in Table 4-6.40 More precisely, the first two models (Models 1a 
and 1b) in Table 4-6 account for all of the inventions and include invention-specific 
covariates. Specifically, Model 1a includes the indicator variable for the patent 
application, the director involvement, and the technological section to which the 
                                                
40 Additionally, I employed competing risk models following the method of Lunn and McNeil (1995) to 
separate the competing events. More precisely, licensing to foreign versus domestic firms and 
licensing to spin-offs versus external licensees are interpreted as competing events. The results of the 
invention-specific determinants are similar to the outcomes of the Cox proportional hazard model. 
These results are available upon request. 
invention belongs. Model 1b additionally controls for the top 5 institutes and the year 
of disclosure. The last two models (Models 2a and 2b) in Table 4-6 consider a 
subset of patented inventions and include the same invention-specific covariates 
and controls as in Models 1a and 1b. Furthermore, in Model 2b quality measures 
such as the patent family size and the breadth of the patent protection are 
implemented as additional controls. 
Table 4-6: Licensing Hazards (Cox Proportional Hazard Model; Hazard Ratios) 





































Patent family size 1.009** 
(0.004)    
Triade  1.274** 











p>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *; **; and *** denote significance at the 0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 
levels, respectively. 
The regression results in Models 1a and 1b (Table 4-6) identify a strong, 
significant hazard ratio for biomedical inventions. The hazard ratios (larger than one) 
suggest that the biomedical inventions that have not been licensed by a certain time 
have a higher chance of being licensed at the next point in time compared to the 
inventions from the chemistry-physics-technology section. Thus, the inventions from 
the biomedical section require less time to become licensed, which is consistent with 
Hypothesis 1. Models 2a and 2b suggest that the patented biomedical inventions 
require even less time to become licensed compared to the patented inventions 
from the chemical-physics-technology section, which confirms Hypothesis 1. These 
results indicate that the inventions with higher technological and commercial 
opportunities, such as biomedical inventions, require less time to become licensed. 
Furthermore, Models 1a and 1b show that inventions that are co-invented by the 
Max Planck directors are more likely to be licensed at the next point in time 
compared to the inventions generated by junior researchers. To put it differently, the 
hazard ratios that are greater than one imply that director participation reduces the 
time until an invention is licensed to private-sector firms, which is consistent with 
Hypothesis 2. For the subset of patented inventions (Models 2a and 2b), significant 
hazard ratios confirm this result. Thus, the qualitative and reputational effects 
appear to influence the pace of technology transfer. 
With respect to patent protection, the results in Models 1a and 1b do not 
support Hypothesis 3, namely that patented inventions require more time to become 
licensed. Moreover, the results in Models 2a and 2b suggest that collaborative 
inventions require significantly less time to become licensed compared to non-
collaborative inventions, which is consistent with Hypothesis 4. Thus, the 
collaborations between public research institutes and private firms can not only 
reduce any information asymmetries but can also reduce the pace by which the 
inventions are transferred to the market. Finally, two more control variables are 
noteworthy. First, I find that the inventions from the five most active Max Planck 
Institutes with respect to disclosures require significantly more time to become 
licensed compared to the disclosed inventions from the other institutes. Second, 
Model 2b shows that a broad patent protection (Triade) and a larger patent family 
size promote the speed of technology transfer for an invention. Thus, high-quality 
technologies are transferred more quickly to private-sector firms than lower quality 
inventions. 
4.6.2 The Implications of Time-to-licensing 
The second part of the analysis covers the impact of time-to-licensing on 
commercial success. To address this question, two alternative approaches are 
employed, namely probit and tobit models. For each approach, four regression 
models are estimated employing licensing agreements that provide for royalty 
payments. Specifically, Models 3a-3d (Table 4-7) denote probit regressions using a 
binary measure for commercial success as the dependent variable, whereas Models 
4a-4d (Table 4-8) denote tobit regressions employing the natural log of cumulated 
royalty payments. In Tables 4-7 and 4-8, different model specifications are used. 
More precisely, Models 3a and 4a represent the baseline specification with time-to-
licensing as the main variable of interest. In Models 3b and 4b, additional invention-
specific controls are implemented, such as whether the invention has been 
patented, the disclosure year, as well as the section that the invention comes from. 
Furthermore, Models 3c and 4c include licensee-specific controls, such as the type 
of firm and the sectoral controls. Finally, in Models 3d and 4d, the complete set of 
invention- and licensee-specific covariates is integrated. 
The results in Table 4-7 indicate that the logged time-to-licensing does not 
significantly influence the likelihood of commercial success. Significant marginal 
effects are obtained for the patented inventions that are less likely to be 
commercialized than those for which no patent application is documented (Models 
3b and 3d). Thus, licensees appear to obtain a substantial share of licenses for 
strategic reasons such as “shelving,” which is reflected in the reduced 
commercialization rates. Furthermore, the time of disclosure indicates that the more 
recent inventions are less likely to be commercialized than the older ones. This 
finding could reflect some effects of the right-censored nature of the data. However, 
this finding could also indicate a reduced average quality of inventions (cf. Buenstorf 
and Geissler, 2012). Inventions that are licensed as bundles positively influence the 
likelihood of commercial success. This result could be due to the complementary 
character of the licensed inventions, which lead more often to commercial success. 
Finally, the results in Models 3c and 3d suggest that the spin-off licensees are less 
likely to commercialize the scientific inventions compared to the incumbent firms. 
Table 4-7: Likelihood of Commercialization (Probit; Marginal Effects) 
Commercial success Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c Model 3d 























































Pseudo R2 0.003 0.072 0.057 0.111 
Robust standard errors (clustered by invention) in parentheses; *; **; and *** denote significance at the 
0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
To check whether the above findings depend on the choice of the binary 
measure of commercialization success, a set of tobit models are additionally 
estimated (Models 4a-4d in Table 4-8). Models 4a-4d correspond to the previous 
model specifications in Table 4-7. The results in Table 4-8 are qualitatively very 
similar to those obtained before. Overall, I do not find any evidence suggesting that 
the time-to-licensing lowers the likelihood and the extent of commercial success, 
which contradicts Hypothesis 5.41
Table 4-8: Level of Royalty Income (Tobit) 
Ln royalty payments Model 4a Model 4b Model 4c Model 4d 































































Pseudo R2 0.000 0.024 0.020 0.038 
Robust standard errors (clustered by invention) in parentheses; *; **; and *** denote significance at the 
0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
However, the insignificant result of time-to-licensing does not imply that 
speed is unimportant for certain time spans. It could be that speed has become 
more important as the economic environment has changed. For instance, Kessler 
and Chakrabarti (1996) assert that since the 1990s, innovation speed has become 
one of the most important strategic determinants to create and sustain competitive 
advantage. To check this conjecture, I replicate the regression models conducted 
above and include a dummy variable for the inventions disclosed after 1989. 
Furthermore, I integrate an interaction term that effectively separates the additional 
effect of time-to-licensing on inventions that were disclosed between 1990 and 
2004.42 Models 5a-5d (Table 4-9) report the probit regressions, and Models 6a-6d 
(Table 4-10) report the tobit regressions, including the same set of controls as in the 
former regression models. 
                                                
41 In unreported regression models, I experiment with a quadratic measure of time-to-licensing in both 
probit and tobit models. None of these specifications provide significant results. 
42 A Chow test to find whether the particular date causes a break in the coefficients is significant at the 
1 percent level. 
In Models 5a-5d (Table 4-9), a significant positive correlation is obtained for 
the inventions that were disclosed between 1990 and 2004. This result suggests 
that the inventions disclosed after 1989 are more likely to have been 
commercialized than the inventions disclosed before 1990 in cases where the log 
time-to-licensing is close to zero. Because the interaction effect is significantly 
negative, the positive effect of the inventions disclosed after 1989 decreases with 
the rising log time-to-licensing, which is consistent with the conjecture.43 Because 
the interaction effects in the non-linear models can vary for different observations, I 
employ the method of Norton and Wang (2004) to depict the interaction effect as an 
example for Model 5d in Table 4-9. More precisely, Figure 4-2 shows that the 
interaction effect in Model 5d is negative for all observations. In terms of the 
significance of the interaction effect, Figure 4-3 suggests that the interaction term is 
significant for all of the predicted probabilities. 
Table 4-9: Likelihood of Commercialization with Interaction Term (Probit; Marginal 
Effects)
Commercial success Model 5a Model 5b Model 5c Model 5d 



































































Pseudo R2 0.055 0.082 0.095 0.121 
Robust standard errors (clustered by invention) in parentheses; *; **; and *** denote significance at the 
0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
                                                
43 To verify this result, I also employed Cox proportional hazard models to investigate the influence of 
log time-to-licensing on commercial success. Thus, the elapsed time between the initial licensing 
agreement and the first sale is taken into account. The results are quite similar to the corresponding 
probit models with respect to directions and significance levels. The respective results are available 
from the author on request. 
Figure 4-2: Interaction Effects after Probit 
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Furthermore, to check whether the above findings depend on the choice of 
the binary measure of commercialization success, again a set of tobit models are 
estimated (Models 6a-6d in Table 4-10). The results of these models are 
qualitatively very similar to those obtained before and confirm the significant 
negative influence of log time-to-licensing for inventions disclosed after 1989. 
Table 4-10: Level of Royalty Income with Interaction Term (Tobit) 
Ln royalty payments License agreements providing for royalties Model 6a Model 6b Model 6c Model 6d 









































































Pseudo R2 0.021 0.028 0.037 0.042 
Robust standard errors (clustered by invention) in parentheses; *; **; and *** denote significance at the 
0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The regression results in Tables 4-9 and 4-10 could be influenced by 
unobserved heterogeneity. To control for unobserved heterogeneity across 
inventions, the regression models are replicated for the inventions that are licensed 
multiple times, including indicator variables to control for the invention-specific 
effects. This approach is limited to the subset of inventions that were licensed more 
than once. In total, 120 inventions have been licensed multiple times, which leads to 
272 license agreements.44 However, this number of license agreements is restricted 
to the level of commercial success as the dependent variable. In the case of the 
likelihood to commercialize, the majority of observations are dropped due to a non 
variation in the binary outcome variable across the licensees of a single invention. 
                                                
44 For two license agreements, no information is available for time-to-licensing. Thus, 270 license 
agreements are left for robustness checks. 
Thus, I focus on the extent of commercial success employing tobit models with 
invention-specific fixed effects (Table 4-11). Because fixed effects models rely on a 
certain amount of within-group variation, I drop the invention-specific controls and 
include only the licensee controls. 
The regression results in Table 4-11 (Models 7a and 7b) are consistent with 
the results in Table 4-10 with respect to the time-to-licensing. Specifically, I find that 
the inventions disclosed after 1989 generate lower royalty payments with a rising log 
time-to-licensing, which is consistent with prior results. Thus, after controlling for any 
unobserved heterogeneity across inventions, I find strong evidence that the time-to-
licensing is an important determinant for commercial success for the inventions 
disclosed after 1989. This finding implies that the speed of technology transfer has 
become a crucial determinant for commercial success due to the rapidly changing 
business environments and technological obsolescence. 
Table 4-11: Multiple Licenses with Invention-specific Controls (Tobit) 
Ln royalty payments License agreements providing for royalties Model 7a Model 7b 






















Sectoral controls no yes 





Pseudo R2 0.263 0.274 
Robust standard errors (clustered by invention) in parentheses; *; **; and *** denote significance at the 
0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
4.7 Conclusion 
The importance of technology transfer from public research as a key source 
for innovation, and therefore for economic growth and employment in developed 
countries, has increasingly aroused the interest of policy makers and researchers. In 
particular, technology transfer through patenting and licensing is seen as a useful 
tool to encourage innovation. Whereas a multitude of studies investigate the 
technology transfer of inventions and their commercialization process, only a few 
works analyze how the speed by which the inventions are transferred to private-
sector firms is related to their commercial success. 
In this paper, I investigate two questions related to speed. First, I raise the 
question as to which invention-specific determinants influence the time-to-licensing, 
which is defined as the elapsed time between the disclosure of the invention and the 
signed licensing contract. Second, I analyze how the time-to-licensing is related to 
the likelihood and magnitude of commercial success. The regression results reveal 
that the inventions from the biomedical section, the collaborative inventions with 
private-sector firms, and the co-invented inventions with senior scientists (Max 
Planck directors) require less time to become licensed. According to the influence of 
time-to-licensing on commercial success, I do not find significant evidence that time-
to-licensing negatively influences the commercial success of the inventions 
disclosed between 1980 and 2004. However, separating the effect of time-to-
licensing for the inventions disclosed after 1989, I find a significant negative 
influence for the time-to-licensing on the likelihood and extent of commercial 
success. Thus, the regression results partially confirm the findings of Markman et al. 
(2005) and support the conjecture that the speed of technology transfer has become 
an important strategic factor since the 1990s (cf. Kessler and Chakrabarti, 1996). 
The above analysis is characterized by several limitations. First, the findings 
of this study cannot be generalized because the analysis covers only one public 
research organization. However, because the Max Planck Society is one of the most 
important non-university research organizations worldwide, it takes a key position in 
Germany’s public research landscape. Furthermore, the Max Planck Society is one 
of the first public research organizations in Europe to be subject to a Bayh-Dole-like 
IPR regime. Second, it appears plausible that any unobserved heterogeneity could 
influence the regression results. Conducting a robustness check to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity in the licensed inventions does not influence the main 
finding. However, I cannot conclusively rule out this possibility. 
It should be clear that the results of the invention-specific determinants of 
time-to-licensing should not be taken as a request to interfere in the invention 
development process. The results provided in this study should be considered by 
the TTOs, which are responsible for technology transfer and which tend to form the 
link between public research organizations and private-sector firms. Thus, it appears 
plausible that improvements in the TTOs’ organizational routines and procedures 
could facilitate the speed of the technology transfer. A more efficient technology 
transfer has (at least) two advantages. First, from the policy perspective, an efficient 
technology transfer fosters the effective use of scarce public sources. Second, a 
more efficient technology transfer could advance the economic and social benefits 
from basic research. Because the IPR system has recently been adopted by 
German and other European universities, additional studies are required to better 
understand the determinants of time-to-licensing and its influence on commercial 
success. 
5. The Influence of Leadership on Academic 
Scientists’ Propensity to Commercialize Research 
Findings
5.1 Introduction  
To what extent is individual behavior influenced by past behavior within the 
organization? This question has long been the focus of a scholarly debate in various 
disciplines. Previous literature has highlighted that individuals tend to mimic 
successful behavior observed within the organization in order to perform well 
themselves. In doing so, individuals tend to follow the behavior of organization 
leaders and adapt to peers whose behavior is observed to be rewarded. 
Organizational theory postulates that leadership behavior and organizational 
routines have a long-term impact on subsequent behavior because role model 
effects persist over time, leading to a long-term path dependency on organizational 
routines. Existing empirical evidence largely supports this theory by showing that 
organizational leaders or founders influence individual behavior (see, e.g., Johnson, 
2007; Beckman and Burton, 2008; Levy et al. 2011). 
The effects of leadership behavior have been empirically investigated largely 
in the context of private firms, while surprisingly few studies deal with organizational 
influences in academia. The discipline of science has strong institutional norms, 
which guide scientists’ behavior (Merton, 1973; Mitroff, 1974). These norms are 
independent of the organization. For example, “open science” demands that 
scientists and scholars share their results with the global scientific community as 
soon as possible after discovery (Stephan and Levin, 1992). Scientific careers 
depend upon peer recognition (i.e., scientists working in the same field of research 
worldwide). Thus, in academic institutes, the effects of leaders’ and organizational 
peers’ behavior on individual scientists and whether academic scientists adapt to 
past organizational behavior are less clear. 
One of the rare studies that examined peer and leadership effects in 
academia was conducted by Bercovitz and Feldman (2008). By tracking 1,780 
faculty members across 15 matched departments in two medical schools, the study 
found that department members are more likely to participate in invention 
disclosures when the department head is also actively involved in the process. Yet, 
when the scientists switched from one department where the chair was not involved 
in disclosure activities to another department where the chair was actively involved 
in disclosure activities, the department members tended to engage in disclosure 
activities only once. Thus, the study concludes that adaptation to leadership 
behavior is primarily symbolic.
In this study, we extend the research on the effect of leadership in academia. 
By utilizing panel data of invention disclosure activities within the Max Planck 
Society (MPS), a research organization in Germany devoted to basic research, we 
examine the influence of director involvement in disclosures on subsequent 
disclosure activity. In so doing, we utilize the unique structure of the MPS, which has 
independent research institutes that belong to one parent organization. Thus, our 
study is able to analyze leadership (and peer) influence and measure its impact in 
the organizational context. This research is of interest to economists for (at least) 
two reasons. First, from a behavioral economics perspective, this analysis improves 
our understanding of the influence of leadership in academia, and it addresses the 
question of to what extent existing research in organizational theory applies to 
academic institutions. Second, from an innovation economics perspective, our study 
contributes to the understanding of the extent to which organizational behavior may 
impact an individual scientist’s participation in technology transfer. 
For the organizational portion of our study, we chose to examine the MPS 
because the MPS has several attributes that are beneficial to the purpose of our 
study. Most importantly, the MPS is a parent organization, which comprises 80 
autonomous institutes. This organizational structure allows for an analysis of 
institutional commercialization effects because external factors, such as 
organizational research structure or the quality of the technology transfer office, are 
constant across all of the institutes (because research goals set by the MPS apply to 
all of the institutes who share one central technology transfer office). Furthermore, 
the Max Planck Institutes follow the so-called “Harnack principle,” where institutes 
are built solely around the world's leading researchers who are appointed as 
directors of research units. The directors determine their own research subjects, are 
provided with the best working conditions and have free reign in selecting their staff. 
Thus, the MPS is structured as a person-centered research organization. This 
unique structure allows us to analyze the effects of leadership because directors at 
the Max Planck Institutes have similar powers as leading managers in private firms. 
Moreover, generous public funding is provided to the MPS, accounting for 1.3 to 1.4 
billion € per year, so that scientists are not pressured to obtain external funding. 
Our analysis is based on several sources. First, we rely on a dataset 
containing information on inventions disclosed by Max Planck researchers in the 
natural and life sciences from the mid-1960s through 2005. The second dataset 
considers a subset of all disclosed inventions, which have been licensed to private-
sector-firms. 
Our results suggest that director engagement in disclosure activities and the 
amount of royalties received lead to a significant increase in invention disclosures 
the following year. However, these effects disappear when modeling longer time 
lags. Thus, academic scientists mimic successful behavior, but leadership behavior 
does not have long-lasting effects on commercialization behavior in the institute. 
These results are roughly in line with the findings of Bercovitz and Feldman (2008), 
who suggest that adaptation to leadership behavior is opportunistic and symbolic but 
does not have any sustainable effects. We conclude that existing organizational 
theories need to be modified for academic organizations. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 5-2, the 
theoretical background of organizational theory is presented. In section 5-3, we 
describe the organizational structure of the MPS, which represents the 
organizational context of our analysis. The datasets and variables of interest are 
introduced in section 5-4. Section 5-5 describes our empirical research 
methodology, while the results are presented in section 5-6. Finally, we discuss the 
results and conclude the study in section 5-7. 
5.2 The Role of Leadership in Organization 
5.2.1 Leadership Behavior and its Influence on Individual 
Behavior 
When individuals join an organization, they often imitate the behavior of their 
leaders or co-workers. This behavior may, in part, be due to a selection process. 
Individuals may deliberately self-select into organizations where individual behaviors 
and attitudes match the orientation of the parent organization (Sorensen, 2001; 
Duflo and Saez, 2002). Behavioral adaptation to leadership and peer behavior is 
often observed over time; therefore, organizational theory explains that individual 
behavior is influenced by organizations without excluding the potential self-selection 
mechanism. Adaptations due to peer behavior can be seen as a response to 
imperfect information because individuals have insufficient knowledge of the type of 
behavior required to succeed in the organization. Thus, individuals imitate the 
behavior of their more experienced peers (March and Simon, 1958; Williamson, 
1999).
Leaders influence behavior in organizations by serving both as role models 
and by fostering a particular culture (Kogut and Zander, 1996; Levy et al. 2011). By 
serving as role models, organizational leaders signal what type of behavior is 
expected and likely to be rewarded (Schein, 1985; Beckman and Burton, 2008). A 
finding often stressed in experimental psychology in support of the theory that 
leadership behavior serves as a benchmark for individual behavior is that learning 
through identification and induced beliefs is more powerful than attempts to teach 
individuals via incentives or propaganda (Wood and Bandura, 1989). Furthermore, 
given that individual behavior is shaped by the observation and imitation of others in 
social contexts, organization members may find that actions performed by their 
leaders are legitimate and worthy of imitation (Bandura, 1986). Several studies have 
identified adaptation processes for individual behavior empirically. In the context of 
entrepreneurship, Wagner (2004) provides evidence that small, young firms have a 
pronounced share of nascent entrepreneurs, meaning that workers within such firms 
are relatively more likely to become involved in startup endeavors themselves. 
When observing entrepreneurs in young firms at work, the likelihood that the 
employee later becomes an entrepreneur increases significantly. Thus, individuals 
tend to mimic behaviors that have been shown to be successful in the past. When 
individuals recognize what past behaviors were successful, they orient their own 
behavior in past organization routines in order to perform well themselves. 
Moreover, leaders or founders of firms may have a long-lasting imprinting
effect on organizational behavior. Sociological organizational theory emphasizes 
that an organization’s initial structures and routines tend to persist over time 
because the founding team's prior functional experiences and initial organizational 
and functional structures predict subsequent top manager backgrounds and later 
functional structures (Stinchcombe, 1965; Beckman and Burton, 2008). This 
persistence is grounded in the tendency of individuals in organizations to follow 
inherited organizational scripts and routines (Johnson, 2007). Ecologists have 
operationalized the concept of “structural inertia” (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) in 
which persistence is a function of the difficulty of changing course once investments 
have been made in specific organizational technologies and routines. Because of 
the difficulty in changing existing behavioral routines, it is likely that routines will 
persist over time. 
5.2.2 Leadership in Academia 
Traditionally, academic research has often been described as a public good 
that does not deplete when shared with others (Arrow, 1962; Scherer, 1982). The 
public good nature of academic research requires scientists to devote their efforts to 
the growth of the stock of knowledge, which is freely available. Thus, academic 
institutions have operated under Mertonian norms, which emphasize the open 
dissemination of research discovery and the disdain for commercial activity (Nelson, 
2001; Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008). According to Merton’s studies on the sociology 
of science (Merton, 1957; 1973), scientists are described as following a norm of 
“communalism,” meaning that scientists share their discoveries with the scientific 
community for the common good. In doing so, a scientist gains recognition and 
esteem by being the first to communicate discoveries to peers (Stephan and Levin, 
1992).
Despite the potential change in academic values and norms, it is often 
acknowledged that scientific recognition in academia is determined by international 
standards of research evaluation instead of by organization-specific routines. 
Through comparative statistics of research output, such as the Tinbergen list of AA, 
A and B journal rankings of publications in economics, academic scientists are 
evaluated using comparable, international standards. Moreover, the relevance of 
commercializing research output and academic reputation through 
commercialization may depend more on the degree of peer recognition within the 
particular research community than upon institutional colleagues. Therefore, it is 
unclear whether the impact of organizational behavior described above applies to 
academic organizations. 
In universities or public research institutes, the impact of an organization on 
individual behavior usually is measured with regard to peer effects in publication and 
commercialization output. Azoulay et al. (2007) find that scientists are more likely to 
patent their research when their coauthors have patent experience. Further, Stuart 
and Ding (2006) find that scientists who work with peers who are active in the 
commercialization process are more likely to engage in entrepreneurial activity than 
other scientists. Furthermore, several studies validate that royalty shares impact the 
likelihood of disclosure and the licensing activities of scientists (Thursby et al., 2001; 
Jensen et al., 2003; Siegel et al., 2003b).  
In academic organizations and departments, there is typically one director 
who officially leads the department. In light of the aforementioned findings on role 
model effects in private firms, it is likely that similar effects will also be detected in 
academia. Typically, directors of research organizations are prestigious scientists 
who are appointed to be directors as a result of their academic merit. Observing the 
behavior of directors may lead scientists to behave in a similar way. Thus, if the 
chair pursues commercialization, such activity may be seen as legitimate, and 
scientists may follow such paths in the future. Existing evidence of this relationship, 
however, is scarce. By investigating 15 matched departments from two medical 
schools, Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) found that commercial activity, measured by 
disclosures filed, is weakly correlated to previous director involvement with 
commercial disclosures.  
Even though existing evidence hints that an organization’s influence in 
academia is slightly different than its influence in private firms, a comprehensive 
picture of organizational effects does not yet exist. To fill this gap, we analyze the 
extent to which leadership behavior and past organizational performance influence 
individual behavior by examining the commercialization of research results via 
invention disclosures. In so doing, we analyze disclosure behavior at different 
research institutes over time. 
5.3 Organizational Context: The Max Planck Society 
The MPS is a German research association that was initially founded in the 
year 1911 as the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. In 1948, the association adopted its 
current name. The MPS currently consists of 80 research institutes and three 
additional research facilities in Germany that perform basic research. The institutes 
are organized into three sections: (i) the biomedical section, (ii) the chemistry, 
physics and technology section, and (iii) the humanities and social sciences section. 
Within the German public science sector, major science and research 
organizations - namely universities, the MPS, the Helmholtz Association, the 
Fraunhofer Society, and the Leibniz Science Association - serve different functions. 
The Helmholtz Association pursues long-term, applied research objectives, which 
are based primarily in the technical and medical-biological fields with the aim of 
application. The Fraunhofer Society, which undertakes applied research with direct 
utility to public and private enterprises, conducts even more applied research than 
the Helmholtz Association. Both of these organizations generate a large amount of 
funding from contract research, comprising approximately 30 percent of the 
Helmholtz Association’s total funding and approximately 75 percent of the 
Fraunhofer Society’s total budget. The Leibniz Association is almost completely 
publicly funded and is characterized by its close cooperation with universities. As a 
rule, each director of a Leibniz Institute is also an appointed professor at a 
university. Thus, universities and the Leibniz Association often perform joint 
research. The goal of the MPS is to achieve research excellence, with large 
research projects that require special equipment or such high levels of funding that 
they cannot be managed by other higher education institutions. Research within the 
MPS is basic and thought to be internationally competitive. 
MPS institutes are chosen as the organizational context for our study 
because the MPS has four advantages for our purposes. First, the MPS is an 
independent, publicly funded research organization. Approximately 82 percent of the 
MPS’s expenditures are publically funded by the federal government and the 
German states. The remaining funding comes from donations, member 
contributions, and from a few funded projects. Over the last 5 years, the total budget 
of the MPS accounted for 1.3 to 1.4 billion € per annum. Given the generous budget 
and the nature of the funding, the scientists at the MPS hardly face any pressure to 
commercialize their research to attract external sources of funding. 
Second, the MPS Institutes seek research excellence and promote academic 
freedom. Because research at the MPS is mostly basic, and given the Society's 
demand for excellent research, scientists work at the frontiers of research without 
regard to commercial potential. Therefore, MPS research can be described as 
seeking ground-breaking new results, though not necessarily with the goal of 
application. Thus, scientists’ commercialization incentives are hardly affected by the 
research agenda. 
Third, Max Planck researchers share one central technology transfer office 
(TTO), the Max Planck Innovation GmbH, which is responsible for the inventions of 
all the institutes. Established in 1970, Max Planck Innovation GmbH (named 
Garching Innovation GmbH until 1990) is co-located with the Society’s central 
administration in Munich. Staff members of the transfer office regularly visit the 
individual institutes to solicit the disclosure of new inventions. Patent applications 
are handled in cooperation with external patent attorneys. Technologies are 
marketed to domestic and foreign firms, including spin-offs, which have been 
actively supported since the early 1990s. Max Planck Innovation has entered into 
more than 1,500 license agreements since 1979 (Max Planck Innovation, 2007). 
Accumulated returns from technology transfer activities exceed € 200 million, with 
most income resulting from a handful of “blockbuster” inventions. In the case of 
successful licensing, academic inventors receive 30 per cent of all revenue, and the 
particular Max Planck Institute employing the researcher gets an additional third of 
all the income. The MPS obtains the rest of the revenue to finance the technology 
transfer efforts of its TTO. According to German law, inventors must report their 
inventions to their employer if the invention is a result of work outcome (Kilger and 
Bartenbach, 2002). 
Fourth, each institute focuses on a special, specific, statutory task, such as 
researching the structure of matter, the function of the nervous system, or the birth 
and development of stars and galaxies. Although the MPS consists of many different 
institutes, the institutional setting is consistent throughout. All institutes select and 
carry out their research autonomously and independently within the aforementioned 
scope of the MPS. Each institute administers its own budget and is free to set the 
focus of its own research.  
In sum, the consistent structure of the autonomous MPS institutes, which 
belong to one parent organization with one central technology transfer office, allows 
us to analyze scientists’ commercialization behavior.  
5.4 Data and Variables 
We utilize two sources of data to analyze the impact of organizational 
commercialization successes on individual scientists’ commercialization behavior. 
As a first data source, we rely on collected information of all inventions disclosed by 
Max Planck scientists. The second dataset covers a subset of all inventions that 
have been licensed. Details on how we structure this data are provided in the 
following subsection. 
5.4.1 Commercialization Data at the Organizational Level 
Data on commercialization activities by MPS scientists are based on 
information provided by Max Planck Innovation GmbH. This data has also been 
used in previous studies conducted by Buenstorf and Schacht (2011) and Buenstorf 
and Geissler (2012). 
The first dataset contains all inventions disclosed by Max Planck researchers 
from the mid-1960s through 2005. Overall, 3,012 inventions have been disclosed by 
the MPS. The data provide information regarding the date of disclosure and patent 
application, the institute the invention belongs to, invention-specific characteristics, 
such as the involvement of a Max Planck director, and whether an invention has 
been licensed.45
The second dataset involves a subset of 864 inventions, which are licensed 
to private-sector firms. Because a number of inventions are licensed non-exclusively 
to multiple licensees, there are a total of 1,172 license agreements. Whether a 
licensed invention is commercially successful is not directly observable. However, 
as in previous studies (e.g., Agrawal, 2006; Lowe and Ziedonis, 2006), we take into 
account royalty payments as an indirect indicator of commercial success. The data 
include yearly royalty payments (and fixed fees, if any) for all individual contracts 
                                                
45 Note that only two sections are active in disclosures, namely the biomedical and the chemistry, 
physics and technology sections. 
from conclusion until 2007 or a prior termination date. In total, 731 inventions 
provide royalty payments (with or without fixed fees) from which 365 (50 percent) 
have been successfully commercialized. 
For the empirical analysis, we restrict the sample to inventions disclosed in 
2004 or earlier. Moreover, we restrict the sample to inventions disclosed in 1980 or 
later for two reasons: First, before 1980, Max Planck Innovation GmbH was not only 
responsible for inventions from Max Planck researchers, but it also offered its 
services to other public research organizations. Thus, a clear assessment of 
disclosed inventions belonging to Max Planck researchers is not possible. Second, 
information available for the pre-1980 inventions is inferior to the information 
available for later inventions. These restrictions leave us with a total of 2,376 
disclosed inventions. 
We structured the data such that information on royalties, invention 
disclosures, director involvement and fixed fees payments is provided by year and 
by institute. Information on royalty payments and fixed fees are credited to the year 
in which they were paid. In so doing, we constructed a panel for the years 1980-
2004, which allows for the use of time lagged variables. 
5.4.2 Variables of Interest 
Our panel-dataset at the institute level comprises annual variables related to 
commercialization success, measured by royalty payments and fixed fees, and 
invention disclosures. As additional measures, we included institute maturity, size 
and the research section of the respective institute. A detailed description of our 
variables for the panel analysis is provided in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1: Overview of Variables 
Variables Description 
TOTAL DISCit: This variable captures the number of annual invention 
disclosures of institute i in year t.
 
DIRECTOR DISCit (Binary):  A binary variable that denotes whether inventions have a Max 
Planck director among their inventors. 
 
LN ROYALTIESit: The annual royalty payments (normalized to Deutsche Mark 
payments in year 2000) received by institute i in year t. As the 
distribution is highly skewed we employ the natural logarithm of 
this variable 
 
LN FIXED FEESit: This variable identifies annual fixed fee payments to inventors 
(normalized to Deutsche Mark payments in year 2000) received 
by institute i in year t. As the distribution is highly skewed we 
employ the natural logarithm of this variable 
 
BIOMEDi:  In our analysis, we comprise Max Planck Institutes within the 
biomedical section and the chemistry, physics and technology 
section. This binary variable has a value of 1 to indicate that an 
institute belongs to the biomedical section and zero to indicate 
that an institute belongs to the other section. 
 
SIZEi:  The size of an institute i is measured by the number of research 
directors. Because each department is led by one director, the 
number of directors equals the number of departments, 
excluding temporary junior research groups. Because no 
reliable information on the annual number of employees was 
available, the number of directors is the most precise 
information on the size of the institutes. 
 
INST MATURITYit:  This variable captures the age of institutes measured in years. 
Descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 5-2. Furthermore, correlations 
are reported in Table 5-3. The correlations indicate that commercialization activities 
and commercialization success at the institute level correlate in such a way that we 
must carefully account for the possibility of multicollinearity in our study. More 
precisely, in Table 5-3, a multitude of variables are correlated at a very high rate (r > 
0.40). The highest correlation (r = 0.62) between any two independent variables is 
between the indicator of director involvement and the number of scientific 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.5 Econometric Approach 
We utilize our panel data on disclosure activities between 1980 and 2004 to 
examine whether previous director involvement and the magnitude of commercial 
success affect the extent of subsequent disclosure activities. This analysis is 
implemented with a negative binominal regression model, which is used to correct 
for overdispersion. We use negative binominal regressions with fixed effects to 
identify how invention disclosures are related to one-year lagged organizational 
performance measures. This approach is expressed in equation (5-1). 
(5-1)
In equation (5-1), the left-hand side measures the total number of disclosed 
inventions at the institute i at time t. On the right-hand side of equation (5-1), 
represents a matrix of organizational performance measures in the previous time 
period, such as log royalties, fixed fees and an indicator variable for director 
disclosures.  includes institute characteristics such as the research section an 
institute belongs to.  is the unobserved time-invariant individual effect, and  is 
the error term. 
We focus on one-year time lags to analyze the extent to which scientists 
react to recently observed organizational success. Invention disclosures can be 
completed within weeks (or days) when a scientist thinks that his or her research 
outcome is innovative. Thus, to test whether disclosure behavior is related to peer 
effects and commercialization measures, we focus on short time lags. Further, 
because institutional settings and the work force in public research change 
frequently, it is expected that short-term organizational performance measures will 
have a greater influence on the public research outcome. Yet, because we 
acknowledge that the focus on short-term time lags may seem arbitrary, we also 
analyze models with different time lags as robustness checks. 
5.6 Results 
The results of the negative binomial panel regressions with fixed effects are 
reported in Tables 5-4 and 5-5. In the first step, we analyze the impact of leadership 
effects and the extent of commercial successes on the total number of disclosed 
inventions. More precisely, Model 1a includes a one-year lagged binary variable 
indicating whether at least one Max Planck director is listed as an inventor. In Model 
1b, additional control variables such as the size and age of the institute and the 
institutional section are implemented. In Models 2a and 2b, one-year lagged 
commercialization measures are included. Specifically, we employ the logged 
amount of royalties and fixed fees as indicators of commercial success. 
Furthermore, in Model 2b, the full range of controls is implemented. In Model 3a, 
both organizational performance measures are accomplished. Finally, Model 3b 
contains the controls for the institution-specific factors. Additionally, we implement 
the lagged number of scientific disclosures in all regression models to control for 
path dependency.46
Results in Models 1a-1b (Table 5-4) show that the one-year lagged indicator 
of director involvement has a positive and significant influence on the number of 
disclosed inventions, which supports our conjecture of a positive leadership effect. 
Thus, the prior behavior of Max Planck directors who act as role models positively 
affects subsequent disclosure activity. This result remains robust when institute-
specific controls (Model 1b) are included. In Model 2a, the lagged measures of 
commercialization success indicate a significant positive influence on scientific 
disclosures. More precisely, the significant positive influence of the lagged amount 
of royalties and fixed fees suggests that prior commercial successes encourage the 
disclosure of inventions. These results, including the institute controls in Model 2b, 
remain robust. The significant positive influence of organizational leaders and 
royalty payments on invention disclosures is confirmed in Models 3a and 3b, while 
fixed fees do not seem to play an important role. In models with institute-specific 
control variables, the size of the institute has a positive impact on the number of 
disclosed inventions. Furthermore, in all regression models, the lagged number of 
disclosures significantly influences the number of subsequent disclosures, 
suggesting a path dependency of academic disclosure activity. 
                                                
46 In unreported regression results we abstain from the lagged number of scientific disclosures as a 
control for path dependency. The results of the main variables of interest do not change with regard to 
signs and significance levels. The respective results are available from the authors on request. 
Table 5-4: Annual Number of Invention Disclosures - I (Negative Binomial Panel 
Regression) 
TOTAL DISC 
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b 
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Observations 929 929 929 929 929 929 
Number of Institutes 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses; *; **; and *** denote significance at the 0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
To draw a comprehensive picture and reduce the correlation among 
covariates, we employ binary variables next to the indictor of director participation 
for the organizational performance measures (Table 5-5). More precisely, in Models 
5a and 5b, two dummy variables are implemented in place of the magnitude of 
royalties and fixed fees indicating whether revenues have been generated. 
Furthermore, in all six models (Models 4a-6b), we use an indicator variable to 
control for precedent disclosure activity. Again, both baseline models and extended 
models with institutional controls are provided. 
In Models 4a and 4b (Table 5-5), the results reveal evidence that prior 
activity by Max Planck directors positively affects scientific disclosures the following 
year. In the following two models (Models 5a and 5b), the influence of one-year 
lagged organizational performance measures – royalty payments and inventor fixed 
fees – is analyzed. The results suggest that both indicators have a significant 
positive influence on the number of inventions disclosed in the subsequent year. 
This finding suggests that scientists are more inclined to engage in disclosures in 
cases of observable short term commercialization success. Combining all 
organizational performance measures in Models 6a and 6b, the regression results 
suggest that the activity of organizational leaders and the inclusion of royalty 
payments significantly influence scientists’ activities, while the fixed fees have no 
significant impact on invention disclosures. Furthermore, institute size and the 
existence of previous invention disclosures have a positive impact on the number of 
subsequent disclosed inventions. 
Table 5-5: Annual Number of Invention Disclosures - II (Negative Binomial Panel 
Regression) 
TOTAL DISC 
Model 4a Model 4b Model 5a Model 5b Model 6a Model 6b 
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Observations 929 929 929 929 929 929 
Number of Institutes 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses; *; **; and *** denote significance at the 0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
In the previous regressions, we employed lagged organizational performance 
measures to investigate their impact on the total number of disclosed inventions. To 
strengthen our decision to use one-year lagged variables, we experiment with 
different lag structures. Specifically, we use up to five-year lags to exploit their 
relevance on outcome performance.47 Table 5-6 reports regression results for up to 
five-year lags of organizational performance measures. More precisely, Models 7a-
7e investigate the influence of up to five-year lagged organizational performance 
measures on the number of disclosed inventions using negative binomial panel 
regressions with fixed effects. Additionally, we control for the size, age, and section 
of each institute and for the amount of invention disclosures with the corresponding 
lag.
The results in Table 5-6 indicate that we do not have a clear lag structure. 
More precisely, in contrast to the one-year lagged model (Model 7a), none of the 
other models provide a significant influence of director participation on invention 
disclosure. With regard to the commercialization performance measures, only 
Models 7b and 7d provide evidence that the amount of logged commercial 
measures influences disclosure activity. In all of the other models, performance 
measures are insignificant. While the true lead-lag relationship is unknown and may 
                                                
47 The number of lags that can be included in the model is restricted by the size of the dataset because 
any additional lag comes at the cost of a decrease in the number of observations. Hence, we allow for 
detecting the impact of organizational performance measures on the number of disclosed inventions for 
up to five years later but not beyond. 
vary among institutes, the one-year lag seems to be most appropriate for our 
analysis. 
Table 5-6: Lag Structures 
TOTAL DISC 
Model 7a Model 7b Model 7c Model 7d Model 7e 
TOTAL DISCt-1 0.043*** 
(0.009) 
    
    
DIRECTOR DISCt-1 (Binary) 0.217** 
(0.090) 
    
    
LN ROYALTIESt-1 0.029*** 
(0.009) 
    
    
LN FIXED FEESt-1 0.008 
(0.008) 
    
    
TOTAL DISCt-2 0.040*** 
(0.009) 
   
DIRECTOR DISCt-2 (Binary)  0.054 
(0.088) 
   
LN ROYALTIESt-2  0.010 
(0.009) 
   
LN FIXED FEESt-2  0.021*** 
(0.008) 
   
TOTAL DISCt-3   0.023** 
(0.010)   
DIRECTOR DISCt-3 (Binary)   0.009 
(0.092)   
LN ROYALTIESt-3   0.015 
(0.010)   
LN FIXED FEESt-3   0.008 
(0.008)   
TOTAL DISCt-4    0.013 
(0.011)    
DIRECTOR DISCt-4 (Binary)    0.078 
(0.096)    
LN ROYALTIESt-4    0.017* 
(0.010)    
LN FIXED FEESt-4    0.012 
(0.008)    
TOTAL DISCt-5     0.010 
(0.012)     
DIRECTOR DISCt-5 (Binary)     0.074 
(0.098)     
LN ROYALTIESt-5     0.016 
(0.010)     
LN FIXED FEESt-5     0.011 









































Observations 929 858 810 764 718 
Number of Institutes 48 47 46 46 46 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0053 
Standard errors in parentheses; *; **; and *** denote significance at the 0.10; 0.05; and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
5.7 Conclusion 
In the present study we utilize data on the commercialization activities of the 
MPS to investigate organizational effects in academic settings. In so doing, we take 
advantage of the unique structure of the MPS, which has autonomous institutes that 
belong to one parent organization while sharing the same central technology 
transfer office. This specific structure allows for the identification of organizational 
effects. Our results provide two noteworthy conclusions. 
First, leadership behavior has an impact on individual behavior. Director 
involvement in disclosure activities positively relates to subsequent disclosure 
activity the following year. However, this effect disappears when time lags of two or 
more years are used. This finding suggests that academic scientists’ adaptation of 
leadership behavior is rather symbolic. When directors are involved in invention 
disclosures, academic scientists’ disclosure activities increase in the short run, but 
long-term effects are not found. This finding is roughly in line with the finding of 
Bercovitz and Feldmann (2008), who reported evidence that scientists are more 
likely to disclose inventions if the director is involved in invention disclosure, but 
scientists often do so only once.  
Second, scientists’ commercialization activities are significantly related to 
previous commercialization activities and successes - measured in license royalties 
and inventor fixed fees of distinct institutes. However, this effect is only significant at 
the 1 percent level when short-term lags of one year are included. Thus, we 
conclude that scientists react to recently observed organizational success in 
commercialization, which serves as a financial incentive for disclosure activities. 
Moreover, scientists tend to be more inclined to commercialize research when peers 
were successful in commercializing their research in recent years. However, we 
acknowledge that this effect can also be explained by scientific opportunities. 
Chances for commercial success may critically depend on the research agenda as 
some research areas are of high relevance to the private sector. Therefore, one 
could argue that the correlation of disclosure activities of scientists with the same 
indicator in previous years indicates that an institute follows a research program that 
is close to private research. Because both explanations suit our data, we leave the 
question of how to disentangle these potential factors of organizational effects for 
future research. 
In sum, we conclude that the influence of organizations on individual 
behavior in academia can only partially be explained by existing organizational 
theory. Short-term effects of leadership behavior and past organizational 
performance can be explained by role model effects and financial incentives, 
respectively. This is in line with existing organizational theory addressing how 
individuals tend to adapt to behavior that appears worthy of following. The finding 
that these effects disappear when modeling time lags of more than one year are 
considered suggests, however, that long-lasting leadership effects are barely 
detected. Directors in the MPS have a central role in shaping the research agenda. 
If directors do not have a long-lasting effect on scientists’ behavior in the MPS, it is 
likely that such effects are also not found in other academic settings. Thus, we 
conclude that the absence of persistent effects of leadership disclosure activities 
and performance measures address the question of the effectiveness of 
organizational theory to explain the behavior of academic organizations. 
6. Conclusions 
Scholarly literature provides evidence that basic research has a considerable 
impact on economic growth, employment and innovation in industrial countries (e.g., 
Mansfield, 1995; Mansfield and Lee, 1996). Thereby, public research organizations 
(PROs) adopt an important role within the knowledge society and the economy. To 
strengthen the link between PROs and industry and improve the applicability of 
publicly funded research results, policy makers undertake considerable efforts to 
foster formal technology transfer. The Bayh-Dole Act in the U.S. aimed to encourage 
the economic use of scientific inventions. Recently, several national legislations in 
European countries converged toward a Bayh-Dole like regime. For example, in 
Germany, professor’s privilege was abolished in 2002, and universities became 
subject to the Employee’s Invention Act that was already common to private-sector 
firms. This thesis focuses on technology transfer and commercialization of publicly 
funded inventions. This thesis is subdivided into four chapters that analyze the 
influence of certain group constellations among market participants on bargaining 
prices and beliefs (chapter 2), antecedents of commercial success of licensed 
inventions (chapters 3 and 4) and the impact of leadership behavior and 
organization performance on subsequent commercialization behavior in public 
research (chapter 5). The following section discusses the summarized results and 
contributions in each single chapter and highlights directions for further research. 
Chapter 2 considers the impact of group identity on the determination of 
prices and beliefs in a small-market bargaining game. While a growing number of 
studies explore the effect of group identity on individual economic decision making, 
only a few studies investigate the influence of group identity in small market settings 
with more than two interacting parties. The central idea of this study is that common 
experiences may already exist between certain participants at the time of 
negotiation due to prior common collaborations or other former relationships 
(Bercovitz and Feldmann, 2006). However, other participants may not have any 
relation to the in-group and thus belong to the out-group. This scenario is applicable 
to licensing markets that are characterized by small bargaining numbers (Jensen 
and Thursby, 2001). Employing a coordination game to induce group identity and 
conducting a three-person bargaining game with different group constellations, 
chapter 2 provides robust evidence that in-group buyers who compete with out-
group buyers offer significantly more when compared to strangers. However, buyer 
in-group favoritism is not reciprocated from in-group sellers in lower asking prices. 
Thus, in-group favoritism seems to be asymmetric and possibly dependent on the 
market power of the actors. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the influence of geographic distance on the likelihood 
and magnitude of commercial success. The research question considers that most 
of the licensed inventions, characterized by an early stage of development (Jensen 
and Thursby, 2001; Thursby and Thursby, 2004) and highly complex character 
(Agrawal, 2006), require further inventor participation in the development process. 
However, academic scientists are not necessarily poised to cover a large distance 
due to travel expenses (e.g., Beise and Stahl, 1999) and high opportunity costs of 
time (Stephan, 1996), so geographic proximity is expected to foster frequent in 
person interactions and face-to-face contacts. This chapter aims to contribute to the 
few extant empirical studies. A dataset of disclosed and licensed inventions from the 
Max Planck Society (MPS) is employed to analyze the influence of geographic 
distance on commercial success. Utilization of different distance measures the 
regression results suggest that geographic distance is not associated with lower 
commercialization outcomes. A negative association between distance and 
commercialization success is only identified for spin-off licensees located outside 
Germany and for foreign firms within the subsample of inventions with multiple 
licensees. 
Previous studies recognize the importance of speed when products are 
developed and placed into the market. Although speed has a positive impact on 
various outcomes, such as product performance (e.g., Carbonell and Rodriguez, 
2006) and development costs (e.g., Langerak et al., 2010), it is unclear whether the 
speed by which publicly funded inventions are transferred to private-sector firms 
influences commercial success. Chapter 4 analyzes the determinants of time-to-
licensing, defined as the elapsed time between the invention disclosure and the 
signed licensing contract, and its impact on commercial success. More precisely, 
this study analyzes how invention-specific characteristics influence time-to-licensing 
and investigates the impact of time-to-licensing on the likelihood and magnitude of 
commercial success. The primary goal of this chapter is to provide additional 
empirical evidence on the impact of speed on commercial success. Moreover, this 
study contributes to the importance of a more effective technology transfer. The 
results from the utilization of disclosed and licensed inventions from the MPS 
suggest that inventions from the biomedical section, collaborative inventions with 
private-sector firms and inventions co-invented with senior scientists require less 
time to get licensed. Moreover, regression results show that time-to-licensing does 
not influence the commercial success of inventions disclosed between 1980 and 
2004. Kessler and Chakrabarti argue (1996) that since the 1990s, speed has 
become one of the most important strategic determinants to create and sustain 
competitive advantages, and the regression models account for their argument. A 
separation of the effect of time-to-licensing for inventions disclosed after 1989 
provides a robust negative influence of time-to-licensing on the likelihood and extent 
of commercial success. 
Chapter 5 analyzes the impact of leadership behavior and organization 
performance on commercialization behavior. This study focuses on the influence of 
commercial performance and director engagement on subsequent disclosure 
activity. Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) find that the decision of individual faculty 
members to participate in technology transfer is influenced by leadership effects that 
are more symbolic than sustainable. This chapter aims to contribute to the rare 
empirical evidence on leadership effects in academia. Data on disclosed and 
licensed inventions from the MPS are employed to investigate this research 
question. The data are structured to list invention disclosures, director involvement, 
royalty and fixed fee payments per year and institute. The results suggest that 
director engagement in disclosure activity and the amount of royalties received lead 
to a significant increase in invention disclosure in the following year. However, these 
correlations disappear when modeling longer time lags. 
Although this thesis generates new research results and contributes to the 
understanding of technology transfer and commercialization, the present chapters 
are not free of limitations. First, the empirical studies in chapters 3-5 rest upon a 
single organization, the MPS. Other scientific organizations across different 
European countries need to be analyzed to ensure more comprehensive and 
verifiable results. Due to the recent change in European policy, more and more 
PROs are active in technology transfer and commercialization, facilitating access to 
more European data. Second, the empirical analysis considers royalty payments as 
an indicator for commercial success. Although this indicator is frequently used as a 
proxy of the commercial success of licensed inventions, no information is available 
about the details of the licensing contracts. To justify the use of royalty payments, 
additional information about the payment structure is required. Third, the commercial 
success of licensed inventions may be influenced by unobserved determinants for 
which the regression models in this thesis partially do not control for due to data 
restrictions. Although various robustness checks are conducted to confirm the 
results, additional insights might be gained by further analysis of more detailed 
datasets. 
Research on licensing and commercializing academic inventions could 
benefit from a more detailed perspective across different levels of analysis. Current 
research lacks in-depth understanding of the interdependent processes of actors 
and agents involved in technology transfer and commercialization. A recent study 
began a detailed investigation of TTO contributions to university-industry technology 
transfer (Tahvanainen and Hermans, 2011). Most of the studies, however, focus on 
distinct subsystems and neglect multilevel interactions across units. It would be 
beneficial to explore how negotiations between PROs and industry occur and which 
determinants influence the conclusion of license agreements. The policy question of 
how licensees find out about new inventions may be relevant to encourage a more 
efficient technology transfer. These mostly unexplored questions are potential 
avenues for future research. 
A further promising future research path related to commercialization is firm 
surveying. Such studies could better understand the commercialization process of 
licensed inventions. The influence of a firm’s capabilities, knowledge, technological 
relatedness and personnel equipment may be important to successfully 
commercialize scientific inventions. It is necessary to follow the entire development 
process from the initial licensing contract to the successful commercialization to 
understand commercialization procedures. Investor involvement is suggested to be 
beneficial for commercial success (Agrawal, 2006), but we do not know much about 
the extent and the type of involvement or at which development stage participation 
matters most. These areas of research may be an interesting entry point for more 
detailed micro-oriented studies. 
Despite the need for further scholarly work on technology transfer and 
commercialization, this thesis presents several recommendations. The results in 
chapter 3 suggest that licensing to more distant firms is not associated with lower 
commercialization success. Preferential licensing to geographically closely located 
firms to support the local economy may be counterproductive from the societal point 
of view. For example, Belenzon and Schankerman (2009) confirm that universities 
with a strong local development objective generate much less income per license 
compared to universities that do not follow such local strategy. To ensure economic 
growth and wealth, academic inventions should be licensed to the best qualified 
licensees independent of their locations or former relationships. The results in 
chapter 4 provide evidence that the longer a technology (disclosed after 1989) is 
shelved, the lower its likelihood and magnitude of commercial success. The primary 
objective of public investors such as the federal government is to encourage an 
efficient technology transfer and guarantee an effective use of decreasing financial 
sources. For example, to enhance formal technology transfer, the number of high-
skilled employees and the course of internal procedures in TTOs are highly 
important (see Swamidass and Vulasa, 2009). Chapter 5 confirms the result of 
Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) that indicate that leadership effects do not have long-
lasting effects on commercialization behavior. The results propose that existing 
organization theories cannot be transferred one-to-one in academia and need to be 
adjusted. 
Formal technology transfer in the form of patenting and licensing is merely 
one of several options available to exploit PRO research results. However, publicly 
funded research results are of little value for the society until they are successfully 
utilized. To quote Thomas Edison, one of the most famous inventors in our history: 
“The value of an idea lies in the using of it” (Battersby and Grimes, 2010, p. 241). To 
encourage economic development and long-term competitiveness, the direct 
exploitation of research results will remain an important aspect of developed 
economies, as confirmed by the recent IP legislation changes in European 
countries. 
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Appendix
A. Printed Instructions (English Translation) 
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your participation! In this 
experiment financed by the German Research Foundation (DFG) you can earn 
money, depending on your own decisions and the decisions of the other 
participants. It is therefore important to read the instructions carefully! If you have 
any questions at any time during the experiment, please press the “pause” key on 
the keyboard. We will come to you and answer your questions immediately and in 
privacy. Please pose your question quietly. All participants of this experiment 
receive the same printed instructions. Any additional information displayed on your 
screen is only intended for the respective participant. Please do not communicate or 
look at the screen of other participants. If you violate these rules, we are 
unfortunately required to remove you from the experiment. Please switch off your 
mobile phone. 
General schedule: This experiment will take approximately 60 minutes. It consists 
of three parts and a final questionnaire. 
The experiment: 
1. Part: You will take part in a game with two other players. Detailed descriptions 
are displayed on your screen. 
2. Part: The second part is divided into 3 stages.  
In the first stage you will participate in a negotiation game. Two buyers and one 
seller are negotiating for an indivisible good. The roles are matched randomly. The 
task of the seller is to sell the single good and the task of the buyers is to buy the 
indivisible good. Please note that the entity offered can only be bought by one of the 
buyers. A total of 113 Experimental Currency Units (ECUs) are available to each of 
the buyers for the purchase of the good. 
The negotiation process: During the negotiation process, either one of the buyers 
and the seller get into action: the seller will note the minimum price he or she is 
asking for the good from each buyer. At the same time, each buyer notes down his 
or her offer. To determine who will purchase the good, the demand of the seller is 
compared to the respective offers. If both offers do not match the demand of the 
seller, the good will not be sold. In this case, all parties end up with 0 ECU from this 
part of the experiment. If both offers match or exceed the demand of the seller, the 
seller may choose between the two offers. If only one offer matches the demand of 
the seller, the good will automatically be sold to the respective buyer. 
The second and third stage of part 2 will be explained to you during the course of 
the experiment. 
3. Part: The third part concludes the experiment with a lottery choice game and a 
final questionnaire. 
Payment: Show-up fee (2.50€) + profit (in ECUs) from part 1 + profit randomly 
selected from the three stages of part 2 (in ECUs) + profit randomly selected from a 
chosen lottery pair. The conversion rate is 1 ECU = 0.08€. Your earnings will be 
privately paid to you after you fill in the questionnaire. No other participant will know 
how much you have earned. 
Further schedule: After you have read the instructions carefully, please wait for the 
other participants to finish reading, and then start with the computer program on 
your screen. 
Good luck! 
B. Heckman Selection Model 
Commercialization of technologies from public research is a two-stage 
process. Technologies first have to be licensed. The attempt to sell products based 
on the licensed technology then constitutes the second stage, particularly because 
inventions from public research are often embryonic in nature (Jensen and Thursby, 
2001; Agrawal, 2006). Not all inventions from public research are licensed, and 
selection of technologies into licensing is most likely not a random process. It 
therefore seems a valid concern that non-random selection into licensing may lead 
to biased results when the commercialization odds of licensed technologies are 
analyzed.
In this appendix we show that the empirical analysis presented above is not 
invalidated by non-random selection into licensing. For this purpose, the two-stage 
methodology developed by Heckman (1979) is adopted. An equation for selection 
into licensing is estimated first, which then informs the second stage equation 
estimating commercialization outcomes.  
In the first stage, the selection equation predicts the likelihood that an 
invention will be licensed. The underlying selection equation looks as follows: 
 (B-1)
where z are observable variables and v is an unobserved error term. s is 
equal to 1 if an invention has been licensed and commercial success is observable 
and zero otherwise. The prediction from the first stage is used to calculate the 
inverse Mills ratio as . The inverse Mills ratio is then included as an additional 
exogenous variable in the modified version of commercialization equation (3-3):  
(B-2)
For the Heckman model to be consistent, the selection equation must include 
exogenous variables that determine sample selection, i.e. the probability of 
licensing, but do not directly affect the outcome of interest, i.e. successful 
commercialization. Results by Buenstorf and Geissler (2012) indicate that 
technologies (co-) invented by Max Planck directors have higher chances of being 
licensed, while their commercialization odds are not different from other inventions. 
This suggests an impact of reputation effects on the chances of technologies being 
licensed. Second, explanatory variables in the outcome equation should also be 
included in the selection equation provided they are observable. Explanatory 
variables that are not observable in the first stage have to be excluded from the 
selection equation. 
In line with the empirical strategy employed above, two types of models are 
employed to control for selection bias: To investigate the likelihood of commercial 
success we initially employ probit models at both the selection and the outcome 
stages. Subsequently, probit models are employed in the selection stage whereas 
the outcome stage estimates the magnitude of cumulated royalties. 
Results of the selection stage and of the various model specifications for the 
outcome stage are reported in Tables B-1 through B-3. The inverse Mills ratio as an 
additional exogenous variable is not significant in Tables B-2 and B-3. This implies 
that the null hypothesis that both the likelihood and the magnitude of commercial 
success are independent of selection into licensing cannot be rejected throughout. 
Estimations obtained in the outcome models are quite similar to the corresponding 
probit and tobit models with respect to directions and significance levels. 
Table B-1: Selection into Licensing (Probit; Marginal Effects) 
Licensing (All) (Spin-offs) (Externals) 






































Pseudo R2 0.220 0.200 0.107 
Robust standard errors (clustered by invention) in parentheses; *;**; and *** denote significance at the 
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